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Abstract
This work advances a theory about corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to
show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that lead criminal organi-
zations behave, organize, compromise or ﬁght one another. It is my argument that the
propensity of criminal groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal polit-
ical institutions are decentralized because violent criminal organizations are less likely to
be punished. Under decentralized institutional environments, understood here as those
in which diﬀerent levels of government fail to act cohesively as a single decision-making
body, corruption agreements with one government inhibit law enforcement operations
conducted by another. As a result, belligerent criminal organizations that would other-
wise be punished remain untouched. My argument sheds light on why many criminal
organizations are able to operate proﬁtably without major episodes of violence, and illu-
minates the causes of Mexico’s large increases in drug–related violence. A formal model
(Chapter 2), an analytical narrative (Chapter 3), and an empirical test (Chapter 4 and
5) show that Mexican drug traﬃcking organizations increased their propensity to engage
in injurious behavior only recently, responding to incentives set by political decentraliza-
tion that inhibited Mexico’s federal government from controlling the actions of its local
governments, and thus from limiting traﬃcker’s propensity to battle for turf.
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xiiiChapter 1
The Puzzle of Mexico’s Drug War
“Don’t mess with the government. The battle is between us, cowards.”1
At an undetermined time, somewhere in Mexico, a violent war erupted among
drug cartels. Drug lords, who had peacefully conducted operations to introduce cocaine,
and other illegal substances, into the US since the early ﬁfties, started battling for turf.
These wars escalated rapidly. From 2006 to 2010, homicides related to drug traﬃcking
increased an average of 80.47% every year, causing a total of 51,000 casualties by 2011,
and accounting for about 47% of all intentional homicides in Mexico (SNSP, 2011; INEGI,
2011).
Drug–related violence soon became the talk of the town, the favorite puzzle of
academics, and the deﬁning feature of Mexico’s President, Felipe Calder´ on. His govern-
1Message left at Sonora State, December 2009, next to a cooler containing pieces of a dismembered
body (Foro-Nayaritas, 2009). Preliminary investigations identiﬁed the victim as a member of Beltr´ an
Leyva Cartel. The message had been signed by another criminal organization identiﬁed as “The Demons.”
1ment was the ﬁrst to begin tabulating drug–related homicides in 2006 and the one that
embraced a war against drug traﬃcking organizations as its top priority.
The count grew steadily. By 2011, 19 out of the 50 most violent cities in the world
were in Mexico (D´ avila, 2011). Ciudad Juarez, a city of about 1.4 million inhabitants,
located south of Texas, had 2,738 drug–related homicides in 2010 alone (SNSP, 2011), a
homicide rate similar to that of war zones. By 2009, Juarez had been the most violent
city in the world for two consecutive years (D´ avila, 2011).
Government data provided important and vexing information. There were days
when up to 19 homicides could be linked to drug–related activities within a single city.
Such was the case in Chihuahua, a city of 824,000 inhabitants, in June 2010 (Hern´ andez,
2010). Sometimes traﬃckers took breaks from their violent activities. Nobody died in
Chihuahua in June 2007. It seems that traﬃckers did not like to ﬁght in January either,
preferred to murder on weekdays, and sometimes they took days oﬀ. On Christmas Eve,
they rested.Otherwise, December was always the cruelest month of the year. Summers
were good for ﬁghting. Sunday afternoons were mostly calm.
Most homicides took the form of targeted executions (SNSP, 2011). Bodies were
normally discovered late at night, having been dumped into suburban areas or highways
after being killed with high-caliber weapons. The executors were careful to provide ev-
idence of their motives and of their cruelty. The victims were beheaded, dismembered,
hung from bridges, and littered in public places. On occasion, written messages were
strewn amidst the dump heap of bodies, such as: “Zetas [cartel] is here,” “This is what
happens to those that are with La Familia [cartel],” or “Mazatlan [city] has an owner”
(Jimenez, 2010; Milenio-Diario, 2012, 2009). The messages claimed rights over territories,
2sent speciﬁc signals to rival organizations, or blatantly declared that a confrontation was
about to begin. Mexico’s drug war had exploded, a war in which criminal organizations
were killing each other. Implicitly, the federal government became a third actor. “Au-
thorities: The battle is between La Familia and Zetas. Do not take part in it” read a
message left at the state of Michoac´ an in 2009 (El-Universal, 2009).
Outcry arose. Mexican citizens discovered that their cities had turned into battle-
ﬁelds. Their lives were constantly disrupted by criminal violence of every kind. Traﬃckers
were not only killing one another. They were also assassinating journalists, executing
mayors and police oﬃcers, extorting funds from local businesses, and kidnapping Cen-
tral American immigrants. Piles of bodies were found decomposed, in massive graves,
alongside the territories where Mexican drug cartels operated. Small border communities
became ghost towns when people emigrated to other cites of Mexico or outside of Mexico
altogether, for they feared the turf battles that raged among the traﬃckers. Twitter be-
came a depositary of violent stories shared in real-time, many of which were not covered
by the media. Newspaper editors were terriﬁed.
Most pundits tracking homicide-related statistics quickly blamed the Mexican gov-
ernment for the escalation in drug–related violence. They agreed that this exponential
increase in drug–related homicides began in 2006 when President Calder´ on initiated a
war against drug traﬃcking. It was clear that the president had done so thinking that
citizens would support “those who ﬁght the bad guys”. (Osorno, 2009) His critics charged
that he launched the war because “he needed something to legitimize his administration”.
(Osorno, 2009) The legitimation of his administration had suﬀered, due to poor economic
conditions. The President’s hard-fought election, rejected by one party on grounds of
3irregularities, had weakened his popular mandate. The government rejected these cri-
tiques. The oﬀensive against traﬃcking organizations had started in 2006, they claimed,
because organized crime had become increasingly violent, traﬃckers were selling drugs
within Mexico, and criminal organizations were signiﬁcantly impacting the rule of law
in some areas. Criminal organizations were beginning to overpower local police and to
corrupt local politics. They were taking de facto control of some regions. If the federal
government had not done anything about this situation, the government claimed, the
country would have collapsed.
This debate about the drug war continued endlessly. Blame was assigned. Fingers
were pointed. Presidential approval ratings wavered.
Truth is, nobody knew when, why or how all of these problems started.
1.1 A Theory of Political Decentralization and Crim-
inal Violence
As important as drug–related homicides have become for Mexico’s policy agenda, we
know very little of this type of violence, prior to 2006, in its temporal and geographical
patterns. Nobody knows when, where or why drug–related violence ﬁrst escalated. More-
over, nobody knows if this type of violence is a new trend in drug-traﬃcking operations
or if traﬃckers have always killed each other in this way. Nobody knows because nobody
was counting drug–related homicides before 2006.
This dissertation overcomes such omissions in research and seeks to explain pat-
terns of violence. I utilize the tools of social science to nourish our understanding of the
4Mexican drug war. The story begins as drug traﬃckers and politicians share tables at
wedding parties. The story evolves as traﬃckers assassinate ﬁfteen mayors, ten journalists,
and a leading gubernatorial candidate all within the year 2010 alone.
Using Mexico’s drug war as my main case study, I advance a theory about corrup-
tion, criminal organizations, and violence. I show how political institutions set incentives
and constraints that inﬂuence how criminal organizations behave, organize, compromise
or ﬁght one other. I show how political institutions shape illegal activities by analyzing
the way in which they subtly impact the informal rules followed by criminal organizations.
I explore the way in which legal and illegal worlds coexist and interact, while submerged in
a political environment that oﬀers incentives for certain criminal activities and shapes the
way in which criminals organize themselves. The political environment thus establishes
conditions that are conducive to violence.
I argue that we can make sense of criminal violence, with a genuinely political the-
ory of illegal activities, if we study the industrial organization of crime and how criminals
interact, and bargain with each other, under an umbrella of informal rules dictated by
the state. I show that we can understand the conditions that lead criminal groups to
ﬁght one another without assuming that the government can monitor the actions of its
bureaucracy, that enforcing the law is always the right choice, that corruption is detrimen-
tal to state capacity, or that drug traﬃckers are wealthy. These assumptions are wrong
and must be discarded even if they are largely upheld by academic research on the topic.
In my narrative, the government is weak and incohesive. Yet, even while accounting for
these weaknesses, discipline within the system is enforced. My traﬃckers are not always
wealthy nor are they violent; in fact, they sometimes prefer to make less money if they can
5be liberated from a government that may extort their proﬁts. Corruption can sometimes
support the rule of law.
The key ingredient in my theory is decentralization. I deﬁne centralized polit-
ical institutions as those that allow a top-layer of government to have a monopoly on
authority; in other words, such institutions exhibit a monocentric system with a single
decision-making body. (Ostrom et al., 1961; Boettke et al., 2010). A decentralized sys-
tem, on the contrary, will be deﬁned as one that has dispersed decision-making power.
Decisions are made across multiple agencies and across diﬀerent levels of government, each
of which is able to exercise autonomy without regard for the authority of the top-layer.
As such, decentralization connotes many centers of decision-making that may be formally
independent of each other, or may constitute a loose inter-dependent system of relations2.
Decentralization (1) impacts the rules of corruption, (2) impacts the propensity
of competing groups violently to confront one other, and (3) increases their incentives to
arm themselves in order to be protected from potential confrontations.
First, decentralization disperses decision-making power across multiple organiza-
tions and across diﬀerent levels of government, changing the manner in which corruption
occurs. Political centralization allows the top level of the state to have a monopoly on le-
gal authority; it is a monocentric system with a single decision-making body, concentrated
in the hands of the central executive. As a result, while corruption under centralization is
a single-bribe game, decentralization turns corruption into a multiple-bribe game. If law
enforcement can be conducted by many levels of government at the same time, criminal
2Formal rules thus may have little to do with the degree of decentralization. A formal institutional
change, a constitutional amendment or a new piece of legislation may increase or decrease the degree of
decentralization de jure without de facto aﬀecting decision-making power.
6organizations need to bribe many agencies. Decentralization makes corruption relatively
more expensive, when many levels of government are bribed simultaneously, a strategy
that helps the briber to to avoid prosecution.3
Second, decentralized environments increase the propensity of criminal groups to
use violence because the costs of bloodshed are not properly internalized by the central
government. Under centralization, a single government with jurisdiction over the whole
territory is accountable for controlling crime. This single-bribee wants criminal organiza-
tions to operate proﬁtably, without episodes of violence, which could negatively aﬀect its
popularity within the electorate. As a result, any criminal organization that engages in
violent behavior is punished. Under decentralization, governments are only responsible
for maintaining crime controlled within their pre–deﬁned jurisdiction. If a criminal orga-
nization protected by one bribee engages in violent behavior in the jurisdiction of another
bribee, its behavior may go unpunished, because corruption agreements with one gov-
ernment will inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. In other words,
decentralization does not allow a government fully to internalize the costs of violence in
all its jurisdictions and thus reduces the likelihood of punishment4.
Finally, criminal groups have also become prone to violence, as a result of changes
3Common economic predictions, which would imply a reduction in the price of bribes when many
governments compete to attract bribers (i.e. increased corruption demand drives consumer surplus down
when suppliers are limited), only apply under the assumption that bribees are substitute goods, i.e.,
bribing one level of government is enough to avoid prosecution. If bribees are complementary goods,
bribes need to be paid to every level of government, signiﬁcantly increasing the total amount of bribes
paid (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993)
4We can imagine a scenario in which a decentralized government still manages to operate as a central-
ized government, by instituting mechanisms of cooperation between governments that operate as distinct
jurisdictions. For the purpose of my theory, such a situation will be considered an informally centralized
scenario.
7in their internal organization, changes indirectly driven by decentralization. In particular,
decentralization generates incentives for criminal groups to arm themselves in order to
be protected from predatory actions exerted by other criminal groups. Criminal markets
lack a mechanism to enforce, contract, and deter predation (Reuter, 1983). To protect
themselves from predators, and to punish those who violate trade agreements, criminal
groups can commonly choose between two options. Either they may rely on the State,
an external apparatus that will provide them protection as an “outsourcer,” or they may
create their own private army. A private army incurs a cost that criminal organizations
will not pay unless they must. Criminal groups will prefer to outsource protection to
the State in centralized, single-bribe environments because under such circumstances the
government will certainly supply protection. This sanction may ensure that any criminal
organization, that engages in violent or predatory behavior against the government’s allies,
will be punished regardless of the jurisdiction in which the predator operates. However,
as levels of decentralization increase, the government loses its ability to punish in all
jurisdictions and with it, its market advantage as a provider of protection. As a result,
criminals need to create their own“protection departments.” Criminal groups tend to
rely on “protection outsourcing” in centralized environments and on private armies under
decentralized ones.
Furthermore, if decentralization allows many governments to conduct law enforce-
ment in the same jurisdiction, criminal organizations need to bribe many agencies simulta-
neously, making corruption more expensive. The added expense makes it more attractive
to invest in their own private protection, rather paying costly bribes to ineﬃcient protec-
tion providers (Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009). Self-protected criminal organizations
8are also more prone to violence. If protection is outsourced to the state, the use of vio-
lence is limited to defensive actions; however, if the capacity for violence is in the hands
of criminals themselves, arms may be used also for oﬀensive purposes, such as to initiate
predatory behavior.5
1.2 Mexico’s Puzzle
The traditional narrative to explain Mexico’s rise in violence blames recent large increases
in enforcement operations as the main ingredient behind this wave of violence (Aguilar and
Casta˜ neda, 2010; Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009; Maule´ on, 2010b; Osorio, 2011; Lessing, 2012;
Dell, 2011). According to this line of thought, violence between criminal groups remained
until Mexico increased the prosecution of traﬃckers in 2006. When Mr. Calder´ on took
the troops out to ﬁght traﬃckers, mayhem exploded. All of this is true.
Indeed, the traditional narrative is right to point out that it was through the
application of law that Mexican authorities stimulated a breakdown of order. It was when
President Calder´ on took the troops out to ﬁght drug traﬃcking organizations, and when,
due to these enforcement operations, the Mexican state started capturing important drug
lords, that violence increased the most. By killing and imprisoning the heads of criminal
groups, the Mexican state gave rise to criminal groups that lacked leadership. Violence
increased when these criminal organizations, lacking a chief or leader, fractured into cells
5Note that arming makes violence a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Criminals arm themselves fearing that,
without an eﬀective third-party provider of protection, others may engage in predatory behavior against
them. Predatory behavior, which would be impossible without ﬁre power, becomes a possibility once
criminals are armed.
9that violently confronted one another (Rios, 2012).
Confrontations further attracted the attention of the government, increasing the
number of enforcement operations that tried to capture those who were violent, and
triggering even more criminal confrontations. Soon, Mexico found itself locked into a self-
reinforcing violent equilibrium (Rios, 2012). Battles for turf raised the incentives of the
government to prosecute traﬃckers, and prosecution promoted even more confrontations
among criminals. A perfect storm raged and this cycle proved diﬃcult to stop. Crimi-
nal groups had not stopped battling for turf, for they lacked leaders that could establish
agreements with others and institute informal rules conducive to peace among criminals.
Even if leaders emerged, who intended to put a stop to confrontation, they would soon be
captured or killed by Mexican authorities. Mexican authorities continued their prosecu-
tions, because they believed that confrontations between criminals were merely the short
term eﬀect of their enforcement strategy. In the long run,the strategy would fracture
the criminal world, they believed, to the point that criminals would become too weak to
persist.
Yet, the above narrative fails to address some facts that are too often, and too
easily, forgotten: during the nineties, the Mexican state conducted enforcement operations
against drug traﬃcking but, as a result, criminal cells did not violently confront each
other. Instead, during this period, enforcement gave rise to a highly disciplined group
of oligopolistic criminal organizations that operated without major episodes of violence
(Carvajal-D´ avila, 1998; Flores P´ erez, 2009). Violence was virtually absent. Neither of
the above narratives can explain the peaceful conduct, for example, of one notable drug
cartel. When Felix Gallardo, the head of Mexico’s most proﬁtable and large drug cartel,
10was captured in 1989, his organization split peacefully, continuing to operate within their
territories without ﬁghting each other (Blancornelas, 2002; Zepeda, 2007; Cruz, 2009;
Osorno, 2009; P´ erez Varela, 2009). Nor can the existing theories explain why, in contrast,
the 2008 capture of Beltr´ an Leyva, a leader of the Sinaloa cartel, led his organization
to split violently, generating the most cruel and violent battles for turf that Mexico has
ever experienced (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009; Reveles, 2011). Thus, violence has increased
in recent years, by contrast to earlier, even when law enforcement strategy remains the
same.
Academics who have ventured to provide an explanation as to why Mexican crim-
inal organizations seem to be more prone to violent behavior now than before argue that
it was the arrival of Mexico’s opposition parties into power that outweighed incentives
for peace. In particular, the opposition broke a long-standing collusion between two par-
ties: the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI),
the authoritarian and hegemonic ruling party, on the one hand, and drug traﬃckers, on
the other hand, who had maintained peaceful cooperation among drug cartels (Astorga,
1996; Bailey and Godson, 2000; Davis, 2006; Flores P´ erez, 2009; O’Neil, 2009; Astorga
and Shirk, 2010). Corrupt PRI authorities had created a “Pax Maﬁosa” by allowing crim-
inal organizations to engage in illicit drug traﬃcking, in exchange for large bribes. They
stipulated that criminal groups must not ﬁght one another, and they should abstain from
violent behavior and from selling drugs within Mexico (Patenostro, 1995; Valle, 1995;
Andreas, 1998; G´ omez and Fritz, 2005; Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009). Corruption was well
institutionalized. As such, this pact remained a relatively stabilizing force in the coun-
try. This all changed in 2000 when Vicente Fox, a charismatic leader of an opposition
11party, the National Action Party (Partido Acci´ on Nacional, PAN), was elected president
in what many analysts believe to be the ﬁrst truly democratic election in the country
(Resa Nestares, 2001). The rise of opposition parties to power brought about several
changes, among them a dramatic redeﬁnition of the relationship between the government
and criminal organizations. New politicians from opposition parties lacked the experience,
networking and discretionary powers to maintain corrupt pacts. As a result, criminal or-
ganizations gradually broke the long-standing pact by engaging in violent confrontation
against each other.
Important questions may be posed if we may attribute the escalation of drug–
related violence in Mexico to the rise of opposition parties to power. This traditional
narrative makes many problematic assumptions. By arguing that the arrival of PAN
broke the pact, the narrative seems tacitly to imply that PAN authorities were not so
very corrupt. Yet, well known cases of corruption exist within PAN’s ranks, such as
that of Nahum Acosta, the coordinator of the President Vicente Fox agenda, who was
detained in 2005 for holding telephone conversations with drug lords (Hern´ andez, 2012,
p. 425). The assumption that opposition politicians were inexperienced is questionable
and obscures the fact that many of the authorities, who worked within the PRI regime,
adapted to political changes and remained within the system, working as members of PAN
governments (Hern´ andez, 2012). They either shifted party loyalties, to run as members
of opposition parties, or continued in Mexico’s bureaucracy as technocrats, advisers and
professional public servers.
Furthermore, academics have not addressed some counter-examples that disprove
their assumptions. States that had been ruled by the PRI uninterruptedly for more than
12eighty years, such as Tamaulipas,for instance, have experienced much larger episodes of
drug–related violence than states that have been ruled by the PAN since the nineties
such as Guanajuato or Baja California. Current literature is silent as to why, if PAN
took control of the federal government in 2000, violence exploded in certain areas but not
everywhere. Furthermore, if a “Pax Maﬁosa” was so well established during the eight-
ies, when opposition parties had no control over any territory,it is unclear why recorded
instances exist of important criminal disobedience from that period (Astorga, 1996). Ex-
isting accounts also cannot explain why in 1985, when the “Pax Maﬁosa” was at its peak,
members of the Guadalajara cartel assassinated DEA agent Kiki Camarena, triggering
tensions between Mexico and the US. My theory can address these important issues.
It is my theory that we have been unable to understand Mexico’s story of crim-
inal violence because we have wrongly focused our attention on formal institutions and
mechanisms, such as state capacity, judicial institutions and the instability of democrati-
zation processes. Instead, I argue, we must focus on understanding how decentralization
impacted the informal rules under which the state and criminals interact. We have failed
to realize that the core of this story resides in the subtle world of informal rules and
mechanisms, and in the not so subtle ways that decentralization has shaped them.
In this regard, my work builds upon the argument of Snyder and Duran-Martinez
(2009). This argument provides evidence that the decentralization of Mexico’s Attor-
ney General’s Oﬃce (Procuradur´ ıa General de la Rep´ ublica, PGR) changed patterns of
violence in Mexico. In 1996 PGR was formally divided into three sections. Instead of
operating as a single-headed institution, geographical variance in the levels of homicides
increased. This result stems from a fracturing of protection rackets, within Mexico, due
13to formal institutional changes, particularly with respect to how security agencies were
organized. I take this explanation one step forward. My theory shows how decentraliza-
tion can aﬀect criminal behavior, when institutions are transformed not only formally (as
PGR did) but also informally, and by describing the mechanisms that cause violence to
increase, not only to vary, when a state operates within a decentralized environment.
The eﬀects of decentralization in the criminal world results in a radical and fas-
cinating change in the behavior of criminal organizations, a change that speaks directly
to Mexico’s puzzle. In particular, decentralization determines how criminal organizations
will react after they are hit by an external shock. Unexpected enforcement operations,
such as the ones conducted by President Felipe Calder´ on and some of his predecessors,
cause such a shock, I argue, that is followed by violent behavior with higher probability
when criminal organizations operate in a decentralized environment.
Consider the impact of capturing a criminal leader, in deciding the likelihood that
his criminal organization will become violent. Assume that when one organization is left
without a leader, another may decide to take advantage of its weakness and invade it.
Everything else being equal, centralized environments will deter criminal organizations
from invading others and causing violence. As I have described in my theory, criminal
organizations will tend to be unarmed, making belligerence less feasible. Furthermore,
the government will punish violent behavior. A centralized government, predisposed (due
to electoral incentives) towards keeping criminal violence as low as possible, will punish
belligerent criminal organizations independent of the jurisdiction in which these operate.
Those punished will not be able to conduct illegal business, because they will have lost
the favor of a patron for corruption, a central government that cohesively decides who are
14its friends and who are its enemies.
A very diﬀerent situation prevails under decentralization. Criminal organizations
become armed but most importantly, punishment may happen in one jurisdiction and not
in another. Within decentralized environments, belligerent criminal factions will indeed
lose the favor of the government, located in the area in which violent operations take
place, but they may still remain in business under the protection of another government,
responsible for another jurisdiction. The enemies of one section of government may still be
the friends of another section of government. Decentralization makes criminal organiza-
tions prone to split, violently, by providing a diverse pool of potential allies to corruption.
As a result, violent confrontation is less costly and happens with higher probability.
1.3 The Goal of this Work
The most immediate goal of my theory is to explain why Mexican traﬃckers turned
violent, even as other factors would have predicted otherwise. The Mexican state had
systematically improved its ability to prosecute criminals and also made its judicial system
less corrupt and more eﬃcient than ever before (Cornelius and Shirk, 2007; CIDAC, 2011).
Additionally, the demand for drugs, particularly cocaine, had diminished since the late
eighties, reducing the proﬁtability of the drug business (UNODC, 2003, 2011). Some
drugs, like marijuana, had even been legalized, reducing a source of cash ﬂow for small
independent traﬃckers in Mexico (Caulkins et al., 2012; Kilmer et al., 2010).
My overall goal is more ambitious: it is to show that the Mexican case sheds
light on important puzzles within political science. Political science has much to learn
15from Mexican traﬃckers and their reasons for transforming from being secret illegal en-
trepreneurs to becoming warlords. The criminal violence of traﬃckers can improve our
understanding of the impact of political institutions on the creation of political order.
My analytical perspective debunks the idea that violence is the expected outcome
of criminal operations. Violent criminal groups in Mexico are not diﬀerent from other
illegal groups that manage to operate with low levels of violence. Bolivia and Peru produce
marijuana in larger quantities than many Latin American countries and still have among
the lowest murder rates in the region. The Japanese Maﬁa controls the most proﬁtable
market of methamphetamines in Asia without major episodes of violence (Kaplan and
Dubro, 2003; Friman, 2009). Rackets of human traﬃcking in Haiti and Cuba remain
largely paciﬁc even if highly proﬁtable (Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009). Endangered species
are smuggled through Singapore, Manila, Indonesia and Jakarta without confrontations
with poachers (Tagliacozzo, 2009). Bosnia’s sex traﬃcking industry has boomed without
a parallel upsurge in violence (Andreas and Wallman, 2009). Even contemporary African
pirates seem rarely to confront each other (Hebert-Burns, 2002), instead holding a strict
control of the crew just as their eighteenth century fellows did (Thomson, 1996; Leeson,
2007).
My theory directly speaks to all those who study criminal operations and violence,
providing a logic of the conditions under which drug lords may become violent. It is my
claim that the legal and the illegal may coexist in ways that are, more or less, prone
to generate violent conﬂict, depending on the political institutions in which they exist.
My analysis provides tools for academics and policy makers to assess whether criminal
organizations around the world may be heading down a similar path as that of Mexico.
16I contribute to our understanding of violence by showing how decentralization
aﬀects the propensity of groups to confront one other. Academics have long studied the
role that formal rules play in bringing competing groups to commit and to compromise,
avoiding avoid conﬂict.6 but very little is known about the speciﬁc institutions that
promote peaceful agreement or violent confrontation between competing groups.7 The
intention of this work is to ﬁll this gap of knowledge. This work goes into the entrails of
state dynamics, explaining why sometimes institutions lead groups to ﬁght while other
times they do not.
My research delves into this unexplored terrain, anchored in the work of academics
who have pointed to indirect ways in which the state may function as a mediator of
conﬂict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Garﬁnkel, 2004; Powell, 2006; Besley and Persson,
2008). Following in this tradition, I identify a crucial institutional mechanism that aﬀects
the ability of the government to reduce conﬂict among competing criminal groups. Yet,
rather than conﬁning my analysis to formal institutional eﬀects, I argue that completely
to grasp how institutions aﬀect the decisions of actors, we need seriously to consider
the interaction between formal and informal rules and how these informal rules impact
the incentives of groups to organize and interact with one other. My work stands on
the shoulders of Helmke and Levitsky (2006), the academics who changed the scope of
6Ever since Haavelmo (1954) modeled a trade-oﬀ between production and appropriation, a long and
fruitful literature on the incentives for peace/conﬂict has emerged. See Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007);
Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a good summary of the nuances and evolution of this ﬁeld.
7Blattman and Miguel (2010, p.19) discuss this omission, pointing to it as one of the most important
gaps in the current literature on civil wars. A similar claim is endorsed by Bates (2008). Literature on
international relations has accomplished important advances in understanding the propensity for violence
within states (Vasquez, 2009), yet this literature has not permeated the theories of those who study civil
conﬂict.
17comparative research by bringing attention to informal rules. My work walks alongside
that of other young scholars (Tajima, 2010) that underscore informal rules as an important
missing point in conﬂict literature. Informal rules are crucial for my theory because of
the inherent nature of the criminal world. Criminal organizations have little to do with
formal institutions. They are aﬀected by decentralization not in a direct, formal way but
in a nuanced, unoﬃcial fashion.
The theory developed here is not conﬁned to the understanding of criminal vio-
lence. Criminal groups are just one of many forms of non-state actors that operate and
organize under the area of inﬂuence of political institutions. All the dynamics explained
in this theory could be applied to other non-state organized groups, such as multinational
corporations, humanitarian associations, and advocacy organizations. My theory would
predict that the behavior of non–state actors, independent of whether they are criminal
or not, depends on their institutional context. Indeed, evidence shows that at least in
the case of legal transnational organizations, non–state actors clearly adjust, invest and
move according to incentives dictated by the states in which they operate (Lenway and
Murtha, 1998; Spar and Yoﬃe, 1999).
1.4 Testing My Theory
Mexico is a particularly interesting case to which to apply my theory.
The country provides an excellent natural experiment about decentralization and
possesses quite variable patterns of criminal activity. As Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez (2008) has
argued, over the course of the nineties, and the early part of this millennium, the country
18went from being a strongly centralized regime, in which the monopoly of decision-making
lay in the hands of an authoritarian, hegemonic party, to a decentralized regime ruled by
many parties with independent decision-making capacity. Interestingly, decentralization
did not happen homogeneously throughout the country. While some states like Veracruz
are still largely centralized, dominated by a single hegemonic party that controls top and
lower levels of government (i.e. state and municipalities), states like Guerrero are ruled
by diﬀerent parties simultaneously, each one of which makes independent decisions at its
own level of command.8 Mexico’s criminal behavior has also changed, signiﬁcantly, and
has done so with temporal and geographical variance. Criminal violence has increased
largely since 2006, but not homogeneously. Violence has spread in capricious patterns;
for example, there was a three-fold increase in homicide rates in Tijuana in 2008, while
its neighbor state, Baja California Sur, had not a single episode of drug–related homicide
(Rios and Shirk, 2011). Other crimes, such as domestic illicit drug dealing or illegal arms
possession, have also varied broadly in timing and location.
My argument implies that violence will increase when diﬀerent levels of government
have diﬀerent incentives, and thus cannot agree on cohesive punishments to defectors. The
arrival of naive opposition parties is not what causes criminal behavior to change, as others
have argued, but rather the decentralization of the government’s command. My argument
is tested for Mexico’s drug traﬃcking organizations, proving the ﬁrst qualitatively deep
and quantitatively sound explanation of criminal behavior during Mexico’s drug war.
My qualitative evidence of the eﬀects of decentralization, in the behavior of Mex-
8For the purpose of empirical testing, decentralization will be measured yearly at the municipal level
over a period of nineteen years (see Chapter 4 for details), allowing municipalities to change from cen-
tralization to decentralization, or vice versa, every time a new government is elected.
19ico’s drug traﬃcking organization, draws from material that has been patiently assembled
during the last decade, by many ethnographic researchers, from brave journalists (Blan-
cornelas, 2002; G´ omez and Fritz, 2005; Suverza, 2006; Zepeda, 2007; Cruz, 2009; Osorno,
2009; Reveles, 2011; P´ erez Varela, 2009), to social scientists (Astorga, 1996; Grayson,
2010) and consultants (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009). I deconstruct ethnographies and knit
them together again, utilizing a rational framework guided by theory. Many events that
have been traditionally regarded as breakthroughs, in the history of Mexico’s drug traﬃck-
ing industry, are not particularly important to understanding the behavior of criminals.
Our focus on grand events has blurred our ability to recognize real critical junctures.
The assassination of DEA agent Kiki Camarena in 1985, identiﬁed by many as a critical
point in Mexico’s criminal history, (Astorga, 1996; Carvajal-D´ avila, 1998) for example,
is less important to our understanding of criminal behavior than many other seemingly
unrelated institutional changes. I argue that factors de facto contributing to decentraliza-
tion in Mexico’s government are much more important to understanding criminal violence
than the capture of DEA agents and other micro events. Such factors include incremen-
tal victories of opposition parties, at the subnational level, and the approval of national
electoral reforms in 1997.9
I divide Mexico’s drug traﬃcking history into two periods, one characterized by
high levels of centralization and the other characterized by high levels of decentralization.
In my narrative begins in the ﬁfties, the years in which the ﬁrst meaningful operations
of drug cartels in Mexico has been recorded (Cruz, 2009; P´ erez Varela, 2009), and ends
9In the case of Mexico, as I will explain in Chapter 3, democratization was the driving force behind
decentralization; however, this factor may not hold for other cases. According to my theory, a centralized
democracy will generate similar incentives as a centralized autocracy.
20in 1997, the year in which Mexico approved a large electoral reform that allowed for
an increase in opposition victories and thus a more decentralized government (Magaloni,
2006). Decentralization characterized all the years after 1997 until 2010.10
The electoral reforms of 1997 are considered the threshold because in Mexico, de
facto decentralization occurred as a consequence of democratization (Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez,
2008). Mexico had been a federal country since 1917, the year in which its current consti-
tution was approved, but operated as a de facto centralized government due to mechanics
of political advancement. Since 1929, Mexico had been an authoritarian regime without
re-election, and was ruled by a single party lacking opposition. Politicians and bureaucrats
were directly assigned by the central authority and could be removed at will (Centeno,
1994; Langston, 1995). A deﬁance or challenge to the central authority would cancel
any possibility to advance a political career. As a result, local governments were quite
disciplined, following incentives dictated by the center and complied with its will (Wel-
don, 1997). Although the country was a de jure decentralized regime, it was de facto
centralized due to a lack of outside options for politicians and bureaucrats within the
system. Mexico’s top-layer of government had a monopoly on authority and was able
to make decisions as a single body because all local governments depended for their sur-
vival upon the central authority. Outside options opened when, as a result of electoral
reforms, opposition parties began to take oﬃce. Deﬁers could now keep a political career
by joining the opposition parties. Lack of discipline, at lower levels of government, be-
10This division is artiﬁcial. I use it for didactic purposes. It is well accepted among academics in
Mexico that the reforms of 1997 were the beginning of a completely democratic Mexico, one in which the
opposition had a leveraged institutional terrain that allowed it to win elections (Eisenstadt, 1999, 2004;
Lujambio and Segl, 2000). My quantitative test allows for a more detailed distinction of decentralization.
21came increasingly common (Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez, 2008). Governors and local authorities
acquired the possibility to make decisions unilaterally (including decisions that could hurt
the interests of the center) because their careers did not depend on keeping the favor of
the hegemonic party. Indeed, Mexico’s de facto decentralization was driven by increased
electoral competition and, in practice, looks like a multi-party system.
With my analytical narrative in hand, I show that under centralization, Mexico’s
drug traﬃcking organizations react to shocks without violence, while under decentral-
ization, shocks increase the propensity of criminal organizations to split and ﬁght one
another for turf.
When President Calder´ on deployed the troops in Michoc´ an State in December of
2006, with the goal of reducing criminal activities in the state, he expected that criminal
groups would behave just as they had during the previous decade, when the country was
centralized. He expected criminal groups to split non-violently into smaller cells, of re-
duced capacity, that would strictly follow the incentives dictated by the central authority.
It took him by surprise to realize that such was not the case. The animal that Mexico
was ﬁghting had changed in nature and incentives. Criminals were not what they had
been twenty years earlier, because Mexico had changed.
When the Mexican government launched “Operation Condor” in 1977, “an un-
precedented war” to “completely eliminate opium poppy cultivation” [Mexican Federal
Attorney General interviewed by Craig (1980, p. 351)], traﬃcking organizations responded
to these shocks without confronting one another. Instead, they agreed to work in an
oligopolistic fashion and kept conducting business in an organized, unarmed, and rela-
tively peaceful fashion for many years to come. Under centralization shocks, prompted by
22the capture or assassination of criminal leaders, caused internal divisions within criminal
organizations but not violent confrontations. The reason is simple. Mexican traﬃckers
preferred to settle their diﬀerences fast, because large scale violence would have been
punished with disavowal from the government as a whole, inhibiting traﬃckers’ ability
to seal corruption deals, and taking them out of business for good. Because all govern-
ments operated as a single, cohesive entity with similar interests, to break the rules in
one jurisdiction implied disavowal in all jurisdictions, a cost too high to pay.
The state of aﬀairs was quite diﬀerent in 2006. This time, when the army was
deployed to ﬁght an “unprecedented war against drug traﬃcking organizations” (Osorno,
2009) in a decentralized Mexico, enforcement shocks destabilized criminal organizations
and generated large incentives to split. Splitting induced organizations to become vir-
ulently violent. Within decentralized environments, shocks are more likely to trigger
splitting. In such environment, new criminal factions can retain the favor of other gov-
ernments, even if their actions impact another government responsible for another juris-
diction. New and smaller criminal organizations began to emerge all around Mexico. In
just a couple of years, at least four splits occurred (Maule´ on, 2010b), and drug cartels
fractured and battled for turf. Mexico’s drug war had begun. In 2006, unlike in 1977,
shocks driven by unexpected increases in prosecution caused homicide rates to escalate.
Current academics explaining Mexico’s drug war are right to say that the propen-
sity for violence increased when opposition parties took oﬃce. It did. Yet, it only did
so in the cases where opposition parties created heterogeneity among diﬀerent levels of
government. Where the opposition took power extensively, as a solid coalition ruling over
all levels of government, centralization remained in place, maintaining the capacity of
23the state to control criminal violence. Propensity for violence increased only with the
rupture of a system of informal collaboration among diﬀerent levels of government. The
incentives weakened for politicians to collaborate at diﬀerent levels of government due to
their having diﬀerent party labels.
My theory goes a step beyond our current understanding of Mexico’s drug war,
according to which the arrival of opposition parties increased propensities towards violence
per se. What matters is not party aﬃliation but whether decision-makers, at diﬀerent
levels of government, are homogeneously-incentivized so that they may act as a cohesive,
coherent force. Opposition governments can act as cohesively centralized governments,so
long as they operate in jurisdictions where they entirely control law enforcement decisions.
PRI governments can act as decentralized governments if they share jurisdiction with
levels of government ruled by other parties. Indeed, I argue that democratization cannot
explain variation in levels of violence within Mexico because all of Mexico democratized in
unison in 1997. Decentralization can explain this variation. The coherence of enforcement
decisions within a territory varied over time because diﬀerent governments were elected
and ousted at diﬀerent levels also over time.11
This observable implication of my theory may be tested quantitatively, taking
advantage of a particular feature of Mexico’s criminal justice system: crime-dependent
jurisdiction. Mexican federal and local governments share territorial jurisdiction but are
constitutionally responsible for prosecuting diﬀerent crimes. Particularly, only the federal
11For example, a municipality could be centrally commanded when having PAN ruling at the state
and municipal level simultaneously, and could decentralize when, as a result of state elections, a diﬀerent
party was brought into power.
24government is responsible for prosecuting drug traﬃckers.12 Jurisdiction is dictated by
territory and crime rather than only by territory.
Utilizing this unique institutional design, which naturally creates diﬀerentiated in-
centive schemes for diﬀerent levels of government, with respect to enforcing drug–related
laws, I show that homogeneously–incentivized municipalities have lower levels of drug–
related crimes. (Such municipalities are deﬁned as those where diﬀerent levels of gov-
ernment are ruled by the same party). Particularly, I present a duration model, with
time-varying covariates to support my theory. Drug traﬃckers tend to supply local co-
caine markets, more regularly in municipalities where state and local authorities are not
homogeneously–incentivized. Party aﬃliation does not drive this result.
1.5 Outline of this Work
This work comprehends criminal behavior, illegal markets, corruption, and the eﬀect of
enforcement operations, using Mexico as a laboratory. I provide sound evidence that Mex-
ico’s decentralization changed the behavior of criminal organizations, especially behavior
that aﬀected the government, such as domestic drug traﬃcking, criminal violence, and
territorial expansion. The logic can be brieﬂy summarized in a few sentences. Under de-
centralization, local authorities make enforcement decisions independently of other local
authorities and of the federal government. As a result, even criminal groups that defy the
interests of one part of the government have the opportunity to ﬁnd shelter in another
12A reform changed this judicial feature in 2009 (CIDAC, 2011); my quantitative data is from before
the reform.
25part of the government, rather than being punished by the entire government through
cohesive actions. Those defying the rules at one local jurisdiction may remain in business
by setting corruption deals with another local jurisdiction. Decentralization oﬀers op-
portunities for criminal factions to ﬁght each other because belligerent factions, engaging
in violent behavior in one jurisdiction, will be punished in that jurisdiction but not in
those in which they remain paciﬁc. Decentralization allows belligerent violent criminal
organization a chance to survive.
In the following chapters, I will provide full evidence and further explanation for
my theory using Mexico’s drug war as my empirical foundation.
Chapter 2 presents a formal model, in detail, walking the reader through the
eﬀects of political decentralization on criminal violence, highlighting the propensity of
criminal organizations to ﬁght one another. I ﬁrst demonstrate how decentralization
inﬂuences corruption, impacting the utility of diﬀerent levels of government, the quantity
of corruption demanded by criminal organizations, and the value that they get out of
corruption deals.
Then, I show the eﬀects of decentralization on violence propensity, and on the
industrial organization of crime. Finally, I summarize the eﬀects of decentralization by
discussing how it aﬀects security policies, particularly those that generate internal divi-
sions within criminal organizations.
A third chapter presents an analytical narrative, showing the factors that set the
stage for Mexico’s drug war. I identify the two diﬀerent periods of Mexico’s criminal his-
tory and exemplify how political decentralization inﬂuenced incentives of drug traﬃcking
organizations to ﬁght one another. My narrative is based on hundreds of interviews that I
26personally conducted at the border, as well as on academic and journalistic literature. The
level of detail with which corruption is described here is, to the extent of my knowledge,
not matched by any other academic eﬀort.
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence to support my narrative, by testing the
eﬀects of decentralization on criminal behavior and the eﬀect of shocks on the rate of
violent confrontations. In this chapter I use an empirical design to get around the most
pervasive problem faced by quantitative research of criminal organizations: lack of data.
The methodology I adopt relies on stylistic facts about Mexico’s corruption, as well as
on particularities of its legal system, to show that decentralization is strongly correlated
with a lack of control over criminal markets. Using a duration model, I present empirical
evidence, to demonstrate the higher probability that criminal organizations will defy
the government within decentralized municipalities. Evidence is also presented to show
that traﬃcking organizations react diﬀerently to shocks, according to whether or not
the government is decentralized. Within the context of decentralization, shocks increase
the propensity of criminal organizations to be violent; by contrast, within centralization
shocks do not result in violence.
Finally, chapter 5 explains unexpected consequences of Mexico’s drug war: refugees
from drug–related violence have emerged. Patterns of immigration within Mexico, and of
emigration from Mexico to the US, have also changed. This overture to a new research
agenda serves as a teaser for the next generation of researchers. The Conclusion elaborates
further upon these themes.
271.6 A Takeaway Message
As a whole, the following chapters tell the story of Mexico’s drug war–the real one. It
is a story in which criminals are not “primitive (...) [individuals with] little capacity
of self-analysis,” (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 15) or ill-tempered persons that “exploded all of
a sudden to deliver a command for one or ten assassinations” (Ravelo, 2012, p. 15).
In this story, criminals are rational and subject to the expected mistakes that happen,
when information is absent and uncertainty is high. Furthermore, the government makes
mistakes too. Big mistakes. This story tells of a war that exploded right in the hands
of those who mistakenly designed enforcement policies, believing that the result would
be the same as in the old days, when Mexico was centralized. Instead, a group of policy
makers one day woke up to realize they had incited chaos.
Yet above all, this eﬀort must be understood as a cry for political scientists to
address the imperative need in our discipline to improve our understanding, both for the
sake of policy makers and for our own. Our failure to comprehend the incentives cre-
ated by decentralization to increase criminal violence caused 51,000 casualties in Mexico.
Once again, social scientists painfully realized the many unknown and dangerous paths
that ensued from these policies, as well as the impotence of our current theories fully to
comprehend the reality. We failed to note that criminal organizations respond diﬀerently
to enforcement shocks in centralized and decentralized environments. We could not tell
that corruption had changed in Mexico, and that incentives had changed with it. The
missing piece of knowledge was small but dangerous: that the outcome of enforcement
policies depends on the way in which targeted criminal groups are organized, which is
28itself a function of the informal rules under which criminals and governments interact.
The insights in this work have much to oﬀer to policy makers. They contribute to
understanding why similar policies, in this case crackdowns against criminal organizations,
may generate widely diﬀerent outcomes, even if on the surface they have been implemented
similarly.
Indeed, academics have made many advances in understanding the eﬀects of policy.
We used to deﬁne policies as a simple linear mechanism, but now as dynamic processes.
Linear mechanisms can be applied, anywhere indiscriminately, to induce anybody, indef-
initely, to change behavior in a predetermined way. We now know that once policies
are implemented and unleashed, their eﬀects are extremely diﬃcult to predict or control.
Little by little, we have realized that the outcomes of policies depend on their institu-
tional frameworks. The consequences of our previous, less sophisticated understanding of
policies have been dramatic. Textbook solutions, applied to balance of payment crises,
submerged entire regions in economic crisis (Corbo et al., April 1986; Rodrik, 1998). It
was the black decade of Latin America that taught us that policies could not be exported,
without an assessment of market frictions (Easterly et al., 1993; Burki and Perry, 1998;
Bank, 2005; Rodrik, 2006). It was our failure to bring economic growth into Africa, and
the unexpected economic success of East Asia, that made us realize that similar policies
could create diﬀerent incentives, according to internal distributions of wealth and polit-
ical power (Aghevli and Marquez-Ruarte, 1985; Rodrik and Alesina, 1994; Persson and
Tabellini, 1994; Rodrik, April 1995). It was China’s successful economic transition, and
the failure of Russia’s, that showed us that slight changes in the timing of reforms can
deﬁne investment incentives (Sun and Tong, 2003; Lau et al., 2000).
29Much still needs to be done to extract the eﬀects of policies from a vacuum and
to be able fully to understand their consequences. In this work, I will show that Mexico’s
drug war is the eﬀect of policy outcomes, diﬀering according to the type of organization
that they target. Organization matters for policy outcomes. When security policies
are implemented by authorities, which are organized in decentralized agencies or levels
of government, criminal violence rises. In brief, criminal groups are as dangerous as
institutions allow them to be.
30Chapter 2
A Theory of Decentralization and
Criminal Violence1
“It is impossible to move tons of cocaine, launder thousands of million
dollars, and maintain a clandestine organization of several hundred armed
persons without a system of political protection.”2
Criminal groups are what institutions allow them to be. In this chapter, I show
why. Criminals interact and bargain with one another under an umbrella of incentives
dictated by informal rules that are deﬁned by state institutions. This work falls in line
1Thanks to Yinan Yan. It was during those Sundays at Lamont library, and those mornings at Peet’s
coﬀee in Cambridge, that this chapter came alive. Yinan’s friendship and unbounded intellectual curiosity
made this model possible.
2Yolanda Figueroa (1996), assassinated along with her husband and children, after her ﬁrst book on
drug traﬃcking was published in Mexico (N´ ajar, 1996). This phrase was extracted from it, and this
work is a tribute to her and to all the brave journalists without whom this research would not have been
possible.
31with other research in political science. Academic studies have shown that informal rules
can provide governments with a mechanism to induce political order. In the case of the
Ukraine, for example, authorities allow grafting as a prerogative for those who obey the
directives of leaders. Criminal prosecution serves as a potent sanction for those who
disobey and is used selectively to induce order (Darden, 2008). In this chapter, I claim
political decentralization reduces the capacity of the state to promote order by means of
corruption. As a result, criminal groups are less inclined to behave peacefully.
Political institutions set incentives and criminal organizations are not exempt from
their inﬂuence. As any other agent, criminal organizations behave, organize, compromise,
or ﬁght one another according to the constraints that the state imposes on them. Political
institutions shape illegal activities by subtly inﬂuencing the informal rules under which
authorities and criminal organizations interact. These rules, the rules of corruption and
the dynamics of bribing, change the ways in which criminal interact with each other.
Indeed, the legal and the illegal worlds coexist, and have always coexisted; both worlds
lie submerged within a political environment that ultimately exerts a persuasive inﬂuence
upon criminals.
I deﬁne degree of decentralization, here, as the degree to which the government
makes policy decisions as a cohesive, homogeneous decision-making body. Centralized in-
stitutions allow a top-layer of government to have a monopoly on authority (Ostrom et al.,
1961; Boettke et al., 2010). A decentralized system, on the contrary, is characterized by
dispersed decision-making. Multiple agencies, across diﬀerent levels of government, make
policy decisions, each of which operates with autonomy without regard to the author-
ity of the top-layer. As such, decentralization connotes many centers of decision-making
32which could either be formally independent of each other, or just constitute a loose inter-
dependent system of relations.
Note that formal rules may have little to do with degree of decentralization. The
factors that enable a single decision-making body to hold centralized authority vary,
whether they be formal or informal mechanisms. These factors range from the eﬀective
use of force and terror to more nuanced tactics of seduction and persuasion. Iraq in the
1990’s, Uganda under Idi Amin, and the apartheid South Africa are examples of regimes
with centralized internal security apparatuses kept together by the competent and brutal
use of force (Staniland, 2008). Communist Russia provides an example of how centralized
authority can make eﬀective use of selective inducements, like granting nomenklatura use
rights over scarce resources (Nelson, 1997), or allowing access to the underground econ-
omy (Grossman, 1977). Indeed, structural variables may also inﬂuence the government’s
control mechanisms. A homogeneous society with a relatively small ruling elite, for ex-
ample, makes it easier for an authority to operate as a centralized power. Indeed, as these
cases show, centralized formal institutions may keep in place strong informal centraliza-
tion. Even constitutional amendments or new legislation explicitly created to increase (or
decrease) the degree of decentralization may only aﬀect governments de jure, not de facto.
Security policies dictated under centralized or decentralized political environments
aﬀect criminal behavior in diﬀerentiated ways. It is my claim that when centralization is
higher, competing criminal groups commit and compromise to avoid conﬂict, and avoid
violently confronting one another.
In particular, decentralization shapes criminal behavior by (1) aﬀecting how groups
become corrupt, (2) impacting the propensity of competing groups to violently confront
33one another, and (3) increasing their incentives to arm themselves in order to be protected
from potential confrontations.
First, corrupt interactions among criminal organizations and the government change
when centralized institutions replace decentralized institutions. Decentralization disperses
decision-making power across multiple organizations and across diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment, changing the manner in which corruption occurs. Political centralization allows
the state to have a monopoly on authority, to be a monocentric system with a single
decision-making body concentrated in the hands of the central executive. As a result,
while corruption under centralization is a single-bribe game, decentralization turns it into
a multiple-bribe game. If law enforcement can be conducted by many levels of government
at the same time, criminal organizations need to bribe many agencies. Decentralization
makes corruption relatively more expensive when many levels of government need to be
bribed simultaneously in order to avoid prosecution. Decentralization thus hurts criminal
groups by increasing the number of agencies that they need to bribe in order to conduct
illegal operations without uncertainty.
Common economic theories would predict that the price of bribes will be reduced
when many governments compete to attract bribers (i.e. consumer surplus goes down
when suppliers are limited). Such theories only apply under the assumption that bribees
are substitute goods, meaning that bribing at one level of the government is suﬃcient to
obtain the beneﬁts of corruption (e.g. protection against enemies, reduced prosecution,
and so on) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). If bribees are complementary goods, as my work
assumes, criminals need to pay bribes to every level of government, signiﬁcantly increasing
the total number of bribes paid in order fully to beneﬁt from corruption.
34Two additional remarks are noteworthy. First, decentralization increases or de-
creases the utility of authorities depending on whether they are monopolizing the collec-
tion of bribes in centralized settings. Decentralization beneﬁts authorities who operate
at levels of government that do not take part in illegal proﬁts in centralized environ-
ments (see remark 1.1 below). Under centralization, all bribes beneﬁt the group of elite
bureaucrats who direct the central government. Decentralization hurts authorities who
previously monopolized corruption, because they now have to share bribe proﬁts with
other, newly empowered levels of government. Second, because of this scheme of incen-
tives, elite authorities operating in centralized institutions will avoid decentralization, as
much as possible, and will prevent other levels of government from bribing to the extent
of their ability(see remark 1.2).
Decentralized environments also increase the propensity of criminal groups to de-
ploy violence, because the costs of bloodshed are not properly internalized by the central
government (see result 2 below). Under centralization, a single government with juris-
diction over the whole territory is accountable for controlling crime. This single-bribee
intends for criminal organizations to operate proﬁtably, without episodes of violence that
could aﬀect its popularity within the electorate. As a result, any criminal organization
that engages in violent behavior is punished. Under decentralization, governments are
only responsible for controlling crime within their pre-deﬁned jurisdiction. If a criminal
organization that is protected by one bribee engages in violent behavior in the jurisdiction
of another bribee, its behavior will not be punished. Local government has no reason to
prosecute crimes committed in other jurisdictions, even when such violence is perpetrated
by a criminal organization operating in its own jurisdiction. Decentralization does not
35allow a government fully internalize the costs of violence in all jurisdictions. Thus, decen-
tralization reduces the likelihood of punishment in case criminal organizations engage in
violent behavior against one another.3
Finally, criminal groups also become more prone to violence as a result of changes
in their internal organization that are indirectly driven by decentralization (see result 3
below). In particular, decentralization generates incentives for criminal groups to arm
themselves in order to protect their business from predatory actions exerted by other
criminal groups. The logic is simple. Given that criminal markets lack a formal mechanism
to enforce contracts and to deter predation (Reuter, 1983), criminal groups need to protect
themselves if they want to remain in business. I assume that criminals can choose between
relying on the state to protect them or protecting themselves by means of their own
private armies. Note that the state can only provide protection to criminal organizations
by operating coherently. As the logic above indicates, only in such a way can it punish
defectors eﬀectively. Thus, criminal groups will prefer to rely on the government only in
centralized environments. The government then becomes a reliable protector, ensuring
and sanctioning penalties for all violent or predatory behavior, committed by criminals,
against allies of the government. The penalties will apply independently of the predator’s
jurisdiction. Under decentralization, the government lacks the ability to punish in all
jurisdictions and criminals prefer to create their own “protection departments.”
A ﬁnal remark on the interaction between arming and conﬂict propensity is also
3We can imagine a scenario in which a decentralized government still manages to operate as a cen-
tralized government by instituting mechanisms of cooperation between governments operating at distinct
jurisdictions. For the purpose of this theory, I consider this is a centralized scenario, an informally
centralized scenario.
36noteworthy. Because decentralization makes corruption more expensive, it increases the
incentives that criminals have to invest in developing their own private protection, rather
than paying costly bribes to ineﬃcient providers of protection. Self-protected criminal or-
ganizations are more prone to violence, because violence can be used not only defensively,
but also oﬀensively. If protection is outsourced to the state, the use of violence is limited
to defensive actions. The state will defend its allies, reacting with the use of force only
where strictly necessary, but will never engage in oﬀensive operations (e.g. helping their
allies invade the territories of other criminals) if such measures aﬀect its electorate. How-
ever, criminals themselves, given the choice, can use violence for predatory and purely
oﬀensive purposes. As a result, interestingly, when criminals arm themselves, violence
becomes more probable, like a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Without an eﬀective third-party
protector, criminals arm themselves for fear that other criminal groups will engage in
predatory behavior against them. Thus, predatory behavior, which would be impossible
without ﬁrearms, becomes a real possibility once criminals are armed.
In the following sections, I walk the reader through my formal model. I portray
a simple world with two levels of government, that is, a top-level that operates in all
jurisdictions, and lower-level governments operating in one of two jurisdictions. The
model also portrays two criminal organizations, each one proﬁting from illegal operations
that can be conducted in one or two jurisdictions. All agents maximize utility.
Throughout this work, institutions are assumed to be exogenous, meaning that
criminal groups cannot shape state institutions to their liking. An important extension
of the present work would be a dynamic model in which institutions are endogenous and
criminal groups can avoid decentralization in order to keep bribes aﬀordable.
37The government’s utility increases through obtaining bribes and by maintaining
an intact political reputation. Bribes are given by criminal groups. The government’s
political reputation is damaged when citizens feel insecure in jurisdictions for which the
government has responsibility. The government may imprison criminals to increase the
security of citizens, or allow criminals to operate in exchange for bribes. All governments
can operate in a centralized or decentralized manner. Centralized government works in
such a way that the top-level makes all security policy decisions, while lower-levels follow
the incentives dictated by the central authority. Decentralized government engages in
corruption deals independently, making security decisions that impact only their own
jurisdiction. I assume that bribes given to diﬀerent levels of governments are partial
complements, that is, criminals need to bribe all governments operating in a jurisdiction
in order to operate in such an area without being prosecuted.
In this world, criminals only care about proﬁts and freedom. The utility of crim-
inals increases when illegal proﬁts are large (i.e. revenue is large and bribes are small)
and when they are not imprisoned due to the government’s prosecution. A prosecuted
criminal makes no proﬁts. I assume that criminal organizations can operate without af-
fecting citizens’ perception of security if they do not violently ﬁght for turf. Criminals
may operate peacefully “under the radar,” making illegal proﬁts in their jurisdictions, or
may they may operate violently, battling for turf in an eﬀort to conquer the territories of
other criminal organizations. I also assume that turf battles aﬀect only citizens living in
the disputed area.
In the following three sections, I describe the equilibrium that emerges when gov-
ernment and criminals interact in the world described above, and what this tells us about
38corruption, violence and criminal behavior. A ﬁrst section develops a model of how de-
centralization inﬂuences the demand for bribes and their price. A second section shows
the eﬀects of decentralization on the propensity of criminal groups violently to confront
one another. A third section shows the eﬀects of decentralization on the organization of
crime, particularly the propensity of criminals to arm themselves. Finally, a concluding
section summarizes the results of my model and provides examples of how this model
can be used to explain outcomes outside the criminal world. Each section explains the
contribution of my results to the literature and provides supporting empirical evidence
from a variety of ﬁelds and geographical regions. Sections in italics can be skipped by
readers not interested in formal modeling.
2.1 The Eﬀects of the Decentralization of Corrup-
tion.
The degree to which the state can make policy decisions as a cohesive, homogeneous
decision-making body signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the incentives of agents. Extensive liter-
ature has shown that decentralized decision-making shapes state features, such as the
relative bargaining power of bureaucrats versus the state (Huber and Shipan, 2002), the
incentives of authorities to pursue economic growth (Prud’Homme, 1995; Persson and
Tabellini, 2004; Rodrik, 1999; Ross, 2006; Mulligan et al., 2004), and patterns of political
contestation (Gibson, 2004). Decentralization has been identiﬁed as the driver of a range
of distinct reactions (Treisman, 2007), from the devolution of power from military author-
ities to civilian party politicians in Brazil, to the creation of particular electoral rules in
39Venezuela and Mexico (Gibson, 2004; D´ ıaz-Cayeros, 2004). It was centralized command
that allowed informal rules of leader selection in Mexico to be sustainable (Langston,
2002). Underground ﬁnancial institutions in Russia were kept functional partly due to
centralized decision making (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006), and the same can be said of
corruption protocols in China (Johnston, 2005).
Directly addressing this literature, and using models of competitive corruption
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Waller et al., 2002) as my base, I contribute to our under-
standing of criminal behavior by identifying how decentralization impacts the informal
rules for interactions between governments and criminals. In this section I present a
formal model to explain how political decentralization inﬂuences corruption.
Following seminal works on illegal actions within the state (Nye, 1967), I deﬁne
corruption as any behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a public role in order
to access private-regarding pecuniary gains4. Yet, I deviate from most current litera-
ture on corruption. Rather than examining the role of decentralization in promoting
opportunities for corruption (Scott, 1969; Shefter, 1978; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Persson
and Tabellini, 1999; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson et al., 2003; Pereira
et al., 2009; Rehren, 2009),I address the ways that decentralization shapes the forms that
corruption takes.
Let’s begin by exploring the form that corruption takes in centralized versus de-
centralized environments. The model provides three insights:
Result 1: Decentralization increases the total demand for bribes, and the total money
4For simplicity, we can think of a prototypical corruption activity as the sale of protection or permits
to allow criminal organizations to operate monopolistically over a deﬁned territory.
40that criminal groups need to pay to avoid prosecution.
Remark 1.1: Decentralization reduces top-level government’s utility by decreasing its
capacity to collect bribes
Remark 1.2: The size of lower-level bribes is determined by the capacity of the top-level
government to punish lower-level governments.
Consider a government of two levels: a single top level of government G with juris-
diction over the whole national territory, and many lower-level governments gi, where i is
one of n ∈ N jurisdictions. The two levels of government may interact in a centralized or
decentralized political system. Under centralized institutions, the center has the monopoly
of authority and can punish lower levels of government. Under a decentralized politi-
cal system, authority is dispersed and lower levels of government can act independently
without fearing punishment from the top layer.
Criminal groups buy permits from the government for personal gain in the form
of illegal revenues. Accessing illegal revenues α depends on paying bribes B ∈ [0,∞) to
obtain permits from the central government, or bribes bi ∈ [0,∞).
Top and lower-level governments set B and b respectively, to maximize their utility
considering the cost of not-enforcement k > 0. We can think of k as normative costs,
such as reputation and honor, or as more tangible costs, such as reduction in votes due
to public opinion scandals. For simplicity, I will refer to k as the value of votes. Utility
41for governments can be thought as:
UG = (B − kG)Q (2.1)
Ugi = (bi − kgi)qi (2.2)
where Q ∈ [0,∞) and q ∈ [0,∞) are twice diﬀerentiable functions showing the total
amount of corruption that criminal groups will demand. Demand for corruption will be
given by:
Q = α − 2B − 2b
qi = αi − 2bi
Note that by deﬁnition lower-level bribes are complementary to top-level bribes.
Because top and lower-levels of government operate in the same jurisdiction, I assume that
criminals who want to operate at the top-level will need to bribe all levels of government.
The demand for top-level bribes thus decreases as b increases. For simplicity, I assume
that criminal groups who want to operate only at the lower-level do not have to bribe the
top-level of government. The demand for bribes at the lower-level is not impacted by the
prices of bribes at the top-level.
First, consider the case in which political institutions are centralized, such that
only top-level government makes security decisions and thus charges bribes. The center
has a monopoly of authority which gives it the capability of selecting Bc, where c indicates
results for (c)centralized political institutions. Top level politicians decide the price of
42bribes solving a standard monopolist proﬁt maximization problem:
maxB(B − kG)Q
Solving the ﬁrst order condition and assuming ki = kB = k 5 yields, in equilibrium,


















In centralized settings, increases in the revenue of criminals (α), and in the value
of votes (k) will increase the price of bribes. Bribes need to be larger when votes are


















Second, consider now the case in which political institutions are decentralized. The
5Modeling diﬀerentiated costs do not aﬀect the results of the model signiﬁcantly
43two levels of government independently decide on B and bi within their own jurisdictions.
Because each level of government ignores the price of bribes that the other level of gov-
ernment imposes, they maximize a la Bertrand, according to the interception of their best
































where the subscript d refers to results under (d)centralized government.






















Result 1: Decentralization increases the demand for bribes, and the total money that
criminal groups need to pay to avoid prosecution.
Yet, even if the total amount of money that criminals pay increases, that does
44not mean that all levels of government increase their utility. Actually, while top-level
governments are hurt by decentralization, lower-level governments beneﬁt from it.
Remark 1.1: Decentralization reduces the top-level government’s utility by decreasing
its capacity to collect bribes.
Proof: When going from centralization to decentralization, the utility of lower and top-level

























Indeed, it is not surprising that top-level governments will try to avoid decentral-
ization as much as possible.
Consider that decentralization may be avoided if top-level governments sanction
lower-level governments, such that only if the monitoring capacity of the center is imperfect
or the punishment is weak, lower-level governments will take bribes. Assume that the
center has the capacity to invest in monitoring capacity such that with probability p ∈ [0,1]
local politicians supplying local bribes will be caught and punished. If caught, lower-level
politicians are punished with ψ ≥ 0. Assume ψ is a twice diﬀerentiable function increasing
in b. We can think of ψ as ﬁnes or as more intangible punishments such as decreased
chances of career advancement.
Local politicians will select the price b according to maximizing expected proﬁts.
Expected proﬁts are given by bribes proﬁts (b−kb) with probability (1−p), and punishment
45(ψ) with probability p. In formal terms, lower-level governments maximize:
maxb(1 − p)(b − kb)q − p(ψ)
Independently of the value of ψ, the ﬁrst order condition shows that the optimal






where ψ′ refers to the ﬁrst derivative of ψ with respect to b. Note that the degree of pun-
ishment ψ determines whether lower-level corruption falls between one of the two possible
above described scenarios b∗(p,ψ) = [0,bd].
Remark 1.2: The size of lower-level bribes is determined by the capacity of the top-level
government to punish lower-level governments.
Proof: The top-layer of government can set an incentive compatibility constraint that
makes lower-level politicians indiﬀerent about charging bribes, and that allows the top-







In equilibrium, the degree of centralization will be determined by the relationship
between the left-hand side term and the beneﬁts that top-level politicians get out of forc-
ing centralization. As ψ diminishes, the investment in monitoring needs to be larger,
46increasing the cost of centralizing. As p decreases, the results increasingly tend towards
decentralized outcomes. Note that, given Remark 1.2 above, we know that the maximum
that the central government will be willing to invest in enforcement will be given by Uc
G−Ud
G
the diﬀerence between the utility that the center was getting under centralization versus
what it gets under decentralization.
Overall, the model above shows that decentralization inﬂuences corruption by (Re-
sult 1) increasing the total demand for bribes and total money that criminal groups need
to pay to avoid prosecution, by (Remark 1.1) reducing the capacity of the central govern-
ment to collect bribes, and by (Remark 1.2) determining the size of lower-level bribes.
Institutional centralization allows the state to have a monopoly on corruption
decisions; in this context, it is a monocentric corrupted system with a single decision-
making body concentrated in the hands of the central commander. Decentralization
disperses decision-making power across multiple organizations and across diﬀerent levels
of government, altering the corruption game. Thus, while centralized systems develop
corruption mechanisms that are centrally regulated, and that respond to the incentives
dictated by a single-decision maker, corruption under decentralization is dictated by the
incentives of many diﬀerent decision-makers, many of whom have diﬀerent preferences.
Centralized corruption agreements are cohesive, and align with the incentives and rules
dictated by a single-decision maker. It is the central authority, who, for example, decides
the type and quantity of illegal services. 6 Decentralized corruption agreements have an
6For simplicity, this model assumes that corruption agreements under centralization are explicitly done
by a single and unique group of individuals operating at the center. Such types of corruption –as this
model has also shown– may be unfeasible in circumstances in which it is costly to monitor the actions of
47entirely diﬀerent dynamic. Bribes are taken by multiple levels of governments, each of
which acts independently, following its own incentives and motivations.
As a result, decentralization negatively impacts criminal organizations and central
governments, and positively impacts lower-level governments. Criminals, who used to
pay bribes for protection to a cohesively-incentivized government bureaucracy, now need
to pay diﬀerent agencies simultaneously and satisfy all bribees’ preferences in order to
get full protection. Corruption deals become more expensive in the sense that deals that
previously ensured protection for criminals from the government as a whole, in all juris-
dictions, now only secure them protection from a government ruling over a jurisdiction.
If jurisdictions overlap, criminals need to pay more than one bribe simultaneously. Crim-
inals may end up paying many more bribes just to achieve a similar level of impunity.
The central government is also negatively impacted by decentralization, mostly because
its role changes from “monopolistic bribee,” to “Cournot-competitor bribee.” Indeed, de-
centralization reduces proﬁts for those who previously monopolized corruption and who
now need to share proﬁts with other levels of government. On the contrary, lower-levels
of government beneﬁt from decentralization. They change from being passive observers
other individuals. Yet, centralized corruption can be enforced without monitoring, using more indirect
or subtle mechanisms. Self-enforced incentives and informal rules can ensure that corruption agreements
made by many individuals operating in diﬀerent jurisdictions follow the preferences of individuals oper-
ating at the center. Consider, for example, corruption mechanisms in Russia’s medical system (Johnston,
2005). Even if corruption agreements were made by doctors and patients operating in their own jurisdic-
tion, and at the bottom of state’s hierarchy, corruption deals respected the will and followed the incentives
of Russia’s centrally commanded government. For example, corruption agreements never disrupted the
basic operation of the medical system, and a share of the bribes collected at the bottom was given to
upper-level hierarchies. Centralized corruption did not need to be enforced via strong monitoring and
punishment because medical practice was ultimately commanded by the center. It was the center that
made decisions about medical careers. Defying the center’s preferences would cause doctors to lose the
favor of the Russian government and thus all possibilities for practicing medicine in the country
48of corruption -who could be punished by the center if they engaged in corruption deals–
to active proﬁt makers.
An empirical implication of my model on corruption mechanics is that as institu-
tions become more decentralized, the ability of the central government to control lower-
level authorities and keep them from engaging in independent corruption activities should
decrease. Indeed, we should expect corruption to spread increasingly to infect other levels
of government as the system decentralizes. Case studies of corruption around the world
support this result.
China is perhaps the prototypical example of the eﬀects of decentralization in cor-
ruption mechanics (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Fabre, 2001; Gong, 1994). Corruption in Mao’s
China was limited, following the preferences of the highly centralized communist party
that could enforce discipline from above by the selective usage of xiafang, a practice of
sending cadres down to lower levels “to remold bureaucrats’ attitudes” whenever they
contradicted the preferences of the party (Hao and Johnston, 2002). Following the pre-
dictions of the model outlined above, when political decentralization began to take place
in China in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, and decision making over corruption agreements
was delegated to regional bureaucrats, corruption rapidly spread to lower levels of govern-
ment (Johnston, 2005). Lower-level oﬃcials and regional authorities increasingly engaged
in corruption deals more directly. Oﬃcial proﬁteering, known as guandao spiked, taking
many diﬀerent forms, from moonlighting in enterprises to illegal stock dealing (Hao and
Johnston, 2002).
The eﬀects of political decentralization are apparent in other cases as well. It has
been documented that decentralization in Korea (Koo, 2002; Steinberg, 2005; Cheng and
49Chu, 2002), the Philippines (Carino and Alﬁler, 1986; Klitgaard, 1988; Hutchcroft and
Rocamora, 2003), Indonesia (Macintyre, 2003) and post-communist Russia (Leitzel, 1996)
was equivalent to a de facto increase in the number of bribees and lead to a much greater
localized supply of bribes. In all these cases, corruption reached local levels of government
more often after decentralization. Other cases of multi-bribee environments, like the ones
documented by Klitgaard (1990) show a less restricted supply of bribes as the number of
government agencies charging bribes goes from one to many.
It is my claim that Mexico’s drug war was partially driven by this mechanism of
corrupt decentralization and in the following chapters, I will provide evidence to sustain
my argument. Qualitative (Chapter 3) and quantitative (Chapter 4) evidence will be
given to show that decentralization spread corruption by reducing the ability of the top-
level government to limit criminal activities to certain areas. Particularly, drug traﬃcking,
has increased as the center has lost its ability to control the careers of local bureaucrats.
According to Mexico’s judicial system, drug traﬃcking can only be prosecuted by top-
level authorities. Without a top layer to control the decisions of local bureaucrats, and
given that Mexico’s lower governments are not constitutionally responsible for prosecuting
drug traﬃckers (CIDAC, 2011), local authorities have incentives to allow drug traﬃcking
groups to operate in their areas. Traﬃckers increase the revenue of local politicians who,
living in a decentralized system and lacking the limitations imposed by the center, ﬁnd it
in their best interest to make corruption deals (CIDAC, 2011).
502.2 The Eﬀects of Decentralization on Violence Propen-
sity
In this section I claim that levels of criminal violence are determined by institutional
factors. Institutions aﬀect the propensity of criminal groups to violently confront one
other, just as they impact the probability of conﬂict between other organized agents.
Extensive literature provides evidence of how institutions aﬀect the propensity for
violence. Studies have shown that institutions that promote markets and tax levying have
a great impact on whether insurgency groups, faced by conﬂict, use violent or peaceful
approaches (Besley and Persson, 2008; Welsh, 2008). Strong property rights reduce in-
centives for violence (Garﬁnkel, 2004); additionally, clear rules to promote stability after
rapid shifts in power have the same eﬀect (Powell, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001,
2006). In the context of civil wars, diﬀerent institutional designs determine whether eﬀec-
tive mechanisms to reduce conﬂict –like contract enforcement rules– will emerge and will
be eﬀective (Herbst, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; La Ferrara and Bates, 2001; Skaper-
das, 2008; Bates, 2001). Furthermore, many studies have pointed to more indirect ways
in which the state may function as a mediator of violence propensity (Fearon and Laitin,
2003; Garﬁnkel, 2004; Powell, 2006; Besley and Persson, 2008; Tajima, 2010) by, for ex-
ample, changing individual preferences to engage in violent behavior. The likelihood that
group leaders will exert violence as their preferred conﬂict-solution strategy is endoge-
nously driven by institutional features (Weingast, 1997; Bates, 2008; Bates et al., 2002)
like the existence of checks and balances (Sawyer, 2004, 2005) and particular electoral
rules (Wilkinson, 2006).
51Contributing to this literature, I extend the formal model outlined in the previous
section to identify a crucial institutional mechanism that inﬂuences the government’s abil-
ity to discourage competing criminal groups from violent conﬂict: decentralization. The
main insight behind the model is that he propensity of criminal organizations to violently
confront each other increases in decentralized political regimes.
This section shows how the actions of diﬀerent lower-level governments and crim-
inals change when they operate in centralized versus decentralized regimes.7
Assume a one-period relationship of two neutral-risk agents, a government G and
a criminal organization C, that rule or operate in either one or two jurisdictions [i,j]. A
government ruling over jurisdiction i decides whether to prosecute a criminal organization
to gain reputation ki, or, in contrast, receive bribes bi. Prosecuting creates good reputation
(ki > 0) when a government attacks a criminal organization that is aﬀecting citizens living
in i. A criminal organization decides whether to operate solely in its own territory i for
expected proﬁts πi, without aﬀecting citizens, or to violently invade the area of operation
of another criminal organization j and proﬁt in the two territories πij. Invasions are
violent and aﬀect citizens living in the invaded territory, in this case j. Assume also that
a government ruling over i can only punish criminals operating in i, and that invasions
require an upfront payment of A by invaders in order to arm themselves.
Criminals decide between operating peacefully in i, or violently confronting rival
groups operating in j, creating a sense of insecurity in citizens operating in j according
7Adding the operations of a top-layer government does not change the basic intuitions of the model.
52to expected proﬁts given by:
πi = (αi − bi)(1 − λi) (2.3)
πij = (αi − bi + αj − bj)(1 − λi)(1 − λj) + (αi − bi)(1 − λi)(λj) + (αj − bj)(1 − λj)(λi) − A
(2.4)
where λi is the probability of being prosecuted by government gi, and (αi−bi) is the
monetary beneﬁt from operating in territory i. Monetary beneﬁts are given by revenue αi
minus bribes bi. Note that, if criminals are prosecuted, proﬁts are zero.8 The probability of
being prosecuted in territory i is λi, and is determined solely by the government ruling over
such a jurisdiction (i.e. by gi). Illegal proﬁts from operating in i and j are more complex
because a cost of arming A will be paid, and because prosecution may come from two
governments (i.e. by gi and gj). As equation (3) above shows, there are four possibilities
of prosecution: prosecution may not happen (ﬁrst term in the right of πij), may only be
conducted by gj only (second term), by gi (third), or by both (in which case, proﬁts are
zero).





which increases in πij.
8Assuming negative payoﬀs for incarceration do not change the basic intuition of the model.
53Note that the value of λ is crucial to deﬁne illegal proﬁts and depends on gov-
ernment payoﬀs. For any government, prosecuting yields zero payoﬀs if criminals are
operating under the radar, and not prosecuting brings beneﬁts of b∗ (bribes). When crimi-
nals are visible to citizens because they are violent, prosecuting brings governments beneﬁts
of kj, where kj is the good reputation that governments get from enforcing the law to save
citizens who are being aﬀected by violence in disputed territory j. Given the government’s





The two lower-level governments may be centralized or decentralized.
Let’s ﬁrst consider a world in which the government is centralized. All governments
gi and gj are represented by G, a top-layer government that makes decisions as a single
cohesive, monopolistic entity. Substituting b∗
i for the value of Bc obtained above, we know
that the probability of prosecution in each of the two jurisdictions over which G operates










The top level government will monopolize bribing, and decide whether to punish
violence happening in j. Note that in a centralized environment a single government is
responsible for all enforcement decisions, kj > 0 whenever criminal group i invades j.
In other words, citizens living in j will favor the reputation of the top-layer government
for prosecuting violent criminals. Lower-level governments are subordinated by top-layer
decisions and thus will act according to the mandates dictated at the top.
54Let’s now consider a world in which the government is decentralized, meaning two
governments gi and gj make independent prosecution decisions over their own jurisdic-















The numerator of λd
i is zero because violence only aﬀects citizens in j, a reputa-
tion from which the government gi cannot beneﬁt. The government in jurisdiction i gets
bribes from criminals operating in i. If criminals operating in i invade j, citizens in j
will increase the reputation of the politician that helps them. This may create incentives
in gj to prosecute, but will not do the same for gi, a local government that gets nothing
from citizens who live outside its jurisdiction.
Result 2: The propensity of criminal organizations to violently confront each other in-
creases in decentralized political regimes.
Proof: Violence propensity will be given by the value of γ or
γ =
(πi + αj − bj)(1 − λi)(1 − λj) + (πi)(1 − λi)(λj) + (αj − bj)(1 − λj)(λi) − A
πi + (πi + αj − bj)(1 − λi)(1 − λj) + (πi)(1 − λi)(λj) + (αj − bj)(1 − λj)(λi) − A
where λi and λj are given by equations (5-7) above. Note that because λc
i > λd
i, then
γc < γc. In words, under centralization invaders will be prosecuted with some probability
in j and i, while under decentralization invaders will be prosecuted with some probability
55only in j, but never in i.
The above model shows that decentralized environments increase the propensity
of criminal groups to deploy violence. The logic behind this result is straightforward.
When the government cannot make security policy decisions as a uniﬁed monopoly, the
costs of violence are not properly appropriated internalized, incentives to punish criminal
organizations for violent confrontations are reduced, and thus the probability of violence
increases.
Under centralization, the costs of bloodshed are appropriated by a single gov-
ernment that has jurisdiction over the whole territory and that is accountable to all the
electorate for controlling violent crime. If criminal violence —or any other criminal behav-
ior that aﬀects citizens— escalates, the electorate will punish the unique decision-maker,
the central government, for poor security. A government that is cohesively-incentivized
in this manner wants criminal organizations to operate without episodes of violence. As
a result, any criminal organization that engages in violent behavior is punished, inde-
pendently of where violence takes place. All jurisdictions are taken care of by a single
government because a single government is responsible for all of them.
Under decentralization, this mechanism of cost internalization is lost. Governments
are only responsible for maintaining crime controlled within their pre-deﬁned jurisdiction.
If a criminal organization protected by one government aﬀects the electorate of another
jurisdiction, its behavior will not be punished by the entire state in a cohesive crackdown.
A local government has no incentives to invest in cracking down on criminals that commit
crimes in neighboring jurisdictions. Criminals will be punished only by the government
56that is directly aﬀected –the one ruling in the jurisdiction of the pertinent electorate. As
a result, criminals may behave strategically, keeping proﬁtable bases of operation in some
jurisdictions to fund oﬀensive measures in others. With a steady source of income to fund
violent operations, hiding and avoiding prosecution is also more feasible for criminals. A
low intensity warfare, for example, becomes possible. Criminals may engage in targeted
violence against a rival group by selectively tormenting a jurisdiction in which they do
not generate proﬁts. They escape prosecution by hiding in another jurisdiction, where
they can proﬁt while operating peacefully and safely.
The key is that whenever a jurisdiction is salient for security policy decisions,
criminals can strategically avoid punishment. Criminal organizations will be able to sur-
vive by relying on pacts and resources from jurisdictions where they do not practice
violence, while being violent in other jurisdictions, because decentralization prevents the
government from fully internalizing the costs of violence. Centralization allows such ap-
propriation. Empirical evidence of the relationship between conﬂict and decentralization
abounds. The decentralization of decision-making in Indonesia drove large increases in
violence (Peluso, 2002; Bertrand, 2004; van Klinken, 2007). When laws to empower lo-
cal governments with much larger administrative, ﬁscal and political power took eﬀect
in 2001,the spending capacity of Indonesia’s districts got a boost. By 2007, the country
had already been identiﬁed by the World Bank as the second most ﬁscally decentralized
country of East Asia, surpassed only by China, and one of the most decentralized coun-
tries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Murshed et al.,
2009). The resulting fragmentation of its patronage networks prompted an increase in
the number of organized groups employing violence and intimidation as a political, social,
57and economic strategy (Wilson, 2006). Temporal variation under decentralization at the
national level signiﬁcantly matches the outbreak of violence in Indonesia9.
Violent conﬂict in Colombia also rises when local governments are empowered
by a larger, independent decision making capacity (Llorente et al., 2002; S´ anchez and
del Mar Palau, 2006). Decentralization largely increased local disputes between conﬂict-
ing organized groups who fought to appropriate public goods and resources, to interfere
with the political process and to consolidate territorial control. Actually, the geographi-
cal expansion of conﬂict in Colombia follows decentralization reforms that took place in
Colombia from 1974 to 2004 (S´ anchez and del Mar Palau, 2006).10
The link between decentralization and conﬂict has been proven more broadly in
diﬀerent contexts. Just as my narrative argues, a growing number of scholars suggest that
political decentralization intensiﬁes conﬂict and secession by supplying local individuals
or groups with resources to engage in conﬂict (Kymlicka, 1998; Snyder, 2000). The radical
decentralization project of Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resis-
tance Movement (NRM) government in 1986, for example, increased the propensity for
violence between local competing factions (Green, 2008). Seminal cross-country studies
like Brancati (2006) showed that the combination of decentralized-decision making in the
form of federalism and existing regional parties is conﬂict-producing. Lake and Rothchild
9As Murshed et al. (2009) note, this result was surprising, since a large literature had assumed that
giving groups more control over their own aﬀairs would allow them to implement their own policies ,
which could better target and reduce violence (Brancati, 2006; Tranchant, 2007, 2008; Saideman et al.,
2002; Bakke and Wibbels, 2006).
10This is not to say that decentralization is the only and unique driver behind violence in Colombia.
Actually, in many cases violence preceded the reforms. Instead, and in accord with the results of my formal
model, this case provides evidence that decentralization increases the propensity of violent behavior, even
if other factors still constitute underlying causes of violence itself.
58(2005) [as cited by (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005)] also found that secessional battles are
fought and won with larger probability in decentralized states. The creation of local areas
of decision power in Nigeria since the 1970s has not only failed to halt ethnic and religious
violence but has contributed to it (Green, 2008).
In chapter 3, I will present a narrative showing how Mexico’s drug violence has
increased as a result of decentralization. I argue that criminal organizations could be
controlled by a centralized, authoritarian government that would be accountable for in-
hibiting violence in all jurisdictions, and that would make decisions as a uniﬁed agent.
Yet, when democratization dispersed Mexico’s security policy decisions among many local
decision makers, many of whom did not share incentives, accountability also spread. Un-
like a centralized government, decentralized local governments cared only about keeping
violence low in their own jurisdictions. As a result, criminals found themselves suddenly
able to behave strategically with violence. Mexican drug cartels could now engage in
violent ﬁghts in some jurisdictions while proﬁting in others. Unlike a centralized system,
a decentralized environment allowed violent criminal organizations to escape punishment,
reducing the expected cost of violent behavior. Thus, criminal violence increased.
2.3 The Eﬀects of Decentralization on Arming
In this section I show that criminal groups organize according to incentives dictated by the
state. Particularly, I show that criminal organizations arm only under decentralization.
A simple extension of the model described above is employed to assess the conditions
59under which paying A is a preferred strategy.
Assume the decision to pay A will be made by criminal organizations according to





Yes: γ(πij) + (1 − γ)(πi − A)
No: πi
If criminal organization C pays A, there is a probability γ that they will invade j
and obtain πij expected proﬁts, and a probability (1 − γ) that they will not invade, ob-
taining πi and still having paid the private army. If criminal organizations do not pay A,
they won’t be able to invade.
Result 3: Criminal organizations arm only under decentralization.
Proof: If γ = 0, then πi − A < πi. Following from result 2 above, we know γd > γc, thus
making arming more appealing.
When criminal groups make decisions over the best mechanism for protecting their
businesses from predators, they weigh the cost of creating a private army against the value
that they will get out of using this army to invade the territory of other criminals (or to
avoid invasion). Following Result 2 above, we know that invasions become highly probable
only in decentralized environments because punishment of invaders is less probable. Thus,
only in decentralized environments will criminal groups be motivated to pay the cost of
arming themselves.
Indeed, criminal groups prefer to remain unarmed in centralized, single-bribe envi-
60ronments because under such circumstances the government is a certain protector ensuring
low violence propensity. Criminal organizations that invade will be punished. Thus, to
maintain private armies is too costly given that the probability of invasion is very low.
Private armies are not needed because the state is able to contain violence.
Internalizing violence may be further motivated by the increased costs of bribing
in decentralized environments. If decentralization allows many governments to conduct
law enforcement operations in the same jurisdiction, criminal organizations need to bribe
many agencies simultaneously to be protected. With higher costs of protection, investing
in creating a private army seems increasingly appealing given that the alternative is to
pay costly bribes to ineﬃcient decentralized protectors. The internalization of violence in
the criminal world can be understood a form of “vertical integration” in which criminal
groups “produce” their own protection rather than “outsourcing” it from the state.11
Note that, if criminal groups decide to arm themselves because the government
is unable to deter invasions, violence becomes even more probable. When protection
is provided by the state, the use of violence is limited to defensive actions because the
government has an incentive to keep its reputation of being law abiding in the eyes of
citizens. Yet if the capacity for violence is in the hands of criminals themselves, arms may
11Academics are far from a consensus on the empirical determinants of vertical integration versus
outsourcing (Acemoglu et al., 2009). The debate has identiﬁed the importance of some factors like ex
post opportunistic behavior (i.e. hold up) (Williamson et al., 1975; Williamson, 1983, 1985), the size of ex
ante relationship-speciﬁc investments (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Foss, 1999), and
information asymmetries and knowledge non-excludability (Casson, 1996; Rugman, 1981; Ethier, 1986;
Ethier and Markusen, 1996). Some empirical studies have identiﬁed changes in regulation that play a
role in determining organizational structure. The pioneering work of Joskow (1985) for example, shows
that reforms in environmental laws in the US incentivized California’s coal-burning electric generating
plants to vertically integrate. Unfortunately, most of this literature views regulation as an external shock
rather than as a response to changes in political institutions.
61be used also for oﬀensive purposes, such as to initiate predatory behavior.
For the case of Mexico, in the following chapters I will provide qualitative evidence
of how changes in the organizational structure of criminal groups have followed political
decentralization. In Chapter 3, I show an increasing tendency of Mexican drug cartels to
internalize protection —by creating their own security departments and armed branches—
as decentralization was taking place. I develop an analytical narrative about this process,
explaining the ways in which Mexico’s drug–related industry evolved and changed from
the sixties through 2010.
2.4 My Model In Brief
In this chapter, I advanced a theory of corruption, criminal organizations and violence,
showing that when governmental decision-making capacity is decentralized (a) corruption
becomes more expensive for criminal groups, (b) violence propensity between criminal
groups increases, and (c) incentives for criminal groups to create their own private armies
to protect themselves also increase.
My argument can be summarized as follows. Political centralization allows the
top level of the state to have a monopoly of authority and to be a monocentric system,
with a single decision-making body concentrated in the hands of the central comman-
der. Decentralization disperses decision-making power across multiple organizations and
across diﬀerent levels of government, altering the way in which the corruption game is
played. Under decentralization, corruption deals are more expensive because criminal
organizations need to bribe many agents to get the same beneﬁts as a single bribe under
62centralization.12 Furthermore, under decentralization, governments only have the respon-
sibility to keep violence low in their own jurisdictions, which allows criminals to engage in
strategic violent behavior. Criminal groups may violently prey on the territories of other
criminal organizations just in a selected number of jurisdictions, while still hiding and
proﬁting in other jurisdictions, areas in which they are not being punished or prosecuted
because they take care to keep violence low. Thus, under decentralization we expect a
larger propensity for violence. Finally, decentralization also motivates criminal groups
to arm themselves. Because the state can no longer punish criminal organizations that
engage in predatory behavior, criminal groups know that invasions are more probable and
thus, it is in their best interest to create armies to protect themselves.
Overall, my theory has depicted the implications of decentralization for the state,
in its eﬀorts to control and command criminal behavior. My theory resonates with the
unsettled debate about whether decentralization is positive or negative for governance
(Treisman, 2007). Decentralization has been championed by some as a source of bet-
ter policy-making and reduced corruption (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). International
institutions have vigorously supported decentralization, according to the idea that de-
centralization promotes better governance (Bardhan, 2002) by increasing accountability
and responsiveness (Khemani, 2001), by allowing citizens greater control over local issues
(Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999), and by providing minorities with a voice (Stepan,
1999; Gurr, 2000). Yet, others have endorsed a much less favorable view of decentraliza-
tion. Detractors of decentralization have pointed out that local elites may capture beneﬁts
more easily (Keefer et al., 2003), or just have less human capital to deal with issues that
12Assuming bribes given to diﬀerent levels of government are complementary goods.
63a centralized government would ﬁnd easier to control (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000;
McCarthy, 2004). Additionally, other scholars argue that local power may be obsolete
without proper funding, and that poor coordination may oﬀset many of the beneﬁts of
decentralization (Larson, 2005; Treisman, 2007).
My theory shows that in the presence of large criminal organizations, decentral-
ization may be detrimental for citizens’ security by reducing the capacity and willingness
of governments to control criminal activities. It shows that large eﬀorts to decentralize
countries like Thailand (Arghiros, 2001), Philippines (Bird and Rodriguez, 1999; Alonzo,
2003), and Cambodia (Blunt and Turner, 2005), or entire regions like Africa (Green, 2001;
Olowu, 2001) may promote increases in criminal violence. With this in mind, policy mak-
ers need to act with care. Indeed, decentralization may create the conditions to diminish
political violence by, for example, promoting accountability and providing a voice to mi-
norities. Yet, it may also set the stage for other forms of violence to emerge, like criminal
violence, if the state cannot properly internalize the costs of violence in its new decen-
tralized form. Policies that ensure that local governments can implement security policies
cooperatively —such that order and governance is promoted in the country as a whole,
rather than in particular jurisdictions— are necessary to avoid the spread of criminal
violence in decentralizing states.
64Chapter 3
Mexico’s Drug War (1950-2010)
“Mr. President, (...) let us help you to eradicate the cancer of this country.
Poison is fought with poison. Once we ﬁnish with them [Zetas cartel], you
can continue doing your work. Withdraw the troops and the army. [Signed:]
Mexican Cartels Against Zetas.”1
Mexico’s drug war was a war between criminal organizations, ignited by a state
that enforced the law in a decentralized political environment. The state had failed to
realize that over several decades, while Mexico was being largely redeﬁned by process
of decentralization process, diﬀerent levels of government had lost their ability to act
as a cohesive, single-decision body; thus, the state could no longer discourage criminals
from violent confrontations or from arming themselves. Within a decentralized Mexico,
criminal organizations were not what they had been twenty years before. The Mexican
government had changed too.
1Message left by a criminal organization in Durango State, October 2010
65Drawing upon the insights of the formal model in Chapter 2, in this chapter I ex-
plain why Mexico’s drug–related violence escalated in the 2000’s and not before. I provide
an analytical narrative about how decentralization changed has altered the shape that cor-
ruption takes in Mexico, adding incentives for criminals to confront each other and to arm
themselves. When decentralization gave rise to armed, violence-prone criminals, the equi-
librium of peaceful interactions between rival criminal organizations became precarious.
This equilibrium broke when Mexican authorities destabilized criminal organizations by
enforcing the law and capturing drug lords. A war followed.
This chapter is organized in three sections. A ﬁrst section applies the insights of
my formal model to explain how Mexico’s decentralization set the conditions for a drug
war and explains the role of crackdowns in triggering violence. I explain the implications
of Results 2 and 3 for the Mexican case.
A second section provides evidence that centralization set the conditions for the
government to act as a coherent law enforcer, discouraging violence within criminal or-
ganizations. As a result, its crackdowns did not generate violence. I describe extensively
how corruption was conducted under centralization, an environment in which all levels
of government acted as a single, coherent enforcer against criminal organizations that af-
fected the interests of the federal government. I also show how this process of centralized
corruption created incentives for criminal organizations to mitigate violence and their
tendencies to arm themselves. Finally, I explore how crackdowns aﬀected the criminal
world. To do so, I present three case studies of crackdowns that did not cause violence.
First, I show that when the Mexican government launched Operation Condor in 1977,
“an unprecedented war” to “completely eliminate opium poppy cultivation” [Mexican
66Federal Attorney General interviewed by Craig (1980, p.351)], traﬃcking organizations
responded not by violent confrontations. Next, I show that a series of crackdowns orga-
nized by Mexican federal police during the eighties, against diﬀerent drug lords in the
state of Chihuahua resulted, contrary to expectation, only in increased discipline within
the drug traﬃcking industry, and in the consolidation of the Ju´ arez cartel, a highly pow-
erful and cohesive criminal organization. Finally, I present the case of the Guadalajara
cartel. After the capture of its leader in 1989, the cartel fractured into many pieces, yet
none of them fought each other in large-scale violence. Instead, newly formed criminal
factions agreed to work in an oligopolistic fashion and continued their business in an
organized and relatively peaceful way.
A third section provides evidence of the eﬀects of crackdowns under decentraliza-
tion. I begin by exploring the dynamics of corruption, as they changed with decentraliza-
tion. The rupture of Mexico’s hegemonic party system triggered the demise of centralized
control. I describe how corruption changed with decentralization, creating incentives for
local governments to act as independent agents in accord with their own interests. This
change impacted criminal organizations. Particularly, I indicate that criminal organiza-
tions not only grew in size but also increased their propensity to be violent and to arm
themselves. Additionally, I discuss the role of proﬁts in setting the stage for Mexico’s
drug war, focusing speciﬁcally on the impact of Colombia’s security policies and NAFTA,
in providing Mexican criminal organizations with suﬃcient proﬁts for arming themselves.
Mirroring the previous section, I show how crackdowns aﬀect the criminal world, by means
of two case studies of crackdowns that triggered violence. First, I explore the capture of
the leader of the Gulf cartel in 2003, which sparked turf battles between members of the
67private army of the Gulf cartel and the Familia cartel. Finally, I show how the capture
of leaders of the Sinaloa cartel in 2008 and 2009 caused criminal cells to ﬁght each other.
3.1 Political Decentralization Explains Mexico’s Drug
War
The traditional narrative explains the increasing violence of criminal groups in Mexico
by pointing to recent large increases in enforcement operations. (Aguilar and Casta˜ neda,
2010; Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010b; Osorio, 2011; Lessing, 2012; Dell, 2011). According to
this line of thought, violence between criminal groups remained contained until Mexico
increased the prosecution of traﬃckers in 2006. In short, it was when President Calder´ on
sent troops to ﬁght traﬃckers that mayhem exploded.
Aguilar and Casta˜ neda (2010), perhaps the earliest critics of Calder´ on’s oﬀensive,
argue that general homicides had decreased 2.2 percentage points every year from 1997
until 2006, the year in which homicides began to increase. Their book provides the ﬁrst
empirical evidence of an important change in homicide trends in Mexico and attributes
it to a “bloody war against traﬃckers” (Aguilar and Casta˜ neda, 2010) on the part of
the Mexican government. Aguilar and Casta˜ neda (2010) however, provide no insight into
the mechanism behind the trend. Guerrero Guti´ errez (2010b) began to ﬁll this gap by
arguing that homicides began to increase after Alfredo Beltr´ an Leyva, a lieutenant of the
Sinaloa cartel, was captured in 2008. His capture was “the most important shock done,
up until then, by the government as part of the war against drugs that Felipe Calder´ on
had commanded.” Homicides spiked after this shock because the Sinaloa cartel divided
68into two factions that battled for turf (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010b).
Since then, academics have focused more attention on crackdowns upon criminal
violence. In his doctoral dissertation, Lessing (2012) presents a formal model to show
that crackdowns exacerbated violence because they were “unconditional,” meaning they
aﬀected all criminal organizations independently of their violence propensity. The doctoral
work of Osorio (2012) makes a similar argument, identifying the strategy of Calder´ on as
the main cause behind violence due to its “non-selective punishment strategy.” Dell
(2011) provides the ﬁrst quantitative tests within this literature, arguing that the causes
of violence are found in electoral dynamics. According to her study, following a close
election, the probability that a drug–related homicide has occurred is higher after a PAN
mayor takes oﬃce because “the municipal environment becomes less conducive to drug
traﬃcking in the short-run.”
All this is true. Crackdowns destabilized Mexico’s criminal organizations and
promoted violent confrontations between them. The incremental capture of drug lords
that started in 2006 caused large scale instability within criminal organizations, leading
to their fracture into smaller factions that violently confronted each other (Rios, 2012).
While in 2005 there were six major drug cartels (Maule´ on, 2010a), by 2010, after three
years in which eighteen drug bosses had been arrested and two more had died while
combating federal enforcement forces (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010a), there were at least
twelve cartels (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010b). The number of smaller criminal organizations
also spiked, going from ﬁve in 2007 to sixty-two in 2010 (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010b); with
it, the number of homicides related to criminal confrontation largely increased, going from
2,825 in 2005 to 15,273 in 2010 (Rios and Shirk, 2011).
69The real question, however, is not whether crackdowns motivated violence, but
why previous crackdowns did not. During the nineties, the Mexican state conducted un-
conditional crackdowns against drug traﬃcking organizations, and yet Mexico’s criminal
world kept functioning as a highly disciplined group of oligopolistic criminal organizations
that operated without confronting each other (Carvajal-D´ avila, 1998; Flores P´ erez, 2009).
Neither of the above narratives can explain why crackdowns ignite drug wars in
some cases while in other cases they do not. There isn’t a compelling explanation of the
case concerning the drug lord Mr. Felix Gallardo, the head of Mexico’s most proﬁtable
and large drug cartel. When he was captured in 1989, his organization split peacefully,
and each faction kept operating within its own territory without ﬁghting each other (Blan-
cornelas, 2002; Zepeda, 2007; Cruz, 2009; Osorno, 2009). There isn’t an explanation as to
why this peaceful outcome had not occurred earlier in 2008, when the drug lord Beltr´ an
Leyva was captured and his organization broke into pieces that fought each other for turf
(Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009).
I argue that the missing variable for understanding the propensity for criminal
violence, described above, is political decentralization. Table 3.1 summarizes my theory.
The conditions favorable for criminal organizations to survive are quite diﬀerent,
depending on whether the setting is centralized or decentralized. Under centralization,
criminal groups are not armed and are less prone to violence. Under decentralization,
criminal groups are armed and more prone to violence. My formal model has shed light
on two eﬀects of decentralization upon criminal behavior. Criminals are more prone to
violence in decentralized settings (Result 2). Decentralization changes the incentives of
local governments, motivating them to prosecute only criminal organizations that directly
70aﬀect their jurisdictions rather than, as they would do in a centralized environment, pros-
ecuting any criminal organization that engages in violent behavior (independently of the
jurisdiction in which violence takes place). Furthermore, criminals arm themselves in
decentralized environments (Result 3). Only in such contexts, in which violent confronta-
tions occur with higher probability, do criminal organizations ﬁnd it in their best interest
to arm themselves in order to react to potential confrontations.
Table 3.1: A Theory of Decentralization and Criminal Violence
Centralization Decentralization
Pre-crackdown conditions Not armed Armed
of criminal groups: Less violence-prone More violence-prone
Criminals’ reaction Short-term violence,
to crackdowns: long-term order Violence
Given the status of the pre-crackdown environment, we can explore the diﬀerent
reactions of criminals to crackdowns according to their violence-propensity and level of
arms. Consider the impact of a crackdown, like the capture or assassination of a criminal
leader, upon the propensity of criminal organizations violently to confront each other.
Assume a case in which the lack of a crackdown severely weakens one criminal group. A
competing criminal group may decide to invade the territory of the weakened organization,
creating violent confrontation for turf. Alternatively, in contrast, the group can continue
to operate peacefully within its own territory and without invasion.
While centralized environments deter criminal organizations from violent conﬂict,
decentralized environments do not. Under decentralization, criminal organizations are
more violent-prone because, as my model shows, only governments whose reputations are
71directly aﬀected by violent behavior will punish such behavior. As a result, criminal or-
ganizations may engage in strategic behavior, assassinating the members of the weakened
organization in the weakened territory, while still operating peacefully (i.e. without visible
violence) in their own, original territory. If this violence is only visible in the weakened
territory, punishment will only come from the government ruling over the visibly violent
territory. Criminals may thus be able to avoid punishment by operating mainly in their
base territory, while conducting raids in the weakened territory. In turn, while punish-
ments may aﬀect raiding criminals, the possibility will always remain for them to escape
back to their base territory without punishment. In contrast, a centralized government
does not allow criminal organizations to escape. Because centralization leads all gov-
ernments to operate as a single, cohesive body, even governments whose territory is not
directly aﬀected by violence will react in solidarity with those governments that are af-
fected. As a result, raiders will be attacked by all governments, in their base territory
and in the raided one. With punishment coming from all fronts, criminals will be less
able to escape. In short, because the expected beneﬁts of violent behavior are much more
negative in centralized environments than in decentralized ones, criminal groups are more
prone to violence under decentralization.
Considering levels of decentralization allows for a better understanding of patterns
of criminal violence. In the nineties, criminal organizations operated under a centralized
Mexico, one that set the conditions for criminals to be less prone to violence, and less
armed; in the 2000’s, criminal organizations operated under a decentralized Mexico, one
that set the conditions for a violent drug war among well-armed organizations.
If in the 2000’s criminal organizations like that of Beltr´ an Leyva split in factions
72that fought each other for turf, it was because they now had the ability to do so. The
capture of Beltr´ an Leyva lead one side of the organization to believe that another one had
betrayed it (Ravelo, 2012). It declared war. Raids, assassinations and large-scale violence
followed. Criminals were more prone to engage in violent behavior in the 2000’s because
they lived in a decentralized environment, one in which the Mexican state had a harder
time punishing them in diﬀerent jurisdictions, one in which diﬀerent levels of government
dictated security policies independently of each other, one in which a lack of coordination
pervaded security operations, and one in which corruption deals could be established with
one level of government to avoid prosecution from another.
If in the nineties criminal organization remained peaceful after the capture of their
leader, it was not because they wanted to, but because they had to. Actually, conditions
favorable to killing each other were present. The capture of Felix Gallardo left a fractured
criminal environment, led by many new leaders who were just consolidating their power
(G´ omez and Fritz, 2005). However, they did not kill each other because a centralized Mex-
ico was an eﬃcient prosecutor of criminals. All levels of government acted cohesively and
could cohesively punish any criminal organization that engaged in violent behavior and
that aﬀected the reputation of the federation as a whole. Independently of whether cor-
ruption deals had been established with lower levels of government, and independently of
where violence took place, under centralization punishment would happen, and criminals
knew it.
733.2 The Times of Criminal Order (1950-1997)
There is a time that seemingly nobody remembers now. At one time, Mexican author-
ities conducted crackdowns against drug lords without igniting large-scale confrontation
between traﬃcking groups that were left without leaders. This was a time in which crim-
inal groups operated proﬁtably, transporting drugs into the US, and typically avoiding
behavior that could hurt Mexican citizens or the image of the Mexican government.
This was a time of criminal order. There were decades in which drug cartels per-
formed their illegal activities without ﬁghting each other often and thus without aﬀecting
the government’s reputation. To maintain the reputation of the government intact re-
quired that criminals adhered to a set of simple rules, a so-called code of conduct (Guer-
rero Guti´ errez, 2009). The code, explicitly described by former governors like Ricardo
Monreal (Zacatecas State), had ten “mandates”: (1) No dead people in the streets, (2)
no drugs in the schools, (3) no media scandals, (4) periodic seizure of illegal drugs and
imprisonment of lower level traﬃckers, (5) generation of economic revenues for small,
poor communities, (6) no gangs, (7) no deals with other branches of government or bu-
reaucracy, (8) mistakes are to be punished with imprisonment, not death, (9) order and
respect for territories, and (10) revenues must return to Mexico in the form of investments
(Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009). The narrative argues the criminals who respected this code
were the ones who would be allowed to remain in business (Resa Nestares, 2001). The
rest would be prosecuted, assassinated or simply banned from prerogatives that would
allow them to keep traﬃcking drugs.
In light of my theory, in this section I argue that the criminals adhered to these
74rules because the Mexican government operated as a de facto centralized entity, with an
authoritarian party centrally commanding all decisions made in the state. I deﬁne this
period as the years from 1950, the date of the ﬁrst meaningful drug-traﬃcking operations
in Mexico, (Cruz, 2009) to 1997, the date when for the rupture of centralization.
3.2.1 Corruption Under Centralization
From 1950 to 1997, Mexico was a de jure federal country operating as a de facto cen-
tralized country (Gibson, 2004). Constitutionally, Mexico is a federal country with three
levels of government (federal, state and local), each one with the legal capacity to dictate
policy autonomously over its territories as long as they respect Mexico’s federal constitu-
tion. However, Mexico could act as a centralized, uniﬁed government, commanded by the
federal level, because of informal political incentives (Gibson, 2004). Local governments
followed the decisions made at the federal level mainly because of Mexico’s electoral rules,
particularly the prohibition of re-election, and the existence of a hegemonic party.
Mexico was ruled by a single hegemonic party, the PRI, that had been in power
since the Mexican Revolution. Without re-election and without opposition parties, politi-
cians, authorities, and bureaucrats were all directly assigned (and removed) by the PRI
(Centeno, 1994; Langston, 1995). The PRI ruled over all levels of government, distribut-
ing positions of power among its loyal followers and supporters, and making decisions
over every branch of the state, from federal judicial authorities to small local polices. As
a result of political dominance, the federal government (the level at which the PRI party
elite was concentrated), was able to play a clever game of “self-enforced discipline” that
(a) kept all lower-level authorities obedient to top-dictated decisions, and (b) discouraged
75criminal organizations from violent behavior or other behavior that broke the code of
conduct.
All members of the political system had strong incentives to be loyal to the PRI
because their careers depended on it. The strong degree of control by the federal gov-
ernment over the careers of authorities, during the period of authoritarianism, has been
well documented (Centeno, 1994; Langston, 1997, 2001; Weldon, 1997; Davis, 2006). It
was the President, or his close staﬀ, who directly selected the Minister of the Interior, the
Chief of the Federal Police, and almost all the mayors of important municipalities within
Mexico (Flores P´ erez, 2010). It was also the president who unilaterally decided the next
candidate to the presidency, and thus, his mostly likely successor (Weldon, 1997). Within
law enforcement institutions, professional careers were assigned only through party con-
nections (Carvajal-D´ avila, 1998). Jobs within the police corporations like the Federal
Direction of Security (Direcci´ on Federal de Seguridad, DFS) for example, were only given
to individuals who had been explicitly recommended by DFS oﬃcials with links to the
party. Actually, DFS’s recommenders had to present a formal, written letter endorsing
their candidates and accepting full responsibility for their behavior within the corporation
(Aguayo Quezada, 2001).
The power that the federal government maintained, due to a lack of re-election,
kept lower-level authorities obedient, even with respect to corruption deals. Local author-
ities were corrupt but were careful to be so while enforcing the code of conduct in their
own territories (G´ omez and Fritz, 2005). If local authorities did not enforce the code of
conduct among the criminal organizations that they protected, local authorities would be
prosecuted (Flores P´ erez, 2009). In the conﬁdential words of an oﬃcial interviewed over
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zations that lacked the blessing of the federal government would be told to stop. If they
persisted, they would be imprisoned or killed” (Flores P´ erez, 2009, p. 204). Actually,
oﬃcials prosecuted under charges of corruption, during the authoritarian days in Mexico,
recurrently argued that they had been imprisoned only after losing the blessings of the
PRI (Astorga, 2001). Many prosecuted authorities claimed that top-level politicians were
aware of the corruption deals well before they had decided to take action against them.
When captured in 1993, Guillero G. Calderoni, the famous chief of the Mexican federal
police who was accused of “unexplainable enrichment”, argued that his imprisonment had
been a “political manoeuvre” planned by a federal elite that suddenly, “for no apparent
reason,” had turned against him (Astorga, 2001).
Whether the federal government had direct knowledge of all corruption agreements
at the local level is ultimately irrelevant. It probably did not. The required monitoring
capacity for such information would have been enormous. To sanction and endorse every
one of the corruption deals within Mexico, the federal government would have needed to
be quite powerful. Directly monitoring every corruption transaction and having complete
control over the criminal world would have required, among many other activities, the
enforcement of agreements between diﬀerent competing criminals groups, the punishment
of cheating and betrayals within the illegal world, the control of rule-breaking criminals
operating in secrecy, and the reward of favorite criminal organizations, to name a few
challenges. Mexico’s federal government may well have lacked the capability for such
monitoring.
What is relevant is that centralization allowed Mexico’s federal government to
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to command. Career incentives for lower-level governments were a strong enough tool to
induce them to follow the preference of the federal government. Actually, the best accounts
of the relationship between Mexican governments and traﬃckers show that the federal
government had a quite lassez-faire policy with respect to corruption agreements done
at other levels of government (Ordo˜ nez, 1991; Flores P´ erez, 2009). Diﬀerent corrupted
agencies did not explicitly coordinate the details of corruption deals, nor did they know
whether other agencies were engaged in corruption too (Ordo˜ nez, 1991). As a Mexican
authority clearly revealed, corruption deals tended to be done in government pockets
that were quite independent: “The army controlled certain groups (...); the Oﬃce of the
Attorney General or the Federal Judicial Police controlled others (...); and local police
chiefs controlled smaller criminal groups” (Flores P´ erez, 2010, p. 197).
Such slack control over lower-level authorities not only allowed the federal govern-
ment to function without heavy monitoring costs but also created an informal mechanism
for the government to reward the loyalty of its members. By permitting authorities to
secure bribes on their own, the federal government was informally increasing the salaries
of enforcers at the lower-level and securing their loyalty to the system. Many beneﬁted
from these non-standard forms of compensation. Federal policemen, for example, were in-
formally assisted in the day to day business of making corruption agreements by informal
enforcers known as madrinas, police oﬃcers who received no formal salary besides bribes
(Ordo˜ nez, 1991). Madrinas proﬁted by taxing the illegal activities like drug traﬃcking,
horse races, or cock ﬁghts (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 118-124).
783.2.2 Criminal Violence-Propensity and Arming under Central-
ization
The self-enforced discipline that characterized Mexico’s government shaped criminal in-
centives. In accord my model, Mexico’s federal government generated incentives for crim-
inal organizations to restrain their violence and to enforce their compliance with the code
of proper conduct. The government did so by controlling all levels of government. The
intuition behind this policy is simple: only “well-behaved” criminal organizations would
receive government support to conduct illegal activities. Without government support,
criminals cannot conduct large-scale criminal operations. All levels of government would
cohesively disavow criminal organizations that violated the code of conduct because oth-
erwise members would risk their political careers. Because the authoritarian regime of
Mexico was centralized –with the federal government holding a monopoly of authority–
criminal organizations (a) were discouraged from ﬁghting each other, and (b) lacked the
incentives to create their own private armies.
At ﬁrst, traﬃckers had few incentives to ﬁght each other because by doing so, they
would break the rules dictated by the federal government, signiﬁcantly reducing their
chances to conduct illegal operations. If two diﬀerent criminal organizations intended
to operate in a similar area, local authorities would always favor the one that had the
approval of the federation (Flores P´ erez, 2009). To have the approval of the federation,
traﬃckers needed to conduct operations peacefully without visibly aﬀecting the image of
Mexico’s government. Interestingly, a common phrase among traﬃckers, “gringos make
and unmake you” (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 101) shows how well aware traﬃckers were of the
79large consequences that the approval of the Mexican federal government would bring to
them. “Mexico only stopped protecting traﬃckers when the US put a price tag on them”
[traﬃcker interviewed by Hern´ andez (2012, p. 235)]. Aﬀecting the USA in signiﬁcant
ways by, for example, killing an American oﬃcer or journalist would unchain punishment
and “unmake” the culpable organization.
Furthermore, because Mexican authorities acted as a single, coherent decision-
maker, traﬃckers had an interest to “outsource” protection from them, rather than cre-
ating their own private armies of protection. Outsourcing was eﬃcient because the state
was a capable punisher. The same logic extracted from Result 2 in my formal model
applies here. Any criminal organization that destabilized the criminal world, by aﬀecting
another organization, would immediately lose the protection of the state and would be
left out of business. A coherent centralized state made the federal government a market
leader in providing punishment, discouraging traﬃckers from solving disputes themselves.
Criminals needed only to inform the government of rule violations and the government
would act. In fact, informing the government about the improper conduct of other crim-
inal groups was quite common (Flores P´ erez, 2010). Traﬃckers provided information to
the government about the actions of criminal, and the government responded solidly. Im-
portant traﬃckers had police oﬃcers as their bodyguards and informants (Blancornelas,
2002). They also informed the government if other criminal organizations wanted to oper-
ate in a territory without paying bribes (Ordo˜ nez, 1991). After all, as a secret informant
mentioned “[traﬃckers] were paying their taxes [bribes]. Why would others not do it?”
[Secret informant quoted by Hern´ andez (2012, p. 118-124)].
Arming was further discouraged by its high relative cost. A necessary condition for
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armies. Until the mid-nineties most illegal drug proﬁts were taken by Colombian cartels;
when these proﬁts shifted to Mexican organizations, it left them with free resources to
arm themselves.
3.2.3 Crackdowns Without Violence
Considering the dynamics of my formal model, it is easy to understand why the gov-
ernment could conduct crackdowns against drug traﬃcking organizations —capturing
and imprisoning important criminal leaders— without igniting large-scale confrontation
between traﬃcking groups. The government could do so, as long as it operated in a cen-
tralized fashion. A centralized environment deterred criminal organizations from violently
confronting each other because violent confrontations between factions would aﬀect the
image of the state, invariably resulting in punishment. Violent criminal factions would
lose the favor of the only corrupt institution, a centralized government that could cohe-
sively decide who its enemies were, and to whom criminals outsourced their protection.
Criminals were not armed and were not prone to be violent.
As long as criminals adhered to the code of conduct, large-scale enforcement op-
erations would not be a dominant strategy for the Mexican government. Operations like
increased seizures, troop deployments, or eradication of illegal crops discouraged illegal
business that ultimately provided proﬁts to the government. If crackdowns could put all
traﬃckers out of business, bribes would disappear. Without bribes, the federal govern-
ment lacked the extra income either to increase personal beneﬁts or reward state members
for loyalty to the regime. The sporadic use of force constituted a clearly winning strategy
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business, but not so little as to induce criminals to misbehave.2
Sporadic crackdowns were still necessary to encourage order because such force
kept criminals aware of the very negative consequences of violating the code of conduct.
Crackdowns kept expectations of punishment high among criminals, reinforcing their will-
ingness to respect the preferences of the state. If crackdowns were completely absent, as
an extension of my model would be able to show, criminals would have updated their ex-
pectations to believe that punishment was too improbable. As a result, indiscipline and
violence would have emerged. For example, after many years as a traﬃcker in Ju´ arez,
Gilberto Ontiveros, known as “El Grenas,” began to believe that he could operate with
complete impunity (Cruz, 2009). Little by little he started becoming visible, attending
horse races to gamble millions of pesos. In 1986, he even tortured and killed an American
photographer. This incident was the tipping point. As soon as his actions were publi-
cized in the U.S., pressure was exerted upon the Mexican government (Poppa, 2010). El
Grenas lost the favor of his local protectors and was imprisoned just two months after the
journalist’s assassination (Ordo˜ nez, 1991; Cruz, 2009).
Empirical evidence demonstrates that crackdowns during the years of authoritar-
ian, centralized control did not generate violent confrontation between criminal organi-
zations. Violence did not result from (a) the crackdown conducted in 1977 known as
2This same logic explains why authorities did not frequently extort traﬃckers or cheat on corruption
agreements. Mexican oﬃcials were partial proprietaries of traﬃcking proﬁts, so that any malfeasance
on the part of oﬃcials would have resulted in decreased rent paid to them. As Estill, Powell, and
Stringham (2006) have shown in their analysis of taxes and fees, when oﬃcials are “proﬁt–motivated
residual claimants,” as Mexican authorities were, their incentives are aligned with their customers, in
this case traﬃckers.
82“Operation Condor,” (b) the crackdowns against traﬃcking organizations operating in
Chihuahua in 1989, or (c) the capture of the leader of the Guadalajara Cartel. Instead,
all these cases indicate that crackdowns induced Mexican traﬃcking organizations to cre-
ate a disciplined and peaceful oligopolistic industry.
(a) Operation Condor: A Crackdown that Creates Order
By 1976, drug traﬃcking in Mexico was thriving. A larger demand for illegal
products, coming mostly from the hippie movement in the US, had increased the size of
the market served by Mexican traﬃckers (Astorga, 1996, p. 107). More Mexican towns
had rapidly started to engage in drug production (Astorga, 1996; Hern´ andez, 2012). In
just a couple of years, Mexico had become the most important purveyor of heroin into
the US, an activity that up until then had been concentrated in Turkey (Craig, 1980, p.
360). Actually, by the beginning of 1977, it is estimated that 21,161 square kilometers,
or 49.8% of the Sinaloa state, and 200,000 campesinos, were involved in drug traﬃcking
operations (Craig, 1980, p. 352). In small Mexican towns like Cosala, about 100 miles
north of Culiacan City, opium gum soon became “for many, if not most campesinos (...),
the ﬁrst and only source of cash income they had ever known [Christian Science Monitor,
1976; cited by (Craig, 1980, p. 353)].”
When this largely proﬁtable traﬃcking business created fears that drug money
would fuel communists guerrillas movements in Mexico’s rural areas, the Mexican govern-
ment reacted (McConahay, 1976; Wright, 1976, as cited by Craig (1980)). A crackdown
against traﬃcking organizations became increasingly attractive. It would not only beneﬁt
Mexican authorities by providing them with an ally, the US, but it would reduce ille-
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guerrilla movements (McConahay, 1976; Wright, 1976, as cited by Craig (1980)).
The crackdown came in 1977. Mexico’s federal government launched Operation
Condor, an unprecedented war to achieve “the total elimination of opium poppy cultiva-
tion” and to respond to a problem that, in the eyes of Mexican authorities, “had gone
out of control” [Mexican Federal Attorney General interviewed by Craig (1980, p. 351)].
Force was used. Cooperation between the US and Mexico was at a new high.3 Nearly
2,500 soldiers and 250 federal police were deployed, destroying 43,915 plots of opium and
14,801 hectares of marijuana ﬁelds (Craig, 1980). The Mexican army conﬁscated 192
kilograms of opium, 81 kilograms of heroin, and 6 kilograms of morphine and disman-
tled 20 heroin/morphine laboratories (Craig, 1980, p. 357). Concurrently, “Houses were
ransacked, men were beaten, women violated, and belongings conﬁscated” (Craig, 1980).
The results were soon felt in the drug market. DEA sources in Mexico City reported
that the percentage of the American heroin market supplied by Mexicans declined from
85% in 1974 to 50% in 1978 and the marijuana from 90% to just 20% (Craig, 1980). While
in 1976 8 tons of heroin were introduced into the US by Mexicans, only 4.5 tons were
exported in 1979. Retail prices and the purity of illegal drugs in the US also changed.
Pure heroin became scarce. One milligram of pure heroin increased from $1.26 to $2.25
in the same period (Craig, 1980).
Drug traﬃcking organizations quickly reacted. Violence diminished. Drug–related
3US oﬃcials noted that the working relationship between Mexican and American anti-narcotic au-
thorities became better than ever before. In their eyes, Operation Condor was the “ﬁnest aerial crop
eradication program (...) [with a] size, professionalism, competence, performance, and experience that
made it the best of the world ” (Scott and Marshall, 1998, p. 37)
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year (Craig, 1980), and large areas where drugs were produced almost depopulated (As-
torga, 1996). The state of Sinaloa, a large drug producer, still remained the “opium
epicenter” but production processes changed. Criminal organizations became more dis-
creet (Craig, 1980). Illegal drug plots became smaller and traﬃckers relocated to new
areas. Criminal leaders re-established themselves in Guadalajara, the second largest city
of Mexico (Astorga, 1996). After the crackdown, traﬃckers continued to conduct business,
but less violently and more quietly.
The Operation Condor crackdown was a clear and bold statement. It showed that
any criminal organization that aﬀected the interests of the state, by funding local guerrilla
movements, would be taken out of business once and for all. As the chief of Mexico’s
Federal police, Mr. Guillermo Calderoni, and head of the most important drug–related
crackdowns during the PRI-regime, pointed out, “without protection, no organization (...)
could survive.” In his opinion, “this was very simple. To say that nobody can ﬁnd them
[traﬃckers] is very diﬀerent than saying that nobody wants to catch them, or that nobody
wants to ﬁnd them. To be able is very diﬀerent than to be willing. Maybe nobody was
willing to ﬁnd them. If somebody would have wanted to ﬁnd them, I think, they would
have been able to” [interviewed by Gonz´ alez Ruiz et al. (1994)]. The declarations of
Mr. Calderoni match those made by many other individuals directly linked to the drug
traﬃcking industry. “Drug traﬃcking without the protection of the state” said Tostado
Felix, a criminal captured in 2000 for conducting large scale cocaine operations in Mexico,
(Diego, 2002) “would be nothing, it could not work (...). Cooperation [between traﬃckers
and the state] is a requirement” (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 234).
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but also became better organized because authorities created incentives for them.4 Having
organized crime, rather disorganized crime, supposes clear beneﬁts for Mexican authori-
ties. Criminal organization promotes criminal discipline because criminal leaders can be
held accountable for the actions of members of their respective organizations [see (Dem-
setz, 1967; Anderson et al., 2006; Anderson and McChesney, 2003; Umbeck, 1981) cited
by Leeson (2011)]. Organization could also increase proﬁts via economies of scale, making
bribes potentially larger.
It was right after 1977 that Mexico began creating large so called “drug cartels”
(Cruz, 2009). Secret informants agree that during this period, “policemen created their
own narcos,” supporting them in exchange for bribes (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 129). The
most important drug cartel of the eighties, the Guadalajara cartel, consolidated under
the protection of Mexican authorities after Operation Condor. Nazar Haro, the chief
of Mexico’s Federal Direction of Security (DFS), an agency to enforce the law against
drug traﬃckers, had a lot to do with this. CIA records show that Mr. Haro gave Felix
Gallardo, the leader of the cartel, police badges to use as a “license to traﬃc” (Dale Scott,
2000). The badges allowed traﬃckers to carry machine guns and to “interview” suspects
at will. Furthermore, the police protected the cartel’s trucks, granted traﬃckers access to
encoded radio systems to check border crossings for signs of American police surveillance,
and facilitated the transportation of contraband by boat (Scott and Marshall, 1998). The
4Literature on the economics of organized crime agrees that it is unfeasible that large criminal orga-
nizations emerge spontaneously, without the sponsorship of the state, because for criminals, large scale
organization is a liability. Criminals have few incentives to organize in large cells because in doing so
they attract the attention of authorities and incur large monitoring costs and agency problems (Reuter,
1985).
86brother-in-law of the leader of the Guadalajara Cartel (Aria-King 2012), Antonio Toledo,
became governor of Sinaloa (Ordo˜ nez, 1991, p. 342) in 1981. Guadalajara’s links with
politicians are well-recorded and well-known. Photographs in which traﬃckers are being
entertained at wedding and social events in houses of local politicians litter Mexican and
American newspapers (Aguilar Cam´ ın, 2008; Sheridan, 2000).
Evidence collected by journalists in the ﬁeld shows that most of the renowned
capos emerged under the direct sponsorship of the state (Blancornelas, 2002, p. 73). It
was, “commander Salvador Peralta (law enforcement oﬃcer), who taught Arellano Felix
(Tijuana drug lord) how to work [as drug traﬃcker] when he [and his brothers] were only
car thieves.” It was the chief of police of Tamaulipas, “who formed ‘The Texas’ [drug
traﬃcking organization] when they were only polleros (i.e. helped Mexicans to illegally
cross the US border)” [Secret informant quoted by Hern´ andez (2012, p. 129)]. Similar
incentives applied to other traﬃckers, which led some analysts to conclude that after Op-
eration Condor and by 1993, about 70% of all the drugs being traﬃcked into the US were
controlled by only three large criminal organizations in Mexico: The Ju´ arez cartel under
the leadership of Amado Carrillo, the Tijuana cartel under Arellano Felix, and the Gulf
cartel under Garcia Abrego (Ordo˜ nez, 1991).
(b) The Ju´ arez Cartel: A Crackdown that Promotes order
The Ju´ arez cartel, a drug traﬃcking organization that operates in the Mexican
state of Chihuahua, is another important example of crackdowns that do not cause vio-
lence. By the mid-eighties, drug traﬃcking in Chihuahua was being conducted by many
traﬃckers, each of whom operated in small, independent criminal cells. Pablo Acosta
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cells directed by traﬃckers Ontivero Lucero, Rafael Aguilar, Rafael Munoz, and Carrillo
Fuentes (G´ omez and Fritz, 2005; Cruz, 2009).
A series of crackdowns conducted by Guillermo Calderoni, the chief of Mexican
police, started in Ojinaga and Ju´ arez in 1987. Traﬃckers started to be prosecuted and
hunted with a force that Chihuahua had not seen before (Hern´ andez, 2012). One of
the ﬁrst was Ruben Jaramillo, an important traﬃcker who transported drugs between
Chihuahua and Sinaloa and who was captured in 1987 (Cruz, 2009). After two years,
many more had been prosecuted. Rafael Munoz was captured after 21.1 tons of cocaine
and $12.6 million had been seized from his properties in Los Angeles, CA (Cruz, 2009).
Ontivero Lucero was arrested and Pablo Acosta was assassinated. Calderoni himself killed
him (Cruz, 2009; Hern´ andez, 2012). The areas of operation of the captured traﬃckers
did not see signiﬁcant increases in criminal violence or battles for turf; instead all the
remnants of criminal cells were united and controlled by Carrillo Fuentes. Traﬃcking
operations conducted in Ojinaga and Ju´ arez consolidated under his leadership and the
Ju´ arez cartel emerged (Cruz, 2009).
By 1993, Carrillo Fuentes had become the uncontested head of a powerful criminal
organization that controlled the proﬁtable business of introducing cocaine into the US via
El Paso, Texas. Rafael Aguilar, the only traﬃcker who continued to operate in the area,
shared the territory (Cruz, 2009). Few traﬃckers would have ever had as consolidated an
organization as that of Carrillo Fuentes (G´ omez and Fritz, 2005; Ravelo, 2007; Hern´ andez,
2012). Actually, Carrillo was the ﬁrst capo to venture into technological innovation (Blan-
cornelas, 2002). Carrillo changed traﬃcking in Mexico by creating a large ﬂeet of airplanes
88to transport illegal substances, a major technological change for cocaine trans-shipment
that allowed him largely to increase proﬁts. This traﬃcking strategy gained him the alias
“The Lord of the Skies” (G´ omez and Fritz, 2005).
(c) The capture of Felix Gallardo: A Crackdown Without Criminal violence
The story of the leader of the Guadalajara cartel, Felix Gallardo, tells about crack-
downs while Mexico was centralized. Even if criminal organizations fractured as a result
of crackdowns, the newly created factions would not battle for turf.
The story starts in 1985, when a drug lord of the Guadalajara cartel, Caro Quin-
tero, killed DEA agent Enrique Camarena. Mr. Camarena was investigating Quintero’s
illegal operations in Mexico (Patenostro, 1995). Camarena had caused Quintero big proﬁt
losses just a year before, when Quintero’s ranch known as “El Bufalo” was raided. The
ranch had more than 1,344 acres of marijuana and was, until 2011, considered the largest
illegal plantation ever seized in Mexico. Quintero lost the equivalent of $3.5 billion in
2011 prices (Friedman, 2011). For all we know, Quintero did not intend to kill Camarena;
“he just wanted to beat him up but things went out of control” (Felix Gallardo 2010).
However, the damage was done.
The Mexican federal government soon reacted to the assassination of Camarena.
The Guadalajara cartel had crossed the line. Mexico launched the most important raid
against traﬃckers since Operation Condor. Federal policemen hunted and imprisoned the
most important Mexican drug lords one by one. Just two months after the assassination of
Camarena, Caro Quintero was arrested in Costa Rica while he was trying to ﬂee (G´ omez
and Fritz, 2005). Another important traﬃcker, Ernesto Fonseca, was captured four days
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Gallardo, the “No.1 narcotics traﬃcker in Mexico”, was captured in Culiacan city, the
capital of Sinaloa state (Rohter, 1989).
All those who protected Gallardo felt the punishment of the federal state. Army
troops rounded up the entire police force of the city, pointing to potential corruption
agreements made between them and Gallardo. Out of the 300 city policemen, 90 resigned
voluntarily. The Public Security Director of Sinaloa was ﬁred and his house was seized.
The chiefs of the municipal and state police were imprisoned and 15 state policemen
resigned their positions (Rohter, 1989).5
Following the raid, the Guadalajara cartel split into various smaller drug cartels,
each one under the command of a criminal leader operating in an independent area (Valle,
1995; Blancornelas, 2002). Journalistic accounts argue that all criminal factions made a
pact to respect each other’s territories in a conference held in Acapulco. According to the
story, all leaders agreed to operate as oligopolies and to conduct business in peace. Fees
would be charged if somebody wanted temporarily to use territories controlled by other
leaders. However, violence was prohibited (Blancornelas, 2002).6
5Informants say that when the chief of Mexico’s police arrested Gallardo, the traﬃcker referred to
him by his nickname. “Memo.” He said, “what is happening?” The fact that Felix Gallardo knew his
nickname has been taken as evidence of the corruption agreements that Gallardo had also established
with the federation (Ravelo, 2007).
6Much speculation exists about why the federal government decided to follow an enforcement strategy
that lead the Guadalajara cartel to split rather than to operate cohesively under the leadership of another
capo. Some have argued that it was Felix Gallardo himself who decided to divide his cartel (Ravelo, 2007).
Yet, it is not entirely unrealistic to assume that Felix Gallardo was not lying when, in the maximum
security prison in Mexico, he declared that it had been Mexican authorities who had decided to divide
the cartel. “It was Calderoni who divided the plaza” Felix Gallardo declared, “he did it to show oﬀ in
front of his bosses and then, he never captured anyone else anymore” (Osorno, 2009, p. 241). Logically,
it seems that by causing the Guadalajara cartel to fracture into smaller cells, a healthy balance could
90Authorities “needed to keep an equilibrium because if other [criminal] groups (...)
saw that [an agent] was working only with one group, they would try to “brush” him”
[interviewed by Flores P´ erez (2009, p. 205)] Oligopolies allowed corruption to remain
functional. Indeed, over the following years, drug–related violence was absent. Factions
did not battle among themselves for turf. Actually, homicides in Sinaloa decreased sig-
niﬁcantly. In 1986, Sinaloa had seen more than 1,400 homicides; by 1988 the ﬁgure had
decreased to just 506, and by 1990 the ﬁgure had gone as low as 449 (Rohter, 1989; INEGI,
2011).
Whether cartels explicitly made a pact or unilaterally decided to avoid confronta-
tion is ultimately irrelevant. What matters is that, after a crackdown, traﬃckers actually
behaved in non-violent ways. Peace came either because they were motivated formally to
agree on a pact —paying the costs of collective action— or because they wanted to act
peacefully for their own sake. Drawing from my theory, I argue that it was the central-
ization of Mexican institutions that allowed the Mexican state to act coherently against
its enemies and thus ultimately to keep traﬃckers aligned.
3.3 The Times of Criminal Violence (1998-2010)
What happened in the 2000’s is well known. A wave of drug–related violence hit Mexico.
Drug cartels started ﬁghting each other in a cruel battle for turf that spread into many
be maintained between the government and the criminal industry. The government needed to be careful
not to favor an organization that could become suﬃciently empowered as to be insensitive to federal
crackdowns. As interviews with Mexican authorities of that time show, keeping an oligopolistic illegal
drug market was the best way to achieve a balance of power (Flores P´ erez, 2009).
91areas throughout Mexico causing 51,000 victims. Traﬃckers’ homicide techniques became
increasingly cruel and sadistic, spreading fear among the population. Bodies started to
appear in the streets with messages aimed at other citizens, politicians or fellow criminals.
Heinous acts such as decapitation and torture suddenly became the rule rather that the
exception. Heads were thrown into the doors of primary schools, and massive executions
replaced targeted murders of a single person. Government authorities were increasingly
targeted by traﬃckers (Freeman, 2006; de los Derechos Humanos, 2008). In border cities
like Tijuana, at least 100 policemen died on duty just in 2008 (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009).
To put this in perspective, in the entire United States 133 police oﬃcers were killed in
the line of duty during the same year. The chief of police in Nuevo Laredo lasted eight
hours in the position (Garza, 2009) before being assassinated by traﬃckers.
In light of the results provided by my model, I argue that violence was possible
only because criminal organizations had changed and adapted to a decentralized political
environment. When the Mexican government could not continue to make decisions as
a single-headed decision-making body, as my theory has predicted, (a) lower-level gov-
ernments became capable of independent decision-making and of disobeying decisions
made at the top-level of government, and (b) larger criminal organizations increased their
propensity to violently confront each other and to create their own armies of private
protection.
3.3.1 Corruption Under decentralization
Mexico became a de facto (i.e. not only de jure) decentralized country when federal
authorities lost their capacity to induce discipline at other levels of government. Discipline
92was induced because a hegemonic party, the PRI, controlled all levels of government.
Thus, decentralization came when diﬀerent parties started ruling in diﬀerent levels of
government.
Starting in 1989, opposition parties increasingly won state elections, reducing the
leverage that the hegemonic party had over the careers and actions of members within
the government (Weldon, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1999, 2004; Snyder, 1999; Lujambio and Segl,
2000). While in 1990, 2,162 of a total of 2,475 municipalities had always been ruled by
the PRI, by 1998 and 2010 the number had diminished to 1,670 and 554, respectively.7
Every year between 1990 and 2010, the PRI lost the monopoly of authority in an average
of 80 municipalities, meaning that every electoral cycle the PRI lost about 9.7% of the
total local government available in Mexico.
As Figure 3.1 shows, the weakening of PRI’s hegemony had a large impact in the
centralization of command in diﬀerent municipalities. While during the nineties, 77% of
Mexico’s municipalities were ruled by the same party at all levels of government, in the
2000’s the ﬁgure was only 14%. Considering municipalities that were ruled by the same
party at the local and state level, 79% of the municipalities in the nineties were centralized,
while only 65% were in the 2000’s. With many parties controlling access to the beneﬁts
of the state, including decisions regarding the employment pool, the federal government
gradually lost its capacity to use the self-enforced discipline described in the previous
section. Lower-levels of government lost their incentive to comply with the decisions
made by the top-level government because their careers no longer depended on it. Unlike
7Extracting the state of Oaxaca, to leave a total 1,887 municipalities, the ﬁgures are 1,681, 1,123 and
182 for years 1990, 1998 and 2010 respectively.
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94previously, authorities could now maintain a career by joining opposition parties. When
alternative career paths opened, loyalty to the preferences of the federal elite lost its value
and indiscipline followed (Weldon, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1999, 2004; Snyder, 1999; Lujambio
and Segl, 2000; Magaloni, 2006).
Inducing lower-level authorities to comply with federal mandates became increas-
ingly diﬃcult. As opposition victories advanced, lack of discipline spread and became
corrosive. Local authorities, like state governors, increasingly defected from the sanc-
tions dictated by the federal government, and thus, were increasingly removed from their
positions by the federal government (Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez, 2008). Side corruption agree-
ments, which did not necessarily favor the preferences of the federal government, started
emerging. With decentralization, state governors saw their autonomy increase, and “they
could create their own clienteles, form groups and punish others without anybody to stop
them (...). Far from the image of governors acquiescing to presidential control, local ex-
ecutives could now demand attention, and above all, rule and make political decisions
freely” (Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez, 2008, p. 143-145).
At the beginning of democratization, the federal government managed to retain
a certain degree of control but only at a high cost. It ﬁrst reacted by trying to control
corruption agreements in a more personalized way. Corruption agreements from 1989 to
1994 were managed directly by the brother of the president, who personally monitored
compliance at the drug markets. According to interviews with local authorities, who
agreed to talk oﬀ-record (Flores P´ erez, 2009), and according to judicial records from
the trial of the president’s brother, Raul Salinas, it was Raul who personally conducted
auctions to allocate “reliable” authorities in highly proﬁtable locations for the illegal
95drug industry. This mechanism allowed the federation to sort authorities deployed in
drug traﬃcking areas by loyalty, a mechanism that had become necessary only because
the previous self-enforced dynamic had started to crumble. The system was simple and
proﬁtable. By paying a fee to Raul, enforcement authorities were allowed to engage
in corruption deals with traﬃckers. Police commanders had to pay between 200 and
500 thousand dollars to “buy spots at the border” (Carla del Ponte, Attorney General,
Switzerland; consulted by Flores P´ erez (2009)). The money was given directly to the
brother who soon started to be called “the 10% man” because of his mechanisms of price
setting (Osorno, 2009, p. 25). The federal government was micro-managing corruption
like never before because as decentralization took place, it increasingly needed to monitor
lower-level oﬃcials.
Yet, by the mid-nineties, keeping corruption centralized had become increasingly
more costly than proﬁtable. This is evidenced by the fact that the federal government
increasingly ﬁred attorney generals in an eﬀort to induce compliance with its mandates
(Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez, 2008). In sharp contrast with the years of solid authoritarianism
(1976-1988), where only two individuals had been removed as attorney generals, during
the early democratization process (1988-1994), there were ﬁve. The average tenure went
from an average of six years to a bit more than a year.
With the arrival of a new federal administration in 1994, headed by President
Ernesto Zedillo, decentralization was further pushed. Zedillo did not monitor or control
corruption agreements at the state level, as his predecessors had (Hern´ andez Rodr´ ıguez,
2008, p. 191). Actually, he took a series of security policy decisions that clearly showed his
willingness to decentralize security-policy decision-making. He selected Lozano Gracia,
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given to a member of the PRI. He dictated apprehension orders against Rodolfo Leon and
Adrian Carrera, two of the previous directors of the judicial police and PRI loyalists. Quite
importantly, he initiated a judicial process against Gutierrez Rebollo, another federal
oﬃcial who had been granted high discretionary power by later PRI presidents, sentencing
him to thirty-one years in prison on multiple charges, among them protecting the Ju´ arez
Cartel.
In 1997, decentralization accelerated. The electoral reforms of 1997, following
the creation of the Federal Institute in 1994, signiﬁcantly aﬀected the electoral rules,
leveraging the terrain for opposition parties (Magaloni, 2006). The rate at which the
PRI lost its monopoly further accelerated. From 1991 and until 1997, the PRI had lost
an average of 3.6% of its controlled municipalities. From 1998 and until 2004, the rate
more than doubled, peaking at an average of 7.4%. The rupture of the PRI’s monopoly
destroyed the capacity of the PRI to control the careers of politicians (Eisenstadt, 1999,
2004; Snyder, 1999; Lujambio and Segl, 2000).
Note that the arrival of opposition parties matters for my argument because it
triggered decentralization, not because of the emergence of opposition parties per se. If
the opposition parties had arrived and kept in place a system in which diﬀerent levels of
government were loyal to each other independently of their party aﬃliation, decentraliza-
tion would not have happened and criminal behavior wouldn’t have changed. In practical
terms, a democratic state where law enforcement decisions are dictated at the top with
no interference from lower-level authorities would be as centralized as an autocracy. De-
mocratization and decentralization do not always go hand-in-hand.
973.3.2 Criminal Violence-Propensity and Arming Under Decen-
tralization
As my formal model showed, decentralization promoted changes in the criminal world. In
particular, when pockets of independent political power began to emerge at diﬀerent levels
of government, so did incentives for organized crime to (a) increase in size, (b) create their
own armies of private protection, and (c) become more prone to violent confrontation.
First, criminal groups had incentives to increase in size because Mexican lower-
level governments did not have the same preferences as the federal government with
respect to the optimal size of criminal groups. The Mexican Constitution grants top-
level governments the sole responsibility to prosecute organized crime (CIDAC, 2011).
Lower-level authorities are neither accountable nor responsible for whether drug traﬃcking
organizations thrive or weaken.8 As a result, while Mexico’s federal government has clear
preferences for keeping organized crime limited to a level in which it is not visible, lower-
level authorities have no incentive to contain the growth of organized crime.
If anything, lower-level authorities would logically prefer criminal groups to grow
so that bribes can be larger. Lower-level governments do not care about the general
equilibrium of the Mexican state. Decentralization created a perverse environment in
which lower-level authorities generated low dispersed-beneﬁts from enforcing the law and
high concentrated-beneﬁts from being corrupt. Once the federal government failed to
provide concentrated-beneﬁts in the form of career advancements to lower-level authori-
8Mexico’s judicial system divides crimes in local and federal according to whether local or federal
authorities are in charge of prosecution. Both spheres have separate judicial institutions and in most
cases, remain largely independent.
98ties that adhere to federal preferences, criminal organizations immediately acquired more
opportunities to grow.9
The growth of criminal groups during the nineties is clear. While in 1997 the
Sinaloa Cartel only had presence in 10 municipalities, in 2006, it was present in 75 mu-
nicipalities and in 2010 in 176 (Coscia and Rios, 2012). The same pattern is true for
many other criminal organizations. Figure 3.2 shows the number of municipalities in
which diﬀerent cartels operated in Mexico from 1990 and until 2010. Drug cartels started
spreading in the early 2000’s just after the PRI had lost its monopoly of power at the
federal level. By 2010, four cartels operated in more than a hundred municipalities: Zetas,
Sinaloa, Familia and Gulf.
Second, decentralization produced incentives for traﬃckers to arm themselves. Cre-
ating private protection armies became more attractive to traﬃckers because decentral-
ization diminished the value of authorities’ protection. Diﬀerent government levels could
now act in contradictory ways. For example, some agencies could crackdown on traﬃckers
that were paying protection fees to other agencies. A telephone conversation recovered
from the conﬁscated cell phone of the traﬃcker “El Rey”Zambada (Hern´ andez, 2012)
shows that minutes before he was captured by federal authorities, he was calling his allies
at another government agency. Actually, while federal agents were surrounding El Rey’s
house and trying to capture him from the rooftop, another group of policemen opened ﬁre
9This is a classic common pool access dilemma largely discussed in the literature on criminal justice
(Benson, 1994; Ekelund and Dorton, 2003) but largely disregarded by academics studying the dynamics
of organized crime. By cooperating with the federal government, local authorities were beneﬁting all
citizens, creating a free, common pool good: security. By not cooperating, local authorities amassed
bribes, a private good. It is well-known that individuals tend to under-invest in the maintenance of
common pool goods and over-invest in private ones. This translates into more organized crime than
optimal in decentralized environments.
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Source: (Coscia and Rios, 2012)
100against the federal agents (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 511). Similar circumstances surrounded
the capture of Beltr´ an Leyva in 2008. The traﬃcker was paying monthly bribes to author-
ities in diﬀerent levels of government when he was captured by the army (Reveles, 2011).
After his capture, the state secretary of public security and many other state authori-
ties were arrested, captured under charges of protecting criminal organizations (Reveles,
2011).
The days in which the government could prevent a criminal organization from
getting attacked by another rival organization had also come to an end. The government
had diminished its capacity to punish violent behavior in a cohesive fashion, reducing
its ability to enforce peace in the criminal industry, and thus, generating a demand for
protection among criminal organizations that they could not satisfy.
As my theory would predict, following the decentralization of Mexico’s government,
traﬃckers began to arm themselves. They went from organizing in single-sector ﬁrms
specialized in traﬃcking operations and “outsourcing” protection from to the state, to
being multi–layered organizations, both traﬃcking and protecting themselves with their
own private armies. Rather than outsourcing expensive, uncertain protection from the
federal government, traﬃckers integrated protection within their production functions.
They created their own groups of armed members, their sicarios, and private armies.
Arming was further facilitated by increases in cocaine proﬁts. Mexican criminal
organizations increased their proﬁtability as a result of (a) increased law enforcement op-
erations in Colombia, and (b) the endorsement of NAFTA, a cooperative trade agreement
between the US, Mexico and Canada, in 1994.
First, proﬁts increased when, during the nineties, law enforcement operations in
101Colombia and along the Caribbean increased the leverage of Mexican traﬃckers in the drug
production chain. Until then, the preferred route for traﬃcking drugs into the US had been
to trans-ship them from Colombia, via the Caribbean islands, to Miami (UNODC 2010).
Yet, the increased use of radars and crackdowns in Colombia made traﬃckers rethink
their strategy. Weakened Colombian cartels increasingly relied on Mexicans to introduce
their merchandise into the U.S. (Andreas, 1998). As early as 1991, some analysts already
pointed to Peru and Bolivia as more important areas of drug production than Colombia
(G´ omez and Fritz, 2005, p. 287). The ﬁrst mention of Mexico as the main port of entry
of drugs into the US came in 1993. By the mid-nineties, it was clear that Mexico had
taken over. About 80% of all the cocaine consumed in the US was introduced via Mexico,
while the Caribbean became just an alternative route.
A second variable that increased the proﬁtability of Mexico’s drug traﬃcking in-
dustry was the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The
agreement signiﬁcantly improved the comparative advantage of Mexican traﬃckers to in-
troduce illegal drugs into the US. Following what economic theory would predict (Fox
et al., 2003; Haralambides and Londono-Kent, 2004), the agreement reduced transac-
tional costs, stimulating trade between Mexico and the US, particularly at border cross-
ings [OFMO (2002) cited by (Matisziw, 2005, p. 2)]. From 1995 to 2003, the overall
value of US-Mexico and Mexico-Canada trade more than doubled, while truck activity
between the US and Mexico increased almost 31% (Matisziw, 2005). Because most drugs
introduced into the US are hidden in legal containers, NAFTA immediately translated
into better conditions for the drug business. Mexican traﬃckers moved fast. They even
hired trade consultants to identify the cargos that were least likely to be inspected at the
102border.10 Some perishable goods, for example, are inspected the least to avoid delays at
the border that may cause the products to spoil.
NAFTA further incentivized war because it changed the balance of power between
criminal organizations. Rather than improving wealth homogeneously within Mexico,
NAFTA changed the allocation of comparative advantage among traﬃcking organizations.
As ﬁgure 3.2 shows, when new trade regulations were enacted, the city of Nuevo Laredo,
an eastern border town located south of Laredo, Texas, became quite useful for trade.
NAFTA signiﬁed the empowerment of the Gulf cartel, the criminal organization that
controlled the city of Nuevo Laredo. By 2000, 32.69% of all cargo crossed into the US
via Nuevo Laredo, while only around 16% crossed via Tijuana or Ju´ arez, respectively. In
practical terms this means that about 35.58% of all the revenues coming from US-Mexico
trade was done in Nuevo Laredo, while only 21.49% was done in Ju´ arez, and 11.16% in
Tijuana (Matisziw, 2005).
The ﬁrst private armies started emerging in Mexico right after 1997. The Gulf
Cartel coopted soldiers deployed by the Mexican federal government to ﬁght drug traf-
ﬁcking and used them to form its private army, known as Zetas. In 1998, between 31
and 67 members of the GAFE, a specialized military, resigned from their positions and
became Zetas (Ravelo, 2012). Recruitment methods were quite bold and included among
many other techniques, the interception of military radio frequencies to broadcast mes-
sages to soldiers and inform them of the many economic beneﬁts that they would obtain
if they “shifted bands.” Military human capital was extremely valuable for traﬃckers;
they “not only knew about weapons, operations, and communications [but] in many cases
10Anonymousauthority interviewed oﬀ-record by author.
103Table 3.2: Number of Trucks Crossing U.S.–Mexico border (2000)
2000
U.S. — Mexico Crossing Total % Empty
Nuevo Laredo 1,351,771 43.93
Tijuana 681,413 45.60





Piedras Negras 106,895 43.96
Acuna 61,226 35.99
Mexicalli 63,254 48.95
San Luis Rio Colorado 30,303 37.55
Camargo 21,849 24.11
Agua Prieta 29,376 40.67
Miguel Aleman 12,957 43.24
Ojinaga 8,742 33.50
Total 4,134,598 1,823,258
% of all border crossings 98.43 98.52
Source: Matisziw (2005). Note that not all points of entry are reported.
104maintained friendships with active-duty oﬃcers” (Bailey and Taylor, 2009) which allowed
them to remain close with valuable informants. Private armies were also developed by
the Sinaloa Cartel, known as “Los Negros” and “Los Pelones” (Men´ endez et al., 2008),
and the Ju´ arez Cartel, under the name of “La Linea” (Paez Varela, 2009). By 2008, the
Mexican secretary of defense estimated that one-third of all Mexican traﬃckers had once
served in the military [G´ omez and Ramos (2008) cited by (Bailey and Taylor, 2009, p.
20)].
Federal and state police oﬃcers, local gang members and even Central American
illegal immigrants were also recruited to become the armed branches of drug cartels (Rios,
2010; Ravelo, 2007; Maule´ on, 2010a). Recruitment for gangs was quite prominent, partic-
ularly in poor urban areas like border towns. The Mexican transformation industry had
been taken over by China generating a large pool of unemployed young men eager to ﬁnd
some income (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010a). The Ju´ arez cartel hired between 300 and 500
local gangs, out of which 30 had at least 500 members. The Mexicles, one of the largest
ones, may have even surpassed 2,000 members (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2010b). The Sinaloa
cartel recruited members from the Mara Salvatrucha, and the Tijuana Cartel hired US-
Mexican gangs like “La M” and “Barrio Logan” (Maule´ on, 2010a). The Gulf cartel even
constructed boot camps to train civilians such that by 2005, Zetas had between 300 and
350 members (Hern´ andez, 2012, p. 403-405).
By 2005, the declarations of Mexico’s Attorney General clearly showed that Mex-
ican authorities were well aware of the important changes that had taken place within
the criminal industry. “It is evident” he said “that the people who manage the economic
aspects of these groups are very diﬀerent from those who manage the assassinations (...)
105we need to be conscious that [criminal] groups function as true corporations (Osorno,
2009, p. 146).”
Interestingly, in the case of Mexico, decentralization not only set incentives for
traﬃckers to arm themselves but also indirectly facilitated the acquisition of the human
capital for them to do it. When federal authorities could not trust lower-level authorities,
federal drug–related crackdowns militarized. For criminal organizations this was an de
facto increase in the quality of human resources available for them to co-opt.
The army was the logical choice for federal authorities looking for a loyal and pro-
fessional enforcement agency. The Mexican army had long been a partner of Mexico’s
hegemonic party, supporting the regime in exchange for large military budgets, and au-
tonomy in the selection of their leaders (Stepan, 1988; Ai Camp, 1992; Davis et al., 2004;
Pi˜ neyro et al., 2005; Moloeznik, 2008). The army was the only enforcement agency that
even after decentralization remained completely loyal to the federal government (Valad´ es
and Massieu, 1989). Soldiers were increasingly used to oversee drug-traﬃcking operations
along Mexico’s territory. Actually, the militarization of drug–related operations took a
major step in 1994, precisely the year in which President Zedillo took power. Previously,
the military had been engaged in crop eradication but never in the direct capture of
traﬃckers (El-Universal, 2003; Sierra Guzm´ an, 2003; Flores P´ erez, 2009). It was in the
mid-nineties that the role of the military forces changed.
The increasing use of highly professionalized military forces to oversee drug traf-
ﬁcking operations was an asset to traﬃckers. By allowing traﬃckers and the army to
interact, traﬃckers were able to access a pool of potential employees that were better
trained in the use of violence than any local or federal police department. The Mexi-
106can government inadvertently provided criminal organizations with the very best of their
“violence capital” right when traﬃckers were thinking of expanding their capacity for
violence.
Finally, a third consequence of decentralization is that it made criminal orga-
nizations more prone to violence. Following the intuition of my formal model, under
decentralization, the costs of bloodshed are not internalized because governments are re-
sponsible for maintaining crime controlled only within its pre-deﬁned jurisdiction. One
government has no reason to prosecute crimes committed in another government’s ju-
risdiction, even when such violence is perpetrated by a criminal organization that also
operates in the jurisdiction of the former. Criminals may then behave strategically, keep-
ing bases of operation in some jurisdictions, to fund oﬀensive violent measures in others.
A low intensity warfare, for example, becomes possible. Criminals may engage in targeted
violence against a rival group by selectively tormenting a jurisdiction in which they do not
generate proﬁts and escaping prosecution, by hiding in another jurisdiction where they
proﬁt and operate peacefully and safely.
3.3.3 Crackdowns With Violence
Drawing from my theory, decentralization resulted in a radical and fascinating change
in the behavior of criminal organizations that speaks directly to the causes behind Mex-
ico’s escalation in drug–related violence. In particular, decentralization determined how
criminal organizations would react after they were hit by an external shock, such as an
unexpected crackdown.
Crackdowns under decentralization are conducive to turf battles because criminal
107groups become increasingly prone to violent behavior and because crackdowns create op-
portunities to ﬁght. First, criminal groups are more prone to be violent because they
are armed and can use jurisdiction strategically. They can simply avoid prosecution by
ﬁghting for turf in some areas while hiding in others. Second, a crackdown generates
opportunities to ﬁght because it changes the balance of power within the criminal indus-
try, presenting criminal groups with the choice of either peacefully restoring a balance by
compromising or violently confronting each other until rival factions are weakened. Every-
thing else being equal, criminal groups will be inclined to pick the latter in decentralized
environments because punishment for violent behavior is less probable.
Yet, criminals will not become immediately violent after decentralization takes
place. Criminal groups may ﬁnd it in their best interest to conduct operations in peace.
Violence is costly and attracts the attention of the federal government, which increases
prosecution and hurts long-cultivated corruption relations between authorities and crimi-
nals. It is well-known that “when traﬃckers exists and function, they don’t need to show
themselves”11 (Hern´ andez, 2012). Organized crime does not necessarily become more
violent as its relative power with respect to the state increases, as some have proposed
(Godson, 2003; Pimentel, 2001).
Actually, in the case of Mexico, traﬃckers created informal mechanisms peaceful
equilibrium even under decentralization. During the early years of decentralization, crim-
inal groups increasingly formed pacts to ally and diminish the probability of large scale
conﬂict (Carrizales, 2001; Ramirez, 2002; Maule´ on, 2010a; Corchado, 2009; Hern´ andez,
11Interview with Carrillo Olea, ﬁrst director of Mexican Intelligence Services (CISEN), and governor of
the state of Morelos who in 1998 was forced to resign. He was prohibited by law from taking any political
position, after being accused of protecting criminal gangs (Alvarado, 2011).
1082012; Ravelo, 2010). The ﬁrst pact came as early as 1993, when traﬃckers from ten
cartels met under the invitation of a drug traﬃcker known as “El Azul” to sign “The
Northern Peace” agreement (Ravelo, 2004). Apparently, the agreement was designed to
promote cooperation between Ju´ arez, Gulf and Sinaloa cartels, an alliance to temper the
power of Tijuana cartel, which during the nineties controlled the highly proﬁtable entry
to California. Another similar pact was signed in 2001, this time without the consent of
Gulf cartel, between Ju´ arez and Sinaloa. This later alliance, known as “The Federation”
(Maule´ on, 2010a) brought together criminal organizations that were increasingly distrust-
ful of the power that armed Gulf cartel had been acquiring since NAFTA. Other similar
agreements, reinforcing alliances to temper power within the drug industry have been
documented by Carrizales (2001); Ramirez (2002); Corchado (2009); Hern´ andez (2012)
among others. Testimonial evidence collected from prosecuted traﬃckers supports the
existence of agreements and alliances, most of them conducted in the form of minor, less
structured gatherings, such as parties, social events, and business meetings. With aston-
ishing regularity, traﬃckers or their representatives seem to meet personally, or digitally,
to discuss agreements (Valdez Villareal, 2010).
In the absence of centralized control, as political scientists and economists have
long documented,12 when only informal mechanisms are used to sustain agreements, peace
is possible but fragile (Leeson, 2011). Any shock impacting the utility of members within
12For example, Benson (1988, 1989); Leeson and Stringham (2005); Leeson (2011) document the opera-
tion of conﬂict-inhibiting norms in some primitive societies. Landa (1981, 1994) considers the emergence
of norms to govern commercial transactions in contemporary Southeast Asia. Similarly, Greif (1989, 1993)
analyzes the importance of norms for 11th-century Mediterranean traders, and Bernstein (1992) examines
extra-legal mechanisms of contract enforcement in the contemporary diamond industry. Finally, Ellickson
(1991) considers the emergence of conﬂict-inhibiting norms in modern-day Shasta County, California.
109the alliance may lead to the rupture of the agreement, depending on how it changes the
expected beneﬁts of membership. Keeping alliances is even more diﬃcult if members are
armed.
Paradoxically, it was the Mexican federal government itself who broke the equilib-
rium that traﬃckers had struggled to keep alive. The destabilizing shock would be a series
of crackdowns. These crackdowns happened under decentralization; for example, (a) the
capture of Osiel Cardenas, the leader of the Gulf cartel in 2003, and (b) the capture
of Alfredo Beltr´ an Leyva in 2008, a leader of Sinaloa Cartel, who promoted indiscipline,
fracture and confrontation in Mexico’s drug traﬃcking industry. All these cases show how
crackdowns were behind Mexico’s large escalation in violence during the ﬁrst decade of
the second millennium.
(a) A War Starts: The Capture of Osiel Cardenas
At the beginning of the 2000’s, a drug cartel named La Familia operated in Mi-
choac´ an under the name of “La Empresa” in an alliance with the Gulf Cartel and its
private army, the Zetas. La Familia controlled L´ azaro C´ ardenas, the main naval port of
Michoac´ an and one of the main entries for illegal substances coming from South America.
An informal cooperative agreement between La Familia and Gulf was in place, according
to which Gulf was able to use the port in exchange for providing private protection for
La Familia and training them in the use of violence (Grayson, 2010).
A drug war between La Familia and Zetas was detonated by a crackdown coming
in the form of the 2003 capture of the leader of the Gulf cartel, Osiel Cardenas. The
federal government had resolved to use force against his criminal organization after a
110slight increase in the number of homicides in Nuevo Laredo (Ravelo, 2012; Osorno, 2009;
Hern´ andez, 2012). The capture of Osiel was quite a destabilizing shock for the criminal
industry, not only because it aﬀected the criminal organization that controlled the most
proﬁtable port of entry into the US, the city of Nuevo Laredo, but because of the Gulf’s
security wing, Zetas.
After the crackdown, the two factions of the Gulf cartel had diﬃculties agreeing
on a single leader, which led Zetas to try to become ﬁnancially independent by taking
over the territory of La Familia. Zetas started confronting La Familia. By 2005, violence
started to increase in alarming numbers in many cities along Michoac´ an, including L´ azaro
C´ ardenas.
Furthermore, the crackdown was a profound shock to the fragile peace that had
been kept between Gulf and other cartels. The incentives crumbled, which Ju´ arez and
Sinaloa cartels had made in order to keep their alliance with the Gulf cartel (Hern´ andez,
2012). It was quite appealing for both cartels to try to take over the valuable territory of
the weakened Gulf cartel, which they proceeded to do.
Ju´ arez and Sinaloa reinforced their alliance and instructed their private army,
under the command of a traﬃcker known as Barbie, to start the war (Maule´ on, 2010a).
Just 15 days after the capture of Osiel, Barbie gave an ultimatum to the remnants of
the Golf cartel: “You have 15 days to give us your territory or we will come to take it”
(Ravelo, 2012). The war had begun.
When confrontations between the Ju´ arez-Sinaloa alliance vs. Gulf, and Familia vs.
Zetas caused violence to escalate, the federal government responded. In 2006, President
Calder´ on started an oﬀensive against drug traﬃcking organizations. La Familia’s main
111territory, Michoac´ an, was the ﬁrst state to experience the intervention of the army to
ﬁght drug traﬃcking. Just ten days after taking oﬃce, President Calder´ on deployed
6,784 soldiers, 1,054 marines, 1,420 federal policemen, and 50 detectives in Michoac´ an
(Grayson, 2010).President Calder´ on declared “a war on drugs” which continued through
his administration and extended from Michoac´ an to at least seven other states and regions:
Chihuahua, the Isthmus region (Mexico’s southern border), Guerrero, Baja California,
Sinaloa, Nuevo Le´ on-Tamaulipas, and the Golden Triangle (parts of Chihuahua, Sinaloa,
and Durango). As a result of prosecution operations within La Familia areas of operation,
a total of 295 individuals were assassinated from 2006 to 2010. The state with the highest
number of drug–related homicides in the period was Guerrero with 159 cases, followed by
Michoac´ an with 98, and Guanajuato with 38 (SNSP, 2011).
By May of 2008 the battle between Zetas and Familia was in place. The confronta-
tion had spread to other states, like Guanajuato, Guerrero and Mexico State. In fact,
about 18.8% of all the 34,611 drug–related homicides occurring in Mexico from December
2006 until 2010 happened in states where La Familia and Zetas were ﬁghting (SNSP,
2011). The average number of drug–related homicides in confronting states (1,635) was
about 63.1% higher than the same ﬁgure in other states (1,003) (SNSP, 2011). Overall,
a total of 6,536 homicides can be traced directly or indirectly to battles between Zetas
and Familia (SNSP, 2011). Both groups engaged in violent targeted executions of rival
members, dropping decapitated and tortured bodies in the cities where their enemies op-
erated. A billboard saying “this is a message for those working with the Zetas of Laredo”
appeared next to the body of an individual assassinated in the port of L´ azaro C´ ardenas
in 2008. The same message was found also in P´ atzcuaro, Michoac´ an, another important
112area for La Familia.
The schism between Zetas and La Familia became publicly evident in October 2008
when Zetas executed an ex-policemen, allegedly a member of La Familia, and left a signed
narco-message reading “This will happen to all those who work for La Familia.” In just a
few months, competition between La Familia and Zetas to control Michoac´ an intensiﬁed,
and violence followed. Signed billboards appeared in many of the most important cities of
Michoac´ an, for example: “this goes to those working for Z, and for all Zetas. Here we are
and we won’t leave.” Sometimes these were directly addressed to policemen, providing
information on the names, locations, and operations of leaders and traﬃckers belonging
to the opposing organization.
As Figure 3.3 shows, there is a strong association between the number of areas
where Familia and Zetas were competing and drug–related homicides. During the peak
of violence, La Familia and Zetas were intensively competing and communicating with
each other. In months where confrontation could be identiﬁed, the average number of
drug–related homicides per month was 53.2, almost 90% higher than the 27.6 drug–
related homicides in months without confrontation. Moreover, since Zetas ﬁrst emerged
as a La Familia competitor in October 2008, violence escalated from an average of 24.6
drug–related homicides per month to 43.1, an increase of 80%.
The fracture of Zetas from the Gulf and their invasion of Familia territories could
also be felt in other Mexican states, particularly Guanajuato. Until late-2008, traﬃcking
within the state was controlled by a stable alliance between the Sinaloa Cartel and La
Familia. At that time, the average number of drug–related executions in the state was
about 4.5 per month. In 2007 the state only suﬀered 51 cases of drug-violence and in 2008
113Figure 3.3: Familia vs. Zetas, Confrontation in Michoac´ an
Source: SNSP (2011); Rios (2012) Note: Competition is proxied by tracking traﬃckers’
public communications. A municipality is considered competitive when Zetas and
Familia communicated one with another via public billboards. Traﬃcking organizations
in Mexico commonly use public billboards to threaten their enemies (Coscia and Rios,
2012).
114only 79. Without any source of confrontation between La Familia and the Sinaloa Cartel,
or between other drug traﬃcking organizations, Guanajuato was literally as peaceful as
Honolulu. Guanajuato’s general homicide rate was about 2.39 per 100,000 inhabitants,
quite impressive for one of the most urban states in the country.
The peace was shattered when the hostilities between La Familia and Zetas spread
into the state. The ﬁrst record of Zetas operating in the state happened in November 2008
when a message blaming an ex-federal policeman for supporting them was left in Irapuato,
Guanajuato. Messages soon inundated the state, some of them explicitly linking drug–
related violence to the conﬂict between La Familia and Zetas. In Celaya, for example, a
message signed by Zetas was left next to a body declaring “These are people of La Familia,
kidnappers, extorters, and terrorist apprentices.” Others just warned the population
about what Zetas claimed to be the ultimate reasons for the confrontation: “[We] condemn
the crystal and ice poisoners [i.e. drug dealers] belonging to La Familia. We are just taking
out the trash.” By January 2009, the open confrontation between La Familia and Zetas
had turned Guanajuato upside down. In 2009, there were 234 drug–related homicides, an
increase of 196% compared to 2008. Violence spiked during the ﬁrst half of 2009, when
drug–related homicides averaged of 19.75 per month.
As Figure 3.4 shows, drug–related violence in Guanajuato tends to be higher when
many traﬃcking organizations operate and compete in a single municipality. A com-
petitive month has an average of 17.4 drug–related homicides, while a month without
competition has only 7.3. As a matter of fact, when Zetas confronted La Familia, Guana-
juato was unrecognizable in terms of drug violence. In 2009 it joined the list of the top-ten
most violent states for the ﬁrst time ever. As Mrs. Berta, a food vendor of Cuer´ amaro,
115a border town between Michoac´ an and Guanajuato, confessed to Ver´ onica Espinoza, a
journalist of Proceso magazine, “We have no peace. Now, with all the homicides. God!
You realize people suddenly start having money and cars, and a little after that they are
killed; you never imagined they were doing the narco thing.”
Figure 3.4: Familia vs. Zetas, Confrontation in Guanajuato
Source: SNSP (2011); Rios (2012) Note: Competition is proxied by tracking traﬃckers’
public communications. A municipality is considered competitive when Zetas and
Familia communicated one with another via public billboards. Traﬃcking organizations
in Mexico commonly use public billboards to threaten their enemies (Coscia and Rios,
2012).
(b) A war Spreads: The Capture of Beltr´ an Leyva in Guanajuato
Following military operations conducted by Mexico’s federal government since
2006, in 2008 a lieutenant of the Sinaloa Cartel named Alfredo Beltr´ an Leyva was cap-
116tured. Beltr´ an Leyva’s capture caused a split within the Sinaloa Cartel that spread
violence to Guerrero (Guerrero 2009). The brothers of Beltr´ an Leyva, H´ ector and Arturo,
also lieutenants of the Sinaloa Cartel, blamed the top leader of the criminal organization,
Joaquin Guzm´ an (alias “El Chapo”) for Beltr´ an Leyva’s arrest (Ravelo, 2012). They
suspected El Chapo had given the Mexican army information to capture Beltr´ an Leyva
in exchange for releasing El Chapo’s son, Iv´ an Guzm´ an, from prison. When Iv´ an was
released, Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers started an open war against El Chapo (Ravelo, 2010).
This enforcement-driven schism within Sinaloa soon aﬀected the state of Guerrero.
Up until then, the state had been more or less stable since an alliance between La Familia
and Sinaloa Cartel controlled the region. The Sinaloa Cartel’s main operator in the
ﬁeld was a well-known local traﬃcker named Rogaciano. Yet, when Beltr´ an Leyva was
captured, his brothers forced Rogaciano to decide between joining them and continuing
to work with the old Sinaloa Cartel (Proceso, 2010). When Rogaciano took sides with
the Sinaloa Cartel, the massacre started. In May 2008, a group of armed men working for
Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers’ local lieutenant “El Nene” arrived at Rogaciano’s home with
orders to kill him, but they could not ﬁnd him. Instead, they kidnapped Rogaciano’s
19-year old daughter. Rogaciano took revenge by killing two of El Nene’s daughters, his
wife, and his sister-in-law.13 El Nene was furious and a war erupted. A massive number
of Rogaciano’s collaborators were executed in the resulting onslaught.
The relationship between drug–related homicides and conﬂicts between traﬃckers
caused by enforcement operations in Guerrero is captured quite explicitly by messages
that traﬃckers left in their areas of operation. Just after the assassination of Nene’s
13Anonymous authority interviewed oﬀ-record by author.
117family, a message reading “This is a message for Rogaciano (...) Kids and women should
not be killed. We will only kill men (...) This will happen to all of you who help him
[Rogaciano]” appeared in Guerrero.
As Figure 3.5 shows, once battles for turf between Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers and
the Sinaloa Cartel started, violence increased gradually in Guerrero. Violence in Guerrero
had remained mostly contained with an average of 22.1 drug–related homicides per month
and a general homicide rate of about 18.71 per 100,000 inhabitants. From April 2008 to
May 2008, the month in which Rogaciano’s daughter was kidnapped, violence went from
eleven drug–related homicides to 41, an increase of 264%. Just a year before the ﬁrst
messages between Beltr´ an Leyva and the Sinaloa Cartel appeared in August 2008, the
state of Guerrero had about 24.8 drug–related homicides per month, with an average
change rate of minus 1.92. A year later, there were on average 51.3 homicides, at an
increasing rate of 6.33 per month.
At these rates, Guerrero soon became one of the three most violent states in
Mexico, calling the attention of enforcement operations and locking the state into a self-
reinforcing violent equilibrium.
When federal troops were deployed in Guerrero, confrontations between authorities
and traﬃckers caused casualties and captures that further destabilized criminal organi-
zations. Drug–related homicides almost doubled, from 299 in 2007, to 419 in 2008, and
to 879 in 2009. As Figure 3.6 shows, the number of enforcement operations (confronta-
tions between drug traﬃcking organizations and government) and drug–related violence
are well correlated. For instance, March 2009, one of the two most violent months in the
sample with 106 drug–related homicides, is also the month with the highest number of
118Figure 3.5: Bentral Leyva vs. Sinaloa, Confrontation in Guerrero
Source: SNSP (2011); Rios (2012) Note: Competition (or internal confrontation) is
proxied by tracking traﬃckers’ public communications. A municipality is considered
competitive (or internally confronted) when Beltr´ an Leyva and Sinaloa (or Beltr´ an
Leyva internal factions) communicated one with another via public billboards.
Traﬃcking organizations in Mexico commonly use public billboards to threaten their
enemies (Coscia and Rios, 2012).
119enforcement operations.
Figure 3.6: Drug–related Violence and Crackdowns in Guerrero
Perhaps one of the most inﬂuential eﬀects of law enforcement on violence hap-
pened in December 2009, when one of Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers, Arturo, was killed by the
Mexican Navy. His assassination left H´ ector as the only remaining brother confronting
the Sinaloa Cartel.
The previous story repeated itself. H´ ector could not keep the loyalty of all of his
followers, which caused the emergence of a competing traﬃcking organization led by a
traﬃcker named Edgar Vald´ es Villarreal (alias “Barbie”). Barbie’s followers became inde-
pendent in January 2010 and started a direct confrontation against H´ ector that could also
be felt in Guerrero. This conﬂict overlapped with the preexisting conﬂict between H´ ector
and the Sinaloa Cartel and further increased the violence. Again, messages between drug
cartels track this confrontation with close precision. Just thirty-four days after Arturo was
killed, the bodies of four men were found next to a long explanation that read “This goes
for all who are with H´ ector Beltr´ an Leyva (...) You gave Mr. Arturo Beltr´ an Leyva to the
120authorities (...) Keep sending people and we will keep giving them back to you like these
(...).” After this message was displayed, Acapulco, Petatl´ an, and other municipalities in
Guerrero transformed into battleﬁelds.14
As Figure 3.5 showed, once Barbie came into the picture, H´ ector battled both
the Sinaloa Cartel and Barbie. Violence kept increasing and never returned to the levels
before the Sinaloa Cartel-Beltr´ an Leyva dispute. The average number of drug–related
executions in months where some competition could be found is about 83.9% higher than
those when drug markets seem to be monopolistic. While a month with competition has
an average of 68.12 drug–related homicides, a month without it has only 37.03.
This story repeated itself. When Barbie was captured, his organization divided
into further confronting cells. Battles for turf continued and homicide rates in Mexico
escalated. This was Mexico’s drug war.
14By 2010, Acapulco was the second most violent city in Mexico and one of the top-50 most violent
cities in the world (SNSP, 2011). The confrontation between Barbie and Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers caused
at least 5,596 casualties from December 2006 to August 2010. It was the third most violent confrontation
between traﬃcking organizations in Mexico during the same period, after the conﬂict between the Sinaloa
Cartel and Beltr´ an Leyva’s brothers (7,813 casualties) and between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Ju´ arez
Cartel (12,174) (Vald´ ez Villareal, 2011).
121Chapter 4
Testing the Role of Decentralization
in Shaping Criminal Behavior
Within a decentralized system, diﬀerent levels of government dictate policies indepen-
dently of one another. Such a system makes criminal organizations prone to violent
behavior. In this chapter, I present empirical evidence supporting this theory.
But ﬁrst, I will make the following disclaimer: To reason empirically about the
relationship between government and criminals is not easy. On top of the ordinary chal-
lenges of social science research, in this case the subjects of my study, and their actions,
are inherently secretive. Very little is known about the size, magnitude and frequency of
bribing, and there exists no signiﬁcant tracking of drug traﬃcking operations or of the re-
lationship between traﬃckers and government oﬃcials. Our knowledge about corruption
agreements, as academics, comes from journalistic accounts that describe political scan-
dals. These accounts do not emerge by a random distribution and they are not covered
122systematically. Furthermore, Mexican authorities have reported data of criminal violence,
at the sub-national level, only from December 2006 to September 2011 (SNSP 2012), a
period in which criminal organizations were already signiﬁcantly violent (Rios and Shirk
2009). Even if data on criminal violence were complete, a proper empirical test of my
theory would require an assessment of how criminals react to destabilizing forces in the
form of a crackdown. Such an assessment could explain how a propensity towards vio-
lence transforms to become actual violence. Unfortunately, no systematic records exist,
chronicling the reaction of drug lords to crackdowns throughout Mexico’s history.
I design here an empirical test that circumvents these problems and, in some
measure, validates my theory.
This chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by explaining the basic logic
behind my empirical design. A second section shows my methodology and walks the
reader through how each piece of my empirical test was operationalized and its three main
speciﬁcations: logit, survival analysis, and matching. A third section presents results,
robustness and placebo tests. A ﬁnal section brieﬂy summarizes the lessons learned within
this empirical exercise.
4.1 Designing a Test
My strategy relies on a simple stylized fact about Mexico’s drug–related corruption, the
existence of a “code of criminal conduct” (Guerrero Guti´ errez, 2009), and on constitutional
features that structurally inhibit coordination among diﬀerent levels of government in
Mexico.
123Ethnographic studies point to the existence of a “code of criminal conduct” that
rules corrupt interactions between criminals and Mexican authorities (Guerrero Guti´ errez,
2009). According to this code, traﬃckers can conduct illegal operations as long as they
injure the reputation of the Mexican government in the eyes of its citizens (Resa Nestares,
2001). Two main rules govern the agreement: traﬃckers cannot kill each other in the
streets, and they cannot sell drugs within Mexico. The logic of this agreement is simple.
Mexican citizens are not directly aﬀected by drug traﬃcking organizations, when drugs
are exclusively directed towards US consumers. Mexicans are only aﬀected by traﬃcking
operations if criminal organizations engage in violent behavior by, for example, shooting
one another in the streets, or when they sell drugs domestically. Shootings make it more
probable that citizens will become bystanders to violence. Domestic sales increase drug
addiction and consumption within Mexico.
Building upon this stylized fact about Mexico’s corruption, I empirically observe
injurious criminal behavior in two ways: drug–related homicides and domestic drug traf-
ﬁcking operations. It is not possible to tell, over a suﬃciently long time period, when
traﬃckers are killing one other. Statistics of drug–related violence come from a biased
sample, only available during periods of high violence. Yet, I can tell when drugs are being
sold in Mexico. Statistics of domestic drug consumption are available at the subnational
level, for a period of two decades. This piece of information that makes my empirical
test possible. I will examine whether criminal groups will be more prone to selling drugs
within Mexico when the government is decentralized.
Mexico is a fascinating natural experiment, for testing decentralization in domes-
tic drug sales, because its diﬀerent levels of government are constitutionally responsible
124for prosecuting diﬀerent crimes. The Mexican constitution creates a system of incen-
tives in which state and municipal governments lack common interests in terms of law
enforcement, even if they operate in common territories. Governments share territorial
jurisdiction but are responsible for prosecuting diﬀerent crimes. Local governments, for
example, are not constitutionally responsible for prosecuting domestic drug sales. In
other words, selling drugs domestically is a criminal activity that hurts the reputation of
non-local governments only.1
The empirical implications of my theory of decentralization and criminal behavior
are straightforward. Decentralization will increase the propensity of criminal organiza-
tions to engage in activities that “hurt” non-local governments, because in decentralized
political environments local governments will not share the same incentives as other layers
of government. In decentralized environments, local governments will only punish crimi-
nal activities that hurt local-governments directly, and selling drugs in Mexico is not one
of those activities. In centralized environments, incentives among all layers of government
will be aligned. As a result, local governments will have solidarity with non-local govern-
ments, acting as a de facto single-level government. In centralized environments, criminal
groups that engage in activities that hurt the upper-level government will be punished by
lower-level governments as if the latter were being directly hurt.
If my theory is correct, we should expect that in centralized environments, all
governments will act as cohesive enforcers with the common interest of inhibiting crim-
inal organizations from selling cocaine within their common territory. In contrast, in
1A judicial reform, passed in 2009 (CIDAC, 2011), changed this feature of Mexico’s judicial system
assigning responsibility to lower-level governments under certain circumstances. This reform does not
impact my results because my data set is limited to the years between 1990 and 2009.
125decentralized territories, levels will act independently, allowing criminal organizations to
operate under the umbrella of protection of some governments even if they are “hurting”
others. I would expect cocaine to be sold with higher probability in areas where the
government has lost its ability to operate with coordination among its diﬀerent layers. In
the following sections, I will test this theory using logits, survival analysis models, and
matching.
4.2 Methodology
My key explanatory variable, government centralization, is operationalized as a dichoto-
mous variable measuring whether diﬀerent levels of government were ruled by the same
party (1=coordinated) or not (0=not coordinated) in a year. I assume local authori-
ties will have better incentives to coordinate with other layers of government, whenever
they share party membership, because political incentives are present. Local govern-
ments wanting to please party elites, to climb the party hierarchy, will have incentives to
coordinate their eﬀorts with top-level governments.
Government centralization measured in this way varies greatly because in Mexico,
municipal governments remain in power for three years, and state and federal governments
for six years. Reelection is prohibited at every level of government and most of the time,
each level has non-concurrent elections. I considered three parties [PRI, PAN and Party of
the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revoluci´ on Democr´ otica, PRD)] and a residual
category (others).2
2In case a coalition is formed (i.e. PAN-PRD), a government is considered coordinated if either PAN
126Table 4.1 shows the number of municipalities that have a coordinated government
by party. Any municipality in which the same party rules at both the top and lower levels
of government is considered centralized. Most coordination comes from municipalities
ruled by the PRI. PAN governments were increasingly coordinated until 2007 and slightly
less coordinated after. PRD’s coordinated governments are increasingly common, and
during the last ﬁve years of the sample PAN and PRD coordination are almost equally
common. Maps showing coordinated municipalities from 1990 to 2010 are available in
Map 4.1.
My dependent variable measures whether cocaine is sold within a municipality.
Following standardized procedures of criminology literature (Evans et al., 2012), I measure
the existence of a domestic market of cocaine by measuring cases of cocaine consumption.
To determine whether criminal organizations sell cocaine in a municipality i, I identify the
ﬁrst year in which a case of cocaine consumption was recorded in i –either because a citizen
had a cocaine overdose or because he or she was hospitalized due to cocaine consumption3.
I assume that after this ﬁrst case, markets will remain open in following years. The
measure was obtained by surveying Mexican mortality certiﬁcates and hospitalization
records, (SINAIS, 2009; INEGI, 2009) a task that, to the extent of my knowledge, had
never been performed before.4
Table 4.2 shows the cases of cocaine overdoses and hospitalizations that were
or PRD rule in the other level of government. If PRI, PAN or PRD rule in coalition with another smaller
party, the government is considered coordinated if PRI, PAN or PRD rule in other levels of government.
3Overdoses are much less common than hospitalization but statistics are available for a twenty year
period. Hospitalizations are available only for the last ten years.
4There is no other data set that contains information on cocaine markets at this level of disaggregation
and with such a large temporal scale.
127Table 4.1: Number of Centralized Municipalities by Party and Year (1990-2010)
Year Centralized PAN PRI PRD
1990 2,162 2 2,160 -
1991 2,153 2 2,151 -
1992 2,102 15 2,087 -
1993 2,078 29 2,049 -
1994 2,084 29 2,055 -
1995 1,999 85 1,914 -
1996 1,830 80 1,750 -
1997 1,760 80 1,680 -
1998 1,654 82 1,572 -
1999 1,659 80 1,569 10
2000 1,646 80 1,556 10
2001 1,556 133 1,410 13
2002 1,402 139 1,244 19
2003 1,311 143 1,119 49
2004 1,312 153 1,097 62
2005 1,321 190 1,001 130
2006 1,335 186 1,008 141
2007 1,356 214 968 174
2008 1,466 173 1,141 152
2009 1,448 173 1,140 135
2010 1,433 164 1,167 102
Source: Author with data from CIDAC (2011)
128Figure 4.1: The Geography of Centralized Governments in Mexico
Source: Author with data from CIDAC (2011)
129recorded in Mexico each year. Maps showing open markets of cocaine consumption from
1990 to 2010 are available in Map 4.2.























Source: SINAIS (2009); INEGI (2009)
Given that the operationalization of my dependent variable does not allow me to
identify the particular point in time, at which cocaine began to be sold, but only the
year during which a case of cocaine consumption was recorded by a health institution,
130Figure 4.2: The Geography of Cocaine Overdoses or Hospitalizations in Mexico
Source: SINAIS (2009); INEGI (2009)
131my sample only considers municipalities that have a hospital infrastructure. In every
speciﬁcation, I also control for the number of hospitals and for their recording capacity.
To proxy recording capacity, I measured the regularity with which other forms of overdoses
were coded. Particularly, I collected information about cases of hospitalizations due to
caﬀeine consumption. Hospital’s personnel follow a similar procedure to record all types
of overdoses (INEGI, 2009). The assumption is that hospitals that have a better capacity
to record caﬀeine overdoses are also more capable of identifying cocaine overdoses. The
availability of hospitals is only recorded for the last 10 years of the sample.
To ensure that other conditions are the same (independent of whether a munic-
ipality is centralized or not), conditions that may increase the probability of a cocaine
market being opened, I include control variables that predict cocaine demand in a year.
Wealthy urban areas are the places where cocaine is in highest demand; thus, I control for
population size, income inequality (Gini), and a measure of poverty, a variable created by
the Mexican government to measure wealth and life quality within a municipality called
the “Disadvantage Index” (i.e. ´ Indice de Marginaci´ on).
Descriptive statistics of all the control variables included in the model are avail-
able in Table 4.3. I use three speciﬁcations to assess whether decentralization triggers the
opening of a local cocaine market in each of the 2,206 municipalities that have hospitals
in Mexico (89.8% of total). First, I use a binomial regression model (logit). The depen-
dent variable is given by whether a municipality has an open (1) or closed (0) market
for cocaine at year y, where y∃{1990,1991,...,2009}. All covariates in logit models are
lagged by one year, such that coordination in year (y − 1) predicts the status of cocaine
markets in year y. A control for the status of cocaine markets in year (y − 1) is also in-
132Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics, Total
Variable Min 1st quartile Median Mean 3rd quartile Max
Gini 0.22 0.40 0.426 0.431 0.461 0.690
Hospitals 1 2 3 5.856 7 101
Poverty -2.459 -0.835 -0.16 -0.082 0.574 4.363
Population 0.002 0.057 0.144 0.476 0.339 18.57
Note: Hospitals are the number of hospitals in a municipality (SINAIS, 2009), Poverty
was operationalized as the “Indice de Marginacion” given by CONAPO (2010),
Population per 100,000 inhabitants (INEGI, 2010), Gini Index (CONAPO 2010).
cluded. Second, in the Cox proportional-hazards regression with time-variant covariates,
the dependent variable counts the number of years from 1990 to 2009 before a market
opens in a municipality. Finally, I use nearest neighbor matching to create a data set
of pre-treatment balanced covariates and run logits. Placebo and robustness tests are
conducted for each speciﬁcation.
4.3 Results
Table 4.4 below presents the results of the logit model.
Models 1 and 2 present the most basic results. Model 1 shows how coordination has
a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, meaning that when municipalities are centralized,
the probability of having an opened cocaine market in the next time period diminishes.
As expected, larger populations, larger income inequality, lower poverty, more hospitals
and better medical recording capacity, are positively correlated with having more cocaine
133cases. Model 2 is a placebo test. It presents a similar speciﬁcation to Model 1 but
changes hospitalizations and overdoses of cocaine with caﬀeine. As we would expect,
unlike with cocaine markets, government coordination does not predict placebo cases.
In other words, caﬀeine consumption is not discouraged by government decentralization,
while cocaine consumption is.
Model 3 introduces year ﬁxed eﬀects, reducing the magnitude of the centralization
coeﬃcient but keeping its negative sign and its signiﬁcance. Gini is not signiﬁcant in
this speciﬁcation. State ﬁxed eﬀects are added in Model 4 without signiﬁcant changes.
Medical recording capacity is not signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation. Finally, both state and
year ﬁxed eﬀects are added in Model 5. Centralization is signiﬁcant and negative, as
expected. Gini and medical recording capacity are not.
Model 6 introduces dummies for parties ruling at the municipal and state levels.
Party labels are not signiﬁcant and centralization remains a solid result. Out of the
controls, only poverty and number of hospitals are signiﬁcant. A placebo test, using
caﬀeine instead of cocaine, is introduced in Model 7 to show that centralization is not


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































135Overall, the logit models provide strong support to my theory, yet to further
conﬁrm the results of the above model, a second speciﬁcation was created. I ﬁt a Cox
proportional-hazards regression with time-dependent covariates5. The sample is largely
censored, meaning some municipalities (81%) never experienced the opening of a cocaine
market, at least not until 2009. To reduce censorship, and following common assumptions
of criminology literature (Evans et al., 2012), I only use municipalities with urban areas,
particularly those that had at least one city of 15,000 or more inhabitants. This reduced
censorship to 58%. Table 4.5 presents the results of the duration models.
5I utilized Cox because it allows me to express a single survival time value for each municipality















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































137Model 8 is the preferred identiﬁcation. As expected, a centralized municipality has
a lower chance of experiencing the opening of a cocaine market. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level. A larger population, more hospitals, more medical recording capacity, more
inequality and less poverty increase the probability of market opening. Model 9 presents
a robustness test. It is the same speciﬁcation as Model 7 but using caﬀeine cases as the
dependent variable. As expected, centralization is not signiﬁcant. The controls follow the
same tendencies as the previous model. Medical recording capacity is not measured for
caﬀeine cases.
I present some additional tests to discard alternative explanations.
In Model 10, I test whether my results are just the eﬀect of other unmeasured
variables that were impacting municipalities even before the opening of the cocaine mar-
ket. To test this, I artiﬁcially change the time in which a cocaine market opened, setting
a “false opening” (ﬁve years before it actually happened). Supporting my theory, the
results show that centralization is not signiﬁcant once I do this. Other false openings
were tested with similar results.
Model 11 tests whether the results are being driven by large cities. I extracted
from the sample all municipalities with more than one million inhabitants, which resulted
in the exclusion of almost all municipalities within Mexico City and other major urban
areas in the country. Results did not change.
Finally, in Model 12, I test whether the eﬀect was caused by having members from
inexperienced opposition parties ruling either at the state or municipal level. I add two
categorical variables to the baseline speciﬁcation: one shows the party that was ruling at
the state (PRI, PAN or PRD), and a second shows the party that was ruling at the lower-
138level (PRI, PAN, PRD, PAN-PRD, or other). I use the PAN as the baseline category
because it is the only party that is composed by real members of the inexperienced
opposition. PRD and other smaller parties were created by ex-PRI members (Magaloni,
2009) and thus, we can assume, have inherited the experience of PRI. The results of my
model hold. Party labels are not signiﬁcant. A placebo test, using caﬀeine cases, shows,
as expected, a non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcient under centralization. Model 13 is a placebo test
speciﬁed as Model 12 but for caﬀeine as dependent variable.
A ﬁnal speciﬁcation comes from matching (closest neighbor approach) municipal-
ities that had cases of cocaine consumption with municipalities that had not but that
otherwise share similar conditions with respect to medical recording capacity, hospital
infrastructure and cocaine demand. Using the matched dataset (830 cases), I run logits.
The results in Table 4.6 show that centralization still plays a crucial role explaining the
opening of cocaine markets. In Model 14, the basic speciﬁcation, centralization, reduces
the probability of having an opened domestic market. Model 15 shows a placebo test with
caﬀeine. In both models, centralization is here signiﬁcant and positive. Model 16 intro-
duces party dummies, leaving PAN as the baseline category. Centralization is negative
and signiﬁcant. Municipal governments from PRI and PRD tend to have fewer markets
of cocaine than the PAN. Model 17 introduces a placebo test to show that centralization
does not predict markets of caﬀeine.
Overall, the statistical and empirical evidence here provided solidly supports my
argument. Decentralization is strongly correlated with criminal behavior. When criminals
face a government that cannot act as a coordinated enforcer, their propensity to engage in
139Table 4.6: Matched Logit Models, Results
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
Dependent Cocaine Caﬀeine Cocaine Caﬀeine
-0.266+ 0.408+ -0.279+ 0.382











0.767*** -2.418*** 1.063*** -2.550***
Constant (0.109) (0.185) (0.185) (0.297)
For signiﬁcance measures: + p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.5, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.
140injurious activities, such as local domestic sale of cocaine, increases. In the case of Mexico,
the above empirical speciﬁcations have shown that cocaine began to be sold in domestic
markets with a higher probability in years in which diﬀerent levels of government were
not coordinated, independently of the size of the drug market and the party that was in
power.
4.4 Lessons learned
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that decentralization is strongly correlated
with lack of discipline among criminals. When criminals face a government that cannot
act as a cohesive enforcer, their propensity to break the rules increases. In the case of
Mexico, the above empirical speciﬁcations have proven that cocaine began to be sold in
domestic markets with higher probability in years when diﬀerent levels of government were
not centralized, independently of the party that was in power. The results are robust to
many other factors including government spending, as well as controls for drug demand.
When a similar empirical speciﬁcation is used to understand the opening of other markets
of legal drugs, results are not signiﬁcant.
141Chapter 5
Unexpected consequences of criminal
violence
“This is for the people of Veracruz. Do not be afraid.
We came to clean your state.”1
Mexico’s drug war was a bloody battle between criminal organizations in which
citizens were a third party. Citizens were not the direct target of violence, yet they
witnessed the uncontrolled violence generated by criminals’ conﬂicts at their doorsteps,
schools, and public plazas. In this chapter, I show how citizens reacted to a drug war.
In order adequately to examine citizen reactions to the drug war, it is necessary
to explore some of the most immediate and tangible consequences of violence in the day
to day life of Mexicans; thus, in this chapter I present the ﬁrst quantitative analysis of a
1Message signed by the criminal group “Mata-Zetas” and left on July of 2009 in the city of Veracruz.
It was found next to the body of man who had been tortured, and whose face was bound with tape
(Peralta, 2009).
142social consequence of Mexico’s drug war: forced migration. In here, I provide evidence
of the ways in which drug traﬃcking organizations are aﬀecting population dynamics by
causing citizens to migrate out of violent communities.
By measuring and understanding this phenomenon, I contribute to migration stud-
ies that have largely pointed to factors such as economic hardship, network analysis, or
labor dynamics as the main drivers of Mexican migration patterns (Massey and Arango,
1998; Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Massey and Taylor, 2004). I argue that such approaches
can only provide a partial explanation of migration patterns. While academics have stud-
ied the eﬀect of violence on migration in the context of civil war in African countries
(Zolberg et al., 1989; Morrison, 1993), we have yet to examine the impact of violence on
migration outside the context of oﬃcially declared armed conﬂict. Especially given the
ubiquity of violent crime in many parts of the developing world, we are thus left with a
gap in our understanding of migration patterns in places like Mexico. This chapter seeks
to ﬁll this gap. As cumulative causation theory improved our understanding of migration
by pointing to how social ties shaped individual’s decisions to relocate2 (Massey, 1990),
here I point to security environments as a missing variable to better understand relocation
decisions.
This chapter is organized in six sections. The ﬁrst section explores how civil-
ians were aﬀected by Mexico’s drug war. The second section shows qualitative evidence
of changes in migration dynamics within Mexico and in the US. The third and fourth
sections show my statistical speciﬁcation and results. The ﬁfth section interprets the
2Indeed, social ties had been overlooked by scholars from new economics, neo-classical economics and
labor market theories (Todaro and Maruszko, 1987; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Piore, 1979). I thank Prof.
Filiz Garip for this insightful framing on migration literature.
143results, contextualizing them by drawing upon qualitative evidence and describing some
particularly interesting cases to complement my quantitative ﬁndings. Finally, the chap-
ter concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these ﬁndings in terms of the
approach in the U.S. to migration policy.
5.1 Civilians in a drug war
“Fear has become part of our lives (...) There’s panic. We
don’t know when the shooting is going to break out”
—Tijuana citizen.3
Civilians were rarely killed in Mexico’s drug war. Out of the 51,000 casualties
oﬃcially recorded by the Mexican government from December 2006 to 2010 as part of
criminal battles for turf, 83% were targeted executions, carried out by criminals against
members of rival criminal organizations, or against individuals directly linked to them
(SNSP, 2011). The rest were homicides that had happened during group confronta-
tions between Mexican authorities and criminals, or between criminals themselves, where
civilian bystanders may have been caught in the crossﬁre. According to the president of
Mexico’s Human Rights Commission, these comprised less than 1% of the total toll (Sosa,
2010).4
3Lacey (2000); during 2008 Tijuana saw 614 drug–related homicides(SNSP, 2011), a rate of about
43.72 per 100,000 inhabitants — quite a bit higher than non–drug–related homicides, which cause only
20.46 casualties per 100,000(INEGI, 2011).
4During 2010 and the ﬁrst half of 2009, the Commission reported 100 civilian deaths out of a total
toll of 19,894 (13,174 in 2010 and 6,720 in the ﬁrst half of 2009)(Sosa, 2010).
144Yet, civilians were aﬀected by the drug war in many less direct ways. Extor-
tion, kidnapping and other forms of violence dramatically increased when criminal groups
sought alternative sources of income to fund their battles. By 2011, 25.7% of all Mexican
citizens declared that they had become prey to extortion. Furthermore, 2.3% of kidnap-
ping victims and as many as 3.1% of the population claimed that at some point they had
witnessed a crossﬁre (D´ ıaz-Cayeros and A., Magaloni, B. and Matanock, A. and Romero,
V.). The war had lead to a general spread of crime and fear. Criminals regularly left the
bodies of their enemies in the streets, hanging from bridges, mutilated and tortured, with
messages directed towards their territories, or towards citizens themselves. For example,
in Monterrey criminals left dozens of messages alongside the head of a local criminal,
proclaiming, “These are the homosexual hitmen of Arturo Beltr´ an Leyva and the one in
the pot is the kid-killer “Caim´ an” himself. You should learn to respect” (Noroeste, 2008)
and “Businessman don’t be weepers. Nothing will happen to you” (Notimex, 2008).
Citizens reacted. Some engaged in protests, asking the government to stop exac-
erbating violence by prosecuting criminals. Others asked criminal groups for protection
(D´ ıaz-Cayeros and A., Magaloni, B. and Matanock, A. and Romero, V.). Many more just
gave up; more speciﬁcally, they gave up on the idea of continuing to live in Mexico. They
covered their sofas and tables with white sheets, loaded their suitcases, closed their doors,
and left for the U.S. Mexican businesses that had served tequila to American tourists in
Tijuana, or for decades had sold fresh produce to Texans who crossed the border to go to
the farmer’s market in Ju´ arez, closed their doors and were abandoned.
1455.2 Changes in Immigration Flows
When drug–related violence ﬁrst started escalating, few people noticed that migration was
taking place. After all, there were many reasons for those leaving Mexico to keep secret
their relocation. Some wished to avoid public judgment. What politician would want
their constituents to know that their city was governed by a mayor who was not living
in town anymore? What would the public think of an attorney general who relocated his
family to the U.S. out of fear that the state couldn’t protect their safety? Who would want
to read a newspaper written by journalists who lived far away from the place they wrote
about? Those who relocated also departed silently because many were running away from
kidnappers and extorters. They had left their homes quickly, leaving neighbors wondering
where the family next door had gone.
It soon became clear that something strange was going on, particularly in border
states.
Even if the U.S. as a whole had witnessed a decrease in the number of Mexican
immigrants5, the opposite seemed to be happening in U.S. cities located at the border.
Mexican immigration to El Paso, McAllen, Brownsville and other cities in Texas has ac-
tually increased, increasing the price of housing and promoting the development of brand
new housing complexes that target Mexican consumers. Preliminary reports estimate
5Mexican immigration to the U.S. has diminished steadily since 2000 (MPP, 2009). With ﬁgures
dropping from an estimated 525,000 Mexicans leaving their country each year, to live in the U.S., to
fewer than 100,000, current migration ﬁgures are the lowest on record (Sheridan, 2011; Cave, 2011).
Among the main reasons behind this diminishing trend are changes in Mexico’s demographic proﬁle
(Terrazas et al., 2011), an increase in the number of Mexicans earning college degrees (Ibarraran and
Lubotsky, 2007; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005), a constant increase in the costs associated with crossing
the border (Massey et al., 2003; Orrenius, 2004; Cornelius and Lewis, 2007; MPP, 2009), and the recession
that the U.S. economy has been facing since late 2007 (Papademetriou et al., 2011).
146that about 115,000 Mexicans have arrived in U.S. border cities since 2006 (IDMC, 2010;
Rice, 2011). El Paso, for example, has grown by 50,000 inhabitants from 2009 to 2011;
at least 30,000 of these new inhabitants are Mexicans moving from Ciudad Ju´ arez [Rubio
Salas interviewed by Alvarado (2011)].
Ethnographic evidence also showed that newer Mexican immigrants had little in
common with the traditional Mexican immigrant. In border cities, it became increasingly
common to see Mexicans wearing Prada and driving Mercedes-Benz cars. Mexicans in-
creasingly crossed into Mexico to work and came back to the U.S. to sleep and spend
their weekends in their newly constructed gated communities.6 The new migrants were
investors and relatively wealthy businessman who used to live in Mexican border cities
and had recently changed their residency to the U.S. They entered the U.S. legally, bought
property and opened businesses (Martinez and Torres, 2011).
Changes could also be felt in Mexico. According to census ﬁgures (INEGI, 2010),
some Mexican cities had unexpectedly depopulated from 2005 to 2010. The usual general
predictors of population trends, which had previously been quite successful in predicting
the yearly population in Mexican counties (Partida Bush, 2008) were now producing
higher than normal prediction errors.
These unexpected migration outﬂows were particularly prominent in Mexican bor-
der cities, probably because migration to the U.S. was relatively less costly there.7 Im-
6Citizen, interviews by author, 2008
7The integration of U.S. and Mexican cities located at the border is quite strong and rooted in
historically important but informal agreements. Many border cities were divided artiﬁcially when the
Rio Bravo was determined to be the natural frontier between Mexico and the U.S. during the late 19th
century.8 The border divided families and communities, leading Mexican and American authorities to
create informal mechanisms to facilitate transportation among border-city inhabitants. Many of these
147portant Mexican border cities were among those experiencing the largest unexpected
population outﬂows from 2005 to 2010. While Mexican border counties lost an average of
35,255 inhabitants unexpectedly from 2005 to 2010, non-border counties tended to gain
an average of 1,297.86 inhabitants. On average about 8,103.63 people left unexpectedly
in border counties. Ju´ arez had lost 150.36 thousand inhabitants–about 11% of its popu-
lation. Other cities like Tijuana, Reynosa, and Matamoros had lost between 6%, 9% and
4% of their population during the same period (Partida Bush, 2008; INEGI, 2010). Small
towns like Praxedis de Guerrero, Mier and Guadalupe have faced unexpected outﬂows of
more than 25% of their entire population (Partida Bush, 2008; INEGI, 2010).
Some accounts have claimed that about 230,000 Mexicans moved out of violent
cities, 115,000 of them to relocate to the U.S. during this period (IDMC, 2010). Other
more radical predictions have claimed that 120,000 was the ﬁgure only for Ju´ arez City
(Martinez, 2010).9
Yet, the truth is nobody knew the extent of this movement.
mechanisms have lasted over the years, generating a much more porous border than Washington and
Mexico City seem to acknowledge. Students in Ju´ arez, for example, pay local tuition at the University of
Texas at El Paso. Furthermore, border cities have instituted “day border passes,” a form of one-day-visa
given to Mexican border inhabitants that allow them to cross into the U.S. without a formal visa or
passport.
9The accuracy of all these ﬁgures remains doubtful as none of these sources explain their methodology.
Some claim this number may be an underestimation as it does not account for Mexicans who left on a
temporary basis, checking in at U.S. hotels for short periods of time, “to rest from the constant violence
(Corchado, 2009).”
1485.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Criminal violence indeed propelled these changes in immigration dynamics, as I argue in
what follows, by presenting empirical evidence linking drug violence and organized crime
activities to Mexican migration outﬂows.
My main speciﬁcation is a linear regression model whose dependent variable is
the number of Mexicans unexpectedly leaving their county of residence from 2005 to
2010. All ﬁgures were scaled to represent rates per 100,000 inhabitants. To measure
unexpected migration outﬂows I compare population predictions (Partida Bush, 2008) to
real population ﬁgures (INEGI, 2010) at each of the 2,475 thousand Mexican counties.
This speciﬁcation was made possible because of a mistake made by Mexico’s Na-
tional Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Poblaci´ on y Vivienda, CONAPO). Every
year, CONAPO predicts county-level population ﬁgures, considering demographic changes
and expected immigration outﬂows. Given how important migration outﬂows to the U.S.
are as predictors of population ﬁgures, CONAPO uses very sophisticated methods to
predict the total number of Mexicans that will change their residency to the U.S.10 The
predictions take into account economic conditions both in Mexico and the U.S., sur-
veys, polls, previous census ﬁgures, and panel studies. Every ﬁve years, when a census
is conducted in Mexico, CONAPO predictions can then be checked for accuracy. Their
predictions are normally quite good. As Figure 5.1 shows, oﬃcial predictions in 2010 were
particularly oﬀ. The graph shows each of the 2,450 Mexican municipalities according to
10Predictions are based in the algorithms developed by Bean et al. (2001) and Corona and Tuir´ an
(2006) using Mexican and US Census ﬁgures (1950 — 2005), the Current Population Survey (1990 –
2005) and the American Community Survey (2002 — 2005). For more details on the speciﬁcation see
Partida Bush (2008).
149the size of the population that was incorrectly predicted for 2005 and 2010. Positive [neg-
ative] numbers refer to municipalities where predictions calculated more [less] population
than actual. In 2005 most of the observations were close to zero, meaning predictions
were accurate; the dispersion of 2010 is much larger. In 2005, oﬃcial statistics failed to
predict the migration of 866,000 Mexicans, in 2010 they failed by 2,394,000, an error that
is 176% higher.
Figure 5.1: CONAPO’s Mistaken Predictions
































Source: Partida Bush (2008); INEGI (2005)
In my main speciﬁcation, I compare CONAPO predictions for 2010 to census
ﬁgures in 2010 to capture population outﬂows that could not be predicted even while
150accounting for changes in economic or demographic conditions in Mexico and the U.S. The
level of analysis is the municipality. I called my dependent variable “Unexpected outﬂows”
and deﬁned it as the number of individuals (per 100,000 inhabitants) in a municipality
that CONAPO predicted would live there and, according to the census ﬁgures, were not.
Unexpected outﬂows are larger when CONAPO predicted more people would be living in
a county than the census captured.
In every speciﬁcation, I have added a control to account for other factors that
cannot be measured, which cause possible errors in CONAPO’s prediction. I proxied for
“expected CONAPO’s errors” by measuring the error that CONAPO had in its previous
predictions. I used the estimation errors that CONAPO had in the second to last census
year (Partida Bush, 2008; INEGI, 2005) because time-wise, I expect the 2010 municipal-
ities to be more similar to what they were in 2005 than to any other earlier census year.
The logic behind this proxy is to control for counties that have proven to be diﬃcult to
estimate for CONAPO. Some counties may have inherent characteristics that make their
population ﬁgures more variable and thus, highly susceptible to incorrect estimation.
As my independent variables, I used measures of three of the most common types
of organized crime violence in Mexico: homicides linked to drug traﬃcking, extortion,
and kidnapping. These variables quantiﬁed the total number of incidences of these crimes
per county, per 100,000 inhabitants for years in between census (i.e. 2006 to 2009).
Drug–related homicide ﬁgures come from Mexico’s National Security Council (SNSP,
2011), an institution that counts the number of homicides related to activities of criminal
organizations and provides monthly ﬁgures per county from December 2006 to December
1512010.11 Kidnapping and extortion ﬁgures were obtained from Mexico’s state-level oﬃces
of the attorney general (SNSP, 2011).
I have also controlled for social and economic factors, which may have generated
unexpected economic conditions within Mexico and which could have changed migration
patterns more than the predictions of CONAPO have allowed. Thus, I have added two
sets of controls: employment and education ﬁgures. Academic research indicates that
these two variables are among the most important drivers of migration (Massey and
Arango, 1998). Particularly, research shows that the number of college graduates is an
important deterrent of migration to the U.S. and enhances migration within Mexico, from
rural to urban areas (MPP, 2009). Higher levels of employment normally translate into
less migration (Tuir´ an et al., 2000a,b).
A dummy was added for each of the 39 Mexican counties located right at the bor-
der. The intention is to capture, in a very indirect way, the ease of migration decisions.
The assumption is that any factor increasing the willingness to migrate among Mexicans
will have an increased eﬀect on border counties, where migration costs are lower as com-
pared to the rest of the country. An alternative speciﬁcation also added a dummy for
each of the ﬁve border states.
Finally, as part of robustness tests, extra controls and speciﬁcations were tested.
An alternative speciﬁcation adds ﬁgures of general homicides not related to organized
crime as assessed by INEGI (2011), to account for the eﬀects that other forms of violence
may have had in driving migration. State ﬁxed eﬀects (32 clusters, one per Mexican state)
11Mexican authorities follow strict procedures to identify whether a homicide is related to organized
crime according to the characteristics of the event as well as intelligence reports. For more information,
refer to SNSP (2011).
152were also added.12
General descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are pre-
sented in Table 5.1.
12I tested for weighted coeﬃcients based on the inverse of their squared residuals. The use of weights





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of my speciﬁcation are given in Table 5.2, and they strongly support my
hypothesis. Migration outﬂows are higher in places with higher drug–related violence
and crime, even accounting for factors such as employment and human capital. Several
models were speciﬁed.
Model 1 presents results without controlling for non–drug–related homicides while
the rest of the speciﬁcations (Model 2 and 3) control for them. Controlling for non–
drug–related homicides does not change the results but improves the model’s ﬁt. Drug–
related violence is strongly linked to migration ﬂows, independent of the general homicide
rate in a county. Furthermore, in every speciﬁcation the coeﬃcients of drug–related
homicides are larger than those of general homicides, which conﬁrm my hypothesis that
Mexicans are making migration decisions based on organized crime activities rather than
general security concerns. The reason why drug–related homicides are better predictors
of migration ﬂows than general homicides may be that drug–related homicides are a
newer phenomenon that was not an important cause of homicides before 2004 (Rios and
Shirk, 2011). These murders may leave a longer lasting impression in their communities
because of their particularly violent features. Unlike general homicides, the victims of
drug–related homicides are tortured and beheaded, and their bodies are dumped on the
streets, hanged from pedestrian bridges, or displayed publicly next to messages directed
at rival traﬃcking organizations.
Model 3 adds ﬁxed eﬀects per states to capture changes at the state level that
may have inﬂuenced migration dynamics —for example, we should expect citizens living
155Table 5.2: Empirical Results: Drug–related Crime and Immigration Outﬂows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
drug–related Homicides 5.424* 5.386* 6.349*
(2.325) (2.331) (2.64)
Extortion 12.416* 12.21* 13.031*
(5.771) (6.445) (6.091)
Kidnapping -1.636 -1.533 -2.188
(1.75) (1.677) (3.519)
Employment -0.022** -0.021** -0.018*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
College Degrees -0.086*** -0.119*** -0.116***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Border county 2395.069* 1480.127 1188.711
(1123.91) (1057.78) (1087.69)
Non–drug–related Homicides 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Eﬀects? No No Yes
Error Correction 0.709*** 0.704*** 0.771***
(0.105) (0.104) (0.116)
Constant 3929.086*** 3905.937*** 2445.998**
(614.76) (613.901) (788.03)
Note: OLS coeﬃcients (top) with White-Huber corrected standard errors (below). For
signiﬁcance measures: + p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.5, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. I identiﬁed with
++ the preferred speciﬁcation. The dependent variable is the number of Mexicans
unexpectedly leaving their county (outﬂows) (INEGI, 2010; Partida Bush, 2008).
Independent variables intend to capture (a) the eﬀects of organized crime activities
(drug–related homicides, extortion and kidnapping) (INEGI, 2010; SNSP, 2011), and of
(b) economic variables (number of college graduates, and employment rates) (INEGI,
2010) in migration decisions. Controls were added to account for potential measure
errors in the dependent variable (Partida Bush (2008); INEGI (2010) —see text for
further explanation), and the eﬀect of non–drug–related homicides. Fixed state eﬀects
and a dummy for Mexican counties located at the US border were also added to some
speciﬁcations.
156in states with justice systems that are highly regarded by the public to be less aﬀected
by drug–related violence, even if the number of homicides are the same as those in states
where citizens are less conﬁdent of their governments. The goal of the empirical speci-
ﬁcation is to show that outﬂows are correlated with organized crime activities, which is
why Model 3 is considered the preferred speciﬁcation.
In all speciﬁcations, drug–related homicides are an important factor in Mexican
migration outﬂows. In my preferred speciﬁcation (Model 3), drug–related homicides in-
creased the number of Mexicans unexpectedly migrating out of their residency counties
by 220,291. Every one-point increase in the rate drug–related homicides per 100,000 in-
habitants is correlated with a 6.34% increase in the number of Mexicans ﬂeeing their
county of residency. As an example, consider the case of Tijuana; in the period from 2007
to 2008, its drug–related homicide rate changed by 31.04 points (going from 176 to 614
drug–related homicides in just one year). If the results of the model hold, an average of
5,367 Mexicans left Tijuana, just during 2008, while ﬂeeing from drug–related homicides.
drug–related homicides are less robust predictors of unexpected immigration in-
ﬂows; actually, when ﬁxed eﬀects per state are added, the variable becomes insigniﬁcant.
That is to say, even if drug–related homicides are correlated with people leaving their
counties, this does not mean that, when deciding where to relocate, people will feel more
attracted to counties with fewer drug–related homicides. Counties with higher drug–
related homicides expel people but counties with lower drug–related homicides do not
attract people.
Other organized crime activities, particularly extortion, also have had important
eﬀects on migration ﬂows. Extortion is correlated with unexpected migration outﬂows
157—and less robustly with unexpected migration inﬂows. In the preferred speciﬁcation, ev-
ery additional case of extortion per 100,000 inhabitants increases unexpected migration
outﬂows in 13.03 per 100,000 inhabitants. That accounts for a total of 44,401 Mexicans
relocating due to higher levels of extortion. From 2007 and until 2010, Tijuana has lost
about 926 citizens because of extortion; other border cities like Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa
and Ju´ arez lost 286, 334 and 221, respectively. Kidnappings were not signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with migration outﬂows or inﬂows. This result is quite robust among all models and
is consistent with what we would expect given the particularities of the victims of this
crime. Kidnappers pick their victims according to their wealth not by location. Because
kidnapping victims are hunted, migration does not change their attractiveness as targets.
Traditional economic explanations of migration ﬂows take the expected signs and
are signiﬁcant in all outﬂows speciﬁcations. An increase of one point in employment rates
or in the number of college degrees per 100,000 inhabitants reduces migration outﬂows
in 0.01 and 0.11 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. Neither employment nor educa-
tion are signiﬁcantly correlated with migration inﬂows. In other words, when deciding
where to relocate, Mexicans do not go to cities with higher levels of education or lower
unemployment.
Finally, all variables introduced to correct for CONAPO’s error were strongly sig-
niﬁcant. Indeed, it seems like CONAPO faces inherent problems in measuring population
ﬂows with respect to some places more than others. In general, places where CONAPO’s
2005 predictions were upward biased (i.e. CONAPO predicted more people than the 2005
census indicated) had the same upper bias in 2010. The relationship is 1 to 0.77 in the
preferred speciﬁcation, meaning an error of 1 in 2005 ﬁgures is correlated with an error
158of 0.77 in 2010 ﬁgures.13
5.5 Mexican Migration Caused by Criminal violence
“Those who can, leave, those who can’t, hide.”
—Reynosa citizen.14
Based on the above speciﬁcation, drug–related violence yielded a total displace-
ment ﬁgure of about 220,291 individuals from 2006 to 2010, and extortion caused an
additional displacement of 44,401, for a total of 264,693 Mexican drug-driven immi-
grants. This ﬁgure accounts for all relocations either within Mexico or to the U.S. Some
cities though, particularly the most violent ones, seem to create most of the migrants.
According to my estimates, Ju´ arez alone has created 40,993 drug-driven migrants, mean-
ing about 15.48% of all displacements in Mexico happened in a city that has just 1.26%
of total Mexico’s population.
Table 5.3 presents estimates of the number of drug-driven immigrants by their
source municipality.15 It shows the top-ten municipalities with the largest outﬂows. When
13The fact that drug–related violence is a predictor of unexpected migration outﬂows is an even more
robust ﬁnding if we consider that CONAPO’s 2010 population predictions assumed migration ﬂows to
the US would remain at least as high as those measured in 2000, which was actually the highest point
of Mexico-U.S. migration to date (MPP, 2009). Given unexpectedly harsh economic conditions in the
U.S., particularly in 2007 and 2008, CONAPO’s estimates should result in an upper bias. In other
words, CONAPO assumed U.S. labor markets would remain as appealing for Mexicans as they were
in 2000, which clearly was not been the case. The fact that, even with CONAPO’s upper estimation
bias, migration ﬁgures were underestimated in border towns strongly reinforces my hypothesis that other
non-=economical factors are driving migration decisions.
14Interviewed by Author, 2008; Reynosa is a Mexican border city located south of Texas with drug–
related homicide rates of about 26.18 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010(SNSP, 2011).
15With my results we cannot know where these people relocated, but preliminary ﬁgures indicate that
159considering total number of citizens, Ju´ arez, Culiacan and Tijuana, with 40.99, 12.4 and
11.37 thousand inhabitants leaving unexpectedly respectively, are the cities that present
the largest ﬁgures. In relative size, the cities with the largest drug-driven migration
outﬂows are Guadalupe, Mier and General Trevino, all with about 0.09 inhabitants per
100,000 leaving unexpectedly because of security concerns. The complete list of results
per municipality can be accessed in Appendix 1
My estimate of 264,693 Mexican migrants due to violence matches what ethno-
graphic, journalistic, and public opinion accounts described as a massive Mexican exodus
both within Mexico and from Mexico to the U.S. In the U.S., Henry Cisneros, former
mayor of San Antonio, Texas, classiﬁed Mexican migration ﬂows as the “largest since the
1920s” and acknowledged that “whole areas of San Antonio (...) [were] being transformed
(Sheridan, 2011).” Within Mexico, opinion polls showed that out of all people interviewed,
17% had changed their residency because of drug violence or to run away from criminal
activities (Parametr´ ıa, 2011). This statistic represents about 2% of the total migration
ﬂows in the country, slightly above my own estimates. The impacts of Mexican outﬂows
were felt with such strength in El Paso that some claimed that “a sort of ‘Little Ju´ arez,’
at least half of them moved to the U.S. (IDMC, 2010; Rice, 2011). Particularly, for middle and upper class
Mexicans living on the border, migration to the U.S. feels like the natural choice when planning a change
in residency. For many of them, it is just like moving from one neighborhood to another within the same
city, or as they describe it, “moving to the American side of the city. 16” Inhabitants commonly refer
to border cities using their Mexican or American name almost interchangeably. As the mayor of Laredo
said “we are inhabitants of Laredos” –referring to Laredo, Texas (USA) and Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas
(Mexico)– “the border does not divide our policies or families (Ram´ on Garza Barrios, Summer 2009,
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas).” Yet, Mexican citizens have surely relocated within Mexico also. Indeed,
some cities, particularly Acapulco, Chimalhuacan and Tlajomulco have experienced unexpected migration
inﬂows. Tlajomulco for example, grew about 30% more than population predictions had accounted for,
Ju´ arez (Nuevo Leon) and Bahia de Banderas also grew in more than 18%.
160Table 5.3: Number of Drug-violence Refugees (Selected Municipalities)
Municipality Refugees Refugees per
million inhabitants
Ju´ arez 40,994 0.31




Torre´ on 3,798 0.07
Guadalajara 3,720 0.02
Gomez Palacio 3,533 0.12








Dr. Coss 101 0.58
Arizpe 171 0.56
Guelatao de Ju´ arez 29 0.55
Praxedis G. Guerrero 459 0.53
Note: Top-10 municipalities with the largest number of drug–related homicides in real
and relative (per 100,000 inhabitants) terms. The number of drug-realted refugees for
all municipalities is available upon request.
161akin to Miami’s Little Havana, was emerging” (Martinez and Torres, 2011). Housing,
schooling, business associations and many other spheres changed signiﬁcantly to adapt to
new migration patterns.
As Figure 5.2 shows, most violence-driven migrants originated in border cities
because Mexico’s security issues are particularly acute there. Drug–related homicides
concentrate in border cities because US-Mexico crossing points are the most proﬁtable
part of the drug traﬃcking business chain (See Figure 1). When a kilogram of cocaine
crosses into the US, its value increases from $6,000—$10,000 to up to $19,000 [DEA cited
by (Brouwer et al., 2006)]. Mexican border towns are the centers of operation for most
Mexican drug cartels. In fact, two of the most important criminal organizations in Mexico
are named after border cities: the Tijuana Cartel and the Ju´ arez Cartel.
The six Mexican states located at the border accounted for 47.81% of all drug–
related murders despite containing just 17.62% of all Mexico’s population. Chihuahua,
south of Texas, was the most violent border state during 2006-2010, with 10,126 murders,
followed by Baja California and Tamaulipas with 2,016 and 1,477 drug–related homicides
respectively. Municipalities located near the US-Mexico border, particularly those con-
taining large border cities, were also among the most violent. Approximately 30.04% of
all drug–related homicides occurred in 39 border municipalities, which represent less than
one percent of the roughly 2,457 municipalities in Mexico, and just 6.06% of the country’s
population.
Empirical evidence shows that the inﬂux of immigrants generated by drug–related
violence actually had a positive eﬀect on real estate markets in Texas. Housing prices,
particularly at El Paso, remained steady even in the face of the recession largely because
162Figure 5.2: The Geography of Violence–driven Migration
Note: Number of drug–related refugees by quartile; estimations based in preferred
speciﬁcation.
163of the inﬂux of Mexicans buying properties (Rice, 2011). Completely new housing devel-
opments were constructed in Texas border cities like McAllen and Brownsville, many of
them speciﬁcally targeting Mexican markets, tastes, and needs. As a real estate devel-
oper in McAllen acknowledged, “the tendency is towards developing gated communities,
close to border bridges, with larger kitchens, and more rooms because our customers have
larger families and need to cross every day to Mexico to work.”17
Mexicans oftentimes moved with their businesses, especially when these businesses
were already targeted towards American consumers. Mexican restaurants, bars and hair
salons closed their doors in Mexico and re-opened in the U.S. Relocating allowed American
clients who were increasingly fearful of crossing into Mexico because of criminal turf
battles to maintain their regular spending habits, and most importantly, allowed Mexican
businessmen to avoid paying extortion fees.
Extortion was among the most economically damaging activities of Mexican crim-
inal organizations. Criminals initially used extortion to target illegal business such as
prostitution rings and casinos, industries in which the probability of being reported to
the police by the owner was exceedingly low. However, the extortion of businesses soon
extended into the legal sphere and became the most accessible means of quickly acquiring
cash for criminals. This crime deeply aﬀected business dynamics. High protection fees
and intimidation forced businesses to go into bankruptcy. Some have estimated that as
many as 700 businesses closed in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, in 2006 (Garza, 2009).18
17Interviewed by author, 2008
18However, business relocation is not an easy task and fails most of the time. Businesses cannot remain
proﬁtable paying U.S. salaries and following U.S. regulations. The move itself is costly, and even worse,
the attractiveness of business may be reduced by the change in location itself. What is considered a
164Estimates for Ju´ arez point to about 10,000 business closings from 2007 to 2010 (Torres,
2011b). Furthermore, extortion pushed some businessmen to take radical actions such as
creating organizations that resorted to violence for self-defense. In fact, some businessmen
in northern Mexico claim to be part of an association called “The Zeta Killers”—referring
to Zetas, a drug cartel well known for their participation in extortion and kidnapping.
The Zeta Killers have taken credit for the assassination of hundreds of Zetas.19 The bod-
ies of tortured traﬃckers regularly appeared in cities around Mexico like Boca del Rio,
Benito Ju´ arez, and Celaya next to messages signed by this group such as, “We are the
new group of the Zeta Killers and we are against kidnapping and extortion, and we will
ﬁght against them in all the states for a cleaner Mexico (sic) ” (SIPSE, 2009).
Besides ethnographic accounts, the exodus of businesses can be tracked to some
extent by the number of U.S. “Investors visas” (E1-E2) given to Mexican citizens. While
from 2001 to 2005 only 7,603 visas were granted, from 2006 to 2010 the number increased
to 31,066. Mexican businessmen have even started to organize themselves into self-support
clubs around the border. In El Paso, for example, a club named “La Red” (“The Net-
work”) provides new-comers with advice on how to relocate their business successfully
in the U.S. As of 2011, “La Red” has almost 500 members, most of them enrolled just
recently (Martinez and Torres, 2011).
The school system also changed in important ways. Oﬃcially, there is not way to
count the exact numbers of students who transferred from Mexican schools to El Paso
charming, local restaurant in Ju´ arez is often perceived as a low-quality venue by El Paso residents, who
are generally used to higher quality standards (Garza, 2009). Fulﬁlling legal requisites such as getting a
SSN and passing the ﬁre inspection is also diﬃcult for relocated business.
19Citizen, Interviewed by author, 2008
165School District, but some numbers provide evidence of Mexicans increasingly studying
in the U.S. The number of students enrolled in bilingual or Limited English Proﬁciency
programs increased by 1,330 students from 2007 to 2010, even as the total number of
students enrolled at the school district dropped from 45,049 in 2007 to 44,778 in 2010
(Martinez and Torres, 2011; Torres, 2011a).
Immigrants who moved due to violence also changed Mexican towns. The number
of unoccupied dwellings in Mexican border cities became quite high and correlates strongly
with the rates of drug–related homicides. According to census ﬁgures, in 2010, 26% of
all dwellings in Ju´ arez were unoccupied, 20% in Tijuana, and 19% in Mexicalli. Other
non-border cities facing drug-violence also had signiﬁcantly low levels of occupancy: Chi-
huahua was 15% empty, and Monterrey faced the same situation at an 11% rate (Martinez
and Torres, 2011).20 Some claim that forced migration impacted smaller, rural towns to
the point of creating de facto ghost towns. Instances in which teachers, doctors, police-
men, and public servants left their communities without previous notice fearing violent
episodes were recorded in the states of Tamaulipas, Michoac´ an, and Chihuahua (Zerme˜ no,
2011).
Ciudad Mier, a border county located south of Texas, is a quite impressive case
in this regard. My estimates account for a total displacement of about 430 individuals,
something considerable given that the city reports only 6,662 inhabitants. Most of Mier
migration happened in mid-2010 when Tony Tormenta, a Mexican drug-traﬃcker, was
20A poll conducted in Ju´ arez showed that only 6.95% of all dwellings were empty, totaling about 32,858
residencies (CIS, 2011). Figures are debatable.
166assassinated.21 Mier inhabitants, fearing violence and retaliation from Tony Tormenta
allies, left the city immediately, creating a true state of emergency. The exodus of at least
one-hundred families was so abrupt that Mexican authorities had to install a refugee camp
in a neighboring community (Guzm´ an, 2010). Other cases of refugee camps, in response
to traﬃckers’ turf battles, have also been created in Michoac´ an. In this Southern Mexican
state, forced and unexpected migration has displaced at least 2.5 thousand Mexicans into
refugee camps.22
Immigrants within Mexico favored cities with larger markets and employment op-
portunities for relocation. Mexico City, for example, became a quite attractive place
(MEPI and ITESM, 2011). In the past, few businessmen desired to move to Mexico
City because of its bureaucracy, the high cost of real estate, and lack of bank ﬁnancing.
Nonetheless, in 2010, about 6,500 businesses relocated into Mexico City coming from other
states (MEPI and ITESM, 2011). This relocation is not surprising given that Mexico City
has not experienced high levels of drug–related violence and, in fact, was safer in 2010
than at any point since 1994.
21Alfredo Corchado, interviewed by author, August, 4th, 2010
22Indeed, migration is not restricted to border communities but has also impacted other highly vio-
lent counties within the country. Journalistic accounts have identiﬁed at least seventy counties where
drug-violence has had important consequences for migration ﬂows, particularly in the Mexican states of
Chihuahua, Guerrero, Durango, Michoac´ an, Nuevo Le´ on, San Luis Potos´ ı, Sinaloa, Sonora y Tamaulipas
(Zerme˜ no, 2011).
1675.6 Final thoughts
“I know that we came here illegally, but at least we can sleep in peace now”
–Citizen of Ju´ arez relocated at El Paso (Torres, 2011b)
Much of the discussion, with respect to the consequences of Mexico’s drug vio-
lence for the U.S., focuses on whether violence may be spill-over from the border and may
soon injure American border towns. Little attention has been paid to other consequences
like increments in illegal Mexican immigration. This chapter has provided a broad un-
derstanding of the consequences of Mexico’s drug war for citizens and the U.S. in this
regard. Illegal migration has become increasingly appealing for Mexican citizens, who are
submerged in a war as third–party observers. In fact, a recent study measuring Ju´ arez
citizens’ opinion, with respect to moving out for security reasons, found that 55% of the
population would leave the city if they had the opportunity to do so (Torres, 2011a). The
policy implications are important: if we previously have thought migration ﬂows could be
stopped by increasing Mexico’s economic development, now we know that the task will
be more challenging. We will need ﬁrst to reduce violence.
In this chapter, I have portrayed a fascinating change in Mexican immigration
patterns. Immigration ﬁgures have reached their lowest point since 2000. Better socio-
economic conditions in Mexico and economic hardship in the U.S. are among the main
causes behind this trend. Yet even if the U.S. as a whole is receiving fewer Mexican
migrants, the opposite is true for cities located on the border. Cities in Texas and other
U.S. border states are not only receiving more Mexicans but also a diﬀerent type of
168migrant. New Mexican migrants belong to the upper and middle class and cross into the
U.S. legally, some even bringing their own businesses with them and buying property. As
a result, the face of some border towns has changed signiﬁcantly. Housing prices have
increased, many Mexican businesses have opened, and enrollment in English as a second
language school programs has gone up.
I have presented the ﬁrst quantitative evidence available, showing that the rea-
son behind these sui generis Mexican migration patterns cannot be found in traditional
explanations of migration dynamics. Mexicans are not crossing into the U.S. to get better-
paying jobs or to run away from economic hardship, –or at least economic factors are not
primary. Instead, I argue that Mexicans are migrating out of fear of drug–related violence
and extortion which has spiked since 2008. This fear is particularly strong in border coun-
ties where Mexican drug-traﬃcking organizations have caused large increases in homicides
rates, and where migration to the U.S. entails relatively low costs.
My estimates showed that, even controlling for normal conditions fostering mi-
gration, like employment and education, drug–related violence and extortion explain a
signiﬁcant part of migration ﬂows both within Mexico and from Mexico to the US. In
my preferred speciﬁcation (model 3), every one-point increase in the rate of drug–related
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is correlated with 6.34 Mexicans ﬂeeing their county
of residency. A total of 264,693 Mexicans have moved their residency in direct response
to drug–related homicides.
My methodology prevents me from disentangling some complexities in migration
patterns, e.g. the proportion of Mexicans who left violent cities to relocate to other
less-violent cities within Mexico versus those who did so in order to relocate to the U.S.
169Even so, it is clear from case studies of border communities, such as Mier and Ju´ arez,
that quite a signiﬁcant share of immigrants are actually crossing the border to live in the
U.S, particularly in Texas. Further research would be necessary to disentangle these two
diﬀerent migration destinations. The goal of this piece has been to show that traditional
economic factors, determining migration patterns from Mexico to the U.S. cannot account
for large, recent migration ﬂows.
For social sciences as a whole, my results provide empirical evidence that can im-
prove our understanding of migration studies. I demonstrate the beneﬁts, in this regard, of
considering variables related both to crime and to the behavior of non-state actors. The
decisions to relocate cannot be grasped entirely by our focus on cost-beneﬁt monetary
analysis and social capital. As I have shown, even the best estimates predicting migration
outﬂows are subject to important errors, unless we introduce as part of our indepen-
dent variables information about the dynamics of crime and violence within territories.
CONAPO’s estimates were ﬂawed in 2010 because Mexican demographers understated
the contributions that these variables have to migration dynamics.
I have also contributed to our understanding of puzzles long researched by conﬂict
scholars. In particular, the Mexican case provides tangible evidence of the precise ways in
which non-state actors aﬀect the decisions made by citizens and other agents within the
state. I have presented robust quantitative evidence to show that violence generated by
criminal organizations aﬀects the location of human capital within a polity. My numbers
show that academics researching the civilian burden of conﬂict (Wilson, 1997; Cullen and
Levitt, 1999; Oliver and Shapiro, 2006) were right to assert that violence has many and
170quite nuanced eﬀects that still need to be studied.
Conclusion
This work has advanced a theory of corruption, criminal organizations, and violence to
show how political institutions set incentives and constraints that inﬂuence how criminal
organizations behave, organize, compromise or ﬁght one other. My argument has shed
light on the reasons why many criminal organizations are able to operate proﬁtably with-
out major episodes of violence. The argument also illuminates the causes of Mexico’s
large increases in drug–related violence. As I have argued, the propensity of criminal
groups to deploy violence increases when formal or informal political institutions are de-
centralized because criminal organizations are less likely to be punished. Centralization
allows the government to internalize the costs of injurious criminal behavior; decentral-
ization does not. As a result, criminal organizations that use violence as their strategy of
problem-solving are punished with larger probability in decentralization.
In Short
My theory was been drawn out with a formal model, exempliﬁed with an analytical
narrative about Mexico’s drug traﬃcking industry, tested with an empirical study of
171Mexico’s cocaine markets, and taken one step further by explaining its consequences for
migration ﬂows.
I began by deﬁning decentralization. Decentralization indicates the degree to which
the government can make policy decisions as a cohesive, homogeneous decision-making
body. Centralized environments allow a top-layer of government to have a monopoly of
authority and to be a monocentric system with a single decision-making body. Decen-
tralized environments, on the contrary, are characterized by dispersed decision-making.
Under decentralization, multiple agencies make policy decisions across diﬀerent levels of
government, each of which exercises autonomy without regard for the authority of the
top-layer. As such, decentralization connotes many centers of decision-making that can
either be formally independent of each other or simply constitute a loose inter-dependent
system of relations.
I next presented a formal model. The formal model provided me with an appara-
tus to show the ways in which decentralization could shape criminal behavior. I showed
that decentralization (1) impacts the rules of corruption, (2) impacts the propensity of
competing groups to violently confront one another, and (3) increases their incentives
to arm themselves in order to be protected from potential confrontations. The insights
provided by the model can be summarized by three results and two remarks:
Result 1: Decentralization increases the total demand for bribes, and the total amount
of money that criminal groups need to pay to avoid prosecution.
Remark 1.1: Decentralization reduces top-level government’s utility by decreasing its
capacity to collect bribes
172Remark 1.2: The size of lower-level bribes is determined by the capacity of the top-level
government to punish lower-level governments.
Result 2: The propensity of criminal organizations violently to confront one another
increases in decentralized political regimes.
Result 3: Criminal organizations arm themselves only under decentralization.
These results provide a straight-forward intuition. First, decentralization makes
corruption relatively more expensive, because many levels of government need to be bribed
simultaneously in order to avoid prosecution (assuming that bribes are partial comple-
ments). Yet, even if corruption is more expensive, criminal groups still demand more
of it because by bribing levels of government that were previously not bribable, crimi-
nals get access to new sources of illegal proﬁt (assuming that bribes at diﬀerent levels of
government yield diﬀerentiated beneﬁts).
Second, criminals become more prone to violent behavior in decentralized institu-
tions, because security policy decisions cannot be made in a coordinated fashion among
diﬀerent levels of government. This dispersion of decision making power reduces the
probability that criminals will be punished because corruption agreements made with one
level of government may inhibit law enforcement operations conducted by another. It
also reduces punishment because diﬀerent governments may distrust each other, reducing
their willingness to share intelligence information. Furthermore, diﬀerent levels of govern-
ment may not be motivated to collaborate to enforce the law, which may leave criminal
organizations unpunished in certain jurisdictions.
Finally, because a decentralized government is one that cannot act with coordi-
173nation, government cannot eﬃciently protect criminal organizations from their enemies;
thus, in decentralized environments criminals are more likely to arm themselves. Without
a centralized command, diﬀerent governments may protect diﬀerent competing criminals,
creating unregulated confrontation for survival between groups that are enemies. When
corrupting one government does not entail the elimination (or control) of rival groups,
criminal organizations need to take their protection into their own hands and thus arm
themselves.
Next, I applied the model to my case study, Mexico. I aimed to understand
why drug traﬃcking organizations became increasingly violent after crackdowns con-
ducted since 2004, and particularly since 2007, and not after crackdowns conducted in the
nineties. The key, I argue, lies in the decentralization that Mexico faced during the late-
1990’s and 2000’s, which inhibited diﬀerent levels of government from deterring injurious
crimes. A centralized Mexican government, during the 1990’s, could punish belligerent
criminal organizations cohesively, along all its territory, independently of the jurisdiction
in which criminals operate. Those punished could not continue to conduct illegal business
because they would have lost the favor of the only potential source that might be cor-
rupted: a central government. The story was diﬀerent in the 2000’s when a decentralized
Mexican government was fractured and thus dysfunctional. Under such circumstances,
belligerent criminal organizations lost the favor of the government in which violence was
taking place, but they could still remain in business by appealing to the government of
another jurisdiction. The enemies of one government could still be the friends of another
government, making violent confrontation less costly and more probable.
Patterns of criminal violence are understandable once decentralization is consid-
174ered. If in the nineties, criminal organization remained peaceful after the capture of their
leader, it was because they needed to be. Centralization had created such a necessity. In
contrast, in the 2000’s criminal organizations like that of Beltr´ an Leyva split into factions
that fought each other for turf because now they could. Decentralization had allowed
them to do so.
My theory was tested empirically. I showed that decentralized municipalities23
have lower levels of control over criminal behavior than centralized ones. As a result,
drug traﬃckers defy the government by supplying cocaine in Mexico’s domestic markets
in municipalities where diﬀerent levels of government are ruled by diﬀerent political elites.
I presented logits, proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates, and matching
exercises to support this theory. Indeed, my empirical tests showed a negative signiﬁcant
and robust relationship between centralization and lack of domestic drug markets. I
interpret this result as evidence of a higher control of criminal activities by governments
that can act coordinately.
Finally, I concluded this dissertation with a chapter on the role of drug violence
in patterns of migration. The chapter presented an empirical speciﬁcation to assess the
correlation between high levels of drug–related violence and migration outﬂows. Addi-
tionally, the chapter also estimated the total number of Mexicans who had migrated out
of their home communities fearing drug violence and extortion.
23Centralized municipalities were empirically operationalized as those in which the same party rules
diﬀerent levels of government.
175The Contribution
As a whole, this work has been an eﬀort to show the role that decentralization has in
shaping corruption and criminal violence, and an attempt to rationalize the behavior of
criminal groups and their interactions with government oﬃcials within the context of po-
litical science. Three main contributions, for political science and policy research, may
be highlighted. First, in response to Blattman and Miguel (2010)’s seminal work on civil
wars literature, my work proposes a tangible institutional design which encourages con-
fronting groups to compromise rather than to ﬁght. I have shown that decentralization
is an institutional design which sets the condition for criminal groups to behave more or
less violently by impacting the probability of punishment. Second, following Helmke and
Levitsky (2006), I have shown how the state can change informally, in its structure, even
while remaining formally intact. My argument stresses an urgent task for political scien-
tists: to analyze the role of informal rules in shaping decisions taken by non-state actors.
Finally, and more broadly, this work has shown that social sciences would greatly beneﬁt
from questioning the common assumption that insurgency groups always antagonize the
state. I encourage the discipline to consider cases in which insurgency groups cooperate
with it.
My ﬁrst contribution is to describe an institutional design that can diminish vi-
olence. This design (i.e. centralization combined with diﬀerent levels of government)
induces potentially violent groups to compromise, agreeing peacefully to resolve conﬂicts,
rather than to confront one other. Indeed, my argument indicates how institutional de-
signs, even if they are not directly involved in controlling violence, nevertheless may do
176so. Indeed, even if the relationship between centralized political control in Mexico and
criminal violence was not immediately evident, my work brought the importance of this
relationship to the forefront. Yet, this is only one of the many indirect ways in which
institutional design may impact the capacity of the state to induce peace. Many more
will be found in future research.
A second contribution comes from arguing Helmke and Levitsky (2006) in favor
of introducing informal institutions into a debate that has largely been centered on un-
derstanding formal mechanisms that induce groups to ﬁght (Tajima, 2010). I have shown
that not only formal rules, but also informal rules, dictate the motivations and actions
of insurgency groups. If we ignore the role of informal rules, we will be unable properly
to understand the relationship between non-state actors and the state, even more so in
cases in which non-state actors, as criminal enterprises, operate in illegal markets. My
case study has demonstrated that criminal incentives in Mexico changed radically when
diﬀerent levels of government lost their informal means for collaborating with one an-
other. In a federal country like Mexico, one that does not allow reelection at any level of
government, cooperation between diﬀerent levels of government is mostly driven by party
loyalties. Even if Mexico had always been a federal government, in a formal sense, de jure,
it only became a federal government de facto when informal centralization ended. There
may be many more instances, like Mexico, in which the behavior of state and non-state
actors remain unexplained if one disregards the role of the informal mechanisms.
Finally, by framing my puzzle within the civil wars literature, I contribute to
elucidate the limitations of this literature, particularly those that come from the broadly
accepted but quite strong assumption that non-state violent groups want to overthrow the
177ruling elite (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Unlike the non-state violent groups that this
literature identiﬁes, criminal organizations are not always interested in overthrowing a
government or ruling over a territory. Actually, as the case of Mexico has shown, criminal
groups may prefer to collude with a government that is strong, strong and corrupt, and
that can provide them with the protection that they need to keep conducting business
without having to invest in arming themselves. The civil wars literature will greatly
beneﬁt from eliminating its assumptions about the motivations of insurgency groups (i.e.
taking over the state). Many of the conclusions to which this literature has arrived belong
to the same side of a coin: understanding insurgency groups that antagonize the state.
A whole side of the coin remains unexplored. Much and fruitful research will come from
understanding non-state violent groups that under certain circumstances mat prefer to
collude with the state rather than to antagonize it. What the civil war literature has
analyzed so far is a special case of what could be a broader understanding of non-state
violent actors.
Policy implications
A most important policy implication stems from my study. Institutional environments
matter for policy outcomes, particularly because they change the way groups react to
policies. Indeed, much has been said about the necessity to assess contextual variables
when predicting the outcomes of policies (Rodrik, 2006). Yet, there has been no systematic
discussion, to my knowledge, of how contexts are to be evaluated, nor of the variables to be
considered as part of this context. I have shown how organizational structure matters for
178policy evaluations and outcomes. As the case of Mexico indicates, when security policies
were implemented in the form of crackdowns in decentralized settings, criminal violence
rose. When the same crackdowns were implemented in centralized settings, violence was
contained.
Understanding the role that organizational structure plays in inducing outcomes
has proven crucial in many more instances. Borrowing and lending policies have diﬀerent
outcomes depending on how the banking structure is organized (Evrensel, 2008). Actually,
because of its extremely complex and interdependent banking structure, housing policies
in the U.S. gave rise to a credit bubble, resulting in the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. If banks
had been organized as independent actors, it would have been easier to identify highly
risky debt, and thus, housing policies might not have led to the same credit bubble. More
examples are to be found in the emerging literature about varieties of capitalism (Hall
et al., 2001). This literature demonstrates that diﬀerent forms of capital organization
favor investments, in diﬀerent areas, and thus make some economies more resilient to
shocks than others. Indeed, similar growth-inducing policies may generate diﬀerent eﬀects
according to how ﬁrms are organized.
For the case of Mexico, the main policy implication is that drug-violence will not
diminish until the country ﬁnds formal and informal ways to coordinate its diﬀerent levels
of government, increasing the probability of punishing criminals.
Reducing drug-violence must be a priority for Mexico because its costs are quite
signiﬁcant. The negative social eﬀect of 51,000 drug–related homicides is quite consider-
able. The ﬁgure represents doubled homicide rates in Mexico within the last ﬁve years.
Economically, the cumulative burden of ﬁve years of drug–related homicides (2007- 2011)
179can be estimated as 26.6 billion dollars, 2.3% of Mexico’s GDP. 24
First, to reduce criminal violence, Mexican institutions must formally change to
make punishment more probable. The Mexican state needs to be able to properly enforce
the law against criminals. This will require the creation of a better and more eﬃcient
judicial system, one in which oﬀenders are actually sentenced.
Few criminals are punished in Mexico, making crime a really low-risk endeavor.
Only 31% of all Mexicans believe that after committing a crime they will be punished,
much less than the 65% (average) of Latin America (University, 2010). Yet, even that
number is an overestimation. In fact, only 6.2% of all the crimes committed in Mexico
are sentenced.25
This criminal justice problem begins with underreporting. It is estimated that
about 87.7% of all the crimes committed in Mexico in 2011 were never reported26 (INEGI,
24Following standard practices (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008), and assuming each individual is responsible
for an equal contribution to the country’s GDP, it can be estimated that the value of life for the average
Mexican citizen is close to 777 thousand dollars. Mexico’s GDP in 2011 was 1.155 trillion dollars (INEGI,
2012b). With a (rounded) population of 114 million in that same year (INEGI, 2010), each Mexican
contributes to the economy with $10,132 dollars. Assuming a life expectancy of 76.7 years (INEGI,
2010), the total added value over a life time would be $777,092 dollars per Mexican. Following a similar
criteria, the value of the life of an American citizen would be $3,794,334 (GDP of 15.09 trillion, 331
million inhabitants, 78.2 expected years of life (Agency, 2011)). These are rough estimates that do not
take account of multiplicative eﬀects, and that have not been weighted by the productive capacity of
victims (inﬂuenced by variables like education, age, location and work experience, to name a few). An
alternative way to quantify the costs of homicide is by measuring the Disability Adjusted Life Years
(Murray, 1994), a measure of years lost due to violent premature death. Assuming that the average age
of a homicide victim is 25, the war against drugs in Mexico has caused a loss of 23 years of life for each
of 100,000 inhabitants from 2007 to 2011.
25This is a conservative estimate done explicitly for this report, by relying on information from Mexican
census oﬃces and victimization surveys (INEGI, 2012b). Other estimates like (Zepeda Lecuona, 2004)
have argued that only 1.2% of all criminals are sentenced.
26In 2010, the same source recorded 87% (INEGI, 2012a). Older surveys that followed a diﬀerent
methodology argue that the ﬁgure is only 78% 27.
1802012a). In rural states like Guerrero and Michoac´ an, more than 93.6% of the crimes
are never reported (INEGI, 2012a). States like Baja California (South and North) and
Queretaro have the highest record of reporting with 76.6% or more (INEGI, 2012a). When
citizens are asked why they don t report crime, most argue (34.5%) that it is a waste of
time, or that they distrust the authority (16.5%) (INEGI, 2012a). Indeed, reporting is
diﬃcult and time consuming. Actually, in 47% of the cases, reporting a crime takes
three hours or more (INEGI, 2012a). If a crime is reported, prosecutors take an average
of 226 days to prepare a case and bring it to a judge (Presidencia, 2012). Even after
a case is ready, oﬃcial records show that legal actions are only taken in 87% of the
cases(Presidencia, 2012).
Actually, out of the total number of cases processed, only 55% are sentenced28 (IN-
EGI, 2012a). The capacity to sentence varies by state. This variation may be explained by
diﬀerentials in the resources of prosecutors and their work load. The federation manages
to sentence 61%, while local authorities only sentence 53% (INEGI, 2011). Local govern-
ments ruling over poor and rural areas like Oaxaca or Guerrero only sentence between
18% and 22% of the cases; urban areas like Mexico City or states like Baja California or
Guanajuato, sentence more than 74% of the cases (INEGI, 2011).
Until Mexico formally ﬁxes its judicial system so as properly to enforce the law,
violence will remain as a distinct option for criminal groups.
Second, to reduce criminal violence, Mexico will also need to coordinate its diﬀerent
levels of government, even if they belong to diﬀerent parties. Incentives most be set for
28About 27% of citizens claim that after reporting a crime “absolutely nothing” happened (INEGI,
2012a)
181politicians to react more directly to the needs of their constituency than to their party
labels. The most important institutional feature, to this end, is reelection. It is because
Mexico lacks reelection that politicians are strongly driven by party incentives. Under
Mexico’s electoral rules, it is the party, and not Mexican citizens which allows politicians
to maintain successful careers as public servants. To modify electoral rules in Mexico, so
as to allow for reelection, would motivate diﬀerent parties to cooperate and agree, thereby
pleasing their common electorate. By contrast, without such electoral changes, parties
will continue to disagree, as they do now, based on political loyalties.
It is important to note that, just recently, drug–related violence has started to
diminish in Mexico. In 2012 drug–related homicides may have reached a plateau (Insti-
tute, 2012)29. This type of homicide appears to have started diminishing, at least within
cities that were considered the most problematic. In 2011, drug–related homicides only
increased 11% nationally, and violence in Ciudad Juarez, the most violent city in Mexico,
was 40% lower than in 2010. The ﬁrst six months of 2012 have seen only 75% of the homi-
cides observed in the same period of the previous year. Northern states like Chihuahua,
Durango, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon have experienced between 494 and 362 fewer cases
each. It will take some time to assess whether this tendency will remain and extend to
all of Mexico, mostly because some other states have witnessed opposite tendencies.30
29The Trans-Border Institute has systematically recorded cases of drug–related homicides as reported
by the Mexican newspaper Reforma. Reforma is the only source that has had a weekly count of drug–
related homicides since 2006 until today. Oﬃcial ﬁgures (SNSP 2011) are available only since December
2006 and until September 2011. For years in which both sources are available, TBI underestimates oﬃcial
ﬁgures by 30% but follows similar trends (Yearly correlation = 0.995)
30The state of Coahuila, for example, had a 52% increase in drug–related homicides in 2012 as compared
to 2011
182At least two reasons can be given for this decline in violence. The ﬁrst is that
indeed, after six years of battling organized crime and reforming its judicial system, se-
curity policies in Mexico are ﬁnally increasing the probability of punishment enough as
to reduce violence propensity among criminals. A second reason has to do with the role
of civil society to promote informal collaboration among diﬀerent levels of governments.
Six years of criminal factions battling for turf have generated a large number of smaller
criminal organizations that rely on diﬀerent criminal activities to survive, besides drug
traﬃcking. As a result, the problem of criminal violence has become a ﬁrst priority on the
agenda at every level of government. Incentives for cooperation among diﬀerent levels of
government have improved as civil society has begun to pressure all levels of government
to provide solutions.
The Road Ahead
Future research in three areas is particularly promising: (a) criminal peace, (b) measuring
drug violence at the sub-national level, (c) identifying the geographic dynamics of violence
contagion.
First, criminal peace may be enforced by criminal organizations themselves, in-
dependently of institutional design. Indeed, decentralization increases criminal violence,
but it does not necessarily cause immediate violent eruptions. As this work has shown,
in Mexico violence only emerged when crackdowns gave incentives for criminal cells to
fracture and engage in turf battles. An equilibrium may exist in which criminal groups
operate peacefully even while facing institutional designs that are not favorable to peace.
183Even in the face of crackdowns, we can imagine a scenario in which violence is too costly
for criminal groups. It remains to be asked where the cost threshold is, for bringing about
such a beneﬁcial result, and what is the most cost-eﬀective policy that the government
may undertake to this end.
Second, the empirical test provided in this work relied on a proxy measure of
criminal behavior: domestic cocaine sale. Future research will need to address my theory
using violence as a dependent variable. To do so, measures of drug–related violence must
be provided for the years before 2006 and at the sub-national level. The key lies in being
able to identify drug–related homicides and diﬀerentiate them with respect to general
homicides.
Third, the logic of criminal violence may not necessarily follow the same territorial
lines as states or sub-national units. Criminal territories may be more complex than
interstate boundaries. In order to properly analyze how the structure of the state aﬀects
violence, further research will be needed about the areas of operation of criminal groups.
This research may inquire as to how violence spreads and moves geographically, identifying
whether criminal areas of operation overlap (or not) with interstate boundaries. Network
analysis and geographical correlations using mapping programs are methodological tools
that will be useful to accomplish this task.
As part of my broader research agenda, I have created two data sets to address
areas of research here discussed. In one data set, I identiﬁed where and when drug–
related homicides started in Mexico. Using an algorithm of multiple imputation and
Bayesian statistics (Honaker et al., 2012) to infer the levels of violence that traﬃcking
organizations exerted from 2000 to 2010, I create the ﬁrst available historical measure of
184drug–related violence in Mexico. Drawing from this data-set, I can now present evidence
of large increases in criminal violence previous to the administration of Mr. Calder´ on.
I further undermine those who argue that the escalation of drug–related homicides was
solely the result of security strategies, implemented during his administration (Osorno,
2009; Aguilar and Casta˜ neda, 2010).
In another exercise, I have mapped the areas of operation of traﬃcking organiza-
tions, in an unprecedented eﬀort to track the activities of criminal groups using autom-
atized search algorithms, Google news, and network analysis (Coscia and Rios, 2012).
The maps provide crucial information on behavior and mobility patterns of criminal or-
ganizations. This previously unknown and novel methodology is useful for researchers,
in a number of diﬀerent disciplines, and will generate accurate intelligence information
at low cost. The information supports my theory by showing diﬀerentiated patterns of
criminal expansion in centralized and decentralized environments. Criminals tend to ex-
pand and split more when they are armed, and when they operate under decentralized
environments.
Overall, studying how government structure inﬂuences the behavior of non-state
actors is a large and fruitful research agenda. This work is only one building block of the
many puzzles awaiting answers.
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